MR. GLADSTONE ON THE CONCERT OF EUROPE.
IT is evident from Mr. Gladstone's resolute speech of Satur- day, a speech which delighted the House, quieted even Mr. Cowen, and reduced Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett to his natural position, that of a perky political quidnunc, that the Govern- ment adheres determinately to its avowed policy in the East. It will carry out the spirit of the Treaty or Berlin,—assign territory to Montenegro, sufficient to enable the mountaineers to live without brigandage ; restore to Greece two of her three provinces on the mainland ; establish endurable order in Macedonia ; and save the Armenians at all events from open outrage ; and it will do these things, if it be only possible, through the European Concert. The Jingo Tories, the friends of Turkey, the Jews, and the jobbers in Turkish Bonds, whose influence in the Continental Press is,mosbbunfortunately, great, are naturally very angry, and as they cannot very well attack the Berlin Treaty, which they helped to make, though they intended to work that Treaty in a very different spirit, they pour out sarcasms op Mr. Gladstone's method. The European concert, they say, is a delusion. The Powers being all selfish and all contemptuous of humanity, and all armed, some of them will break loose. Collective Europe has no means of action except through a Fleet, and at a Fleet the heroic Turks, who have a talent for jeering as well as fighting, will only jeer. In spite of these assertions, which come out every day, as each new movement is made, as if they were produced by machinery—and certainly they are not produced spon- taneously—a great Fleet, commanded by a British Admiral, and really representing " Europe," as far as Europe has con- cerned itself in the Eastern Question, is assembled at Ragusa. The European concert has stood firm so far as to produce a collective demonstration which, as we will presently strive to show, is of a very formidable kind. And it was natural that it should stand firm. Those who ridicule the idea of a Euro- pean concert forget that for forty years, from 1814 to 1854, a concert of Europe for certain purposes did exist ; that the Five Powers acted on many points as a kind of tribunal, and that they succeeded thereby in maintaining peace till the nations, which were for a generation almost exhausted, had recovered their resources. The statesmen of Europe, who, if selfish, are not silly, know the advantage of that accord, the great check it places upon, at all events, minor disturbances, and are not unwilling to renew it, while they have in the Eastern Question an immediate and pressing motive for acting
together. They know that two at least of the Powers are under strong temptations to act alone in the question, and in acting alone may come into collision, and produce a general and destructive war. They also know that it is in the power of the South Slave and the Greeks, if exasperated beyond endurance by the oppression of the Ottoman caste, to provoke this war from below. They are further aware that in provoking it, the Greeks, at 'all events, could appeal with ease to the cosmopolitan Revolution, and produce a situa- tion which the Courts regard with even an exaggerated dread. What, then, more natural than that as they have,through the co- operation of England, the means not only of acting in concert, but of using an effective weapon, the Fleet, of which they are not afraid, because they can restrict and define its action, they should adhere to an accord which restrains individual am- bitions, yet may remove the temptation of the Greeks a,nd 'South Slays to force their hands? They do not want war, though they might engage in it rather than allow certain changes. Many journalists write as if they thought statesmen on the Continent had a secret longing for war ; whereas there is not one of them who does not perceive its risks, foresee with alarm the internal changes which may follow either victory or defeat, and quail at the condition in which a European war would leave the Treasuries. While they hold together they have nothing to fear, and up to a point they will, we believe, barring an accident, like an explosion in Constantinople, strive to remain in harmony. What that point may ultimately be is not yet defined, for the longer the accord holds, and the more effective it is found, the more unwilling will the states- men be to give it up ; but at present, the Treaty of Berlin defines it. The very object of that Treaty, always reserving that stupid clause of Lord Beaconsfield's by which Bulgaria was divided, in order that he might appear to have done some- thing, was to define the length to which changes might be carried without producing a conflagration. Much greater questions were left unsettled, but so far, the Powers would not see in changes in Turkey declarations of war. Up to the limits of that Treaty, therefore, the statesmen who drew it know that, with reasonable care and an unreasonable amount of trouble, the accord might be maintained.
But, say the objectors, the weapon provided—the European Fleet—is of no use. If the Sultan is firm, Europe must give way, or employ some great Power as its mandatory to use mili- tary force, and so break up the concert. Let us look at that a little closer. It is undoubtedly greatly to be regretted that if the Great Powers intend to reconstitute themselves as an informal tribunal for the prevention of war—which is what they are doing now—they cannot induce some small Power to lend them ten or twelve thousand men as an executive force. Such a European Legion would treble their authority, and if the concert is ever formulated, will have to be provided ; but a fleet is not so futile an instrument as it is deemed. As against any maritime Power, a European Fleet is a powerful weapon, can blockade any port, isolate any island, destroy any marine, and intercept any commerce, and as against any but a first-class State, can do these things without being resisted. For if the Power under discipline re- sists, it must fire ; and if it fires, there is war. No Govern- ment could exist which did not permit its fleet to return the fire of an enemy. To fire on Europe is to court destruction, and except under a sense of despair, the hazard would not be encountered. That being the general state of affairs, let us see how it applies to Turkey. Turkey always fights by land, and is therefore assumed to be beyond reach ; but she is in one sense the most maritime Power in the world,—that is, a fleet can do her the greatest harm. Her capital is a seaport. She is full of undefended islands, open ports, and maritime pro- vinces, in which the mere sanction of Europe, understood from the appearance of the fleet, would produce universal insurrec- tion. Syria has been quite recently within hours of independ- ence. A fleet can cut off all the Greek Islands, or shut the Sea of Marmora, or occupy Salonica, or by appearing off Smyrna raise all Syria, not to mention its final power of dividing Europe from Asia, and so reducing Constantinople. Turkey beyond the action of a fleet I Why, a single British war-ship at Jeddah would make the Grand Shereef independent, and termi- nate Turkish rule throughout the Arabian world. A European Fleet, as against any maritime Power a powerful weapon, is against Turkey the most deadly that can be employed, and the one most difficult to resist. The Sultan may, of course, stake all, but though he leans on the fanatical party, he is himself, like most kings, no fanatic ; is well aware that if the Fleet cannot reach Albanians, Albanians cannot reach the Fleet ; knows the Syrian danger thorohghly, and, we are bound to add, met it with nerve and decision ; and has a healthy dread of a war with a Power which he might defeat, but which he would not be allowed to crush, and which could set all his European territories on fire. If the European con- cert holds, and he does not yield, he will have to encounter the tremendous shock which any overt action of the Fleet, or part of it, would give to his authority, and he is not likely to bring on that catastrophe. He may, but such action is hardly within reasonable calculation, and it is on reasonable calculation that statesmen must frame their plans. If the cession is made, the Montenegrin danger and the Greek danger will be averted, a considerable further section of Turkey will be emancipated, and Europe may wait for a moment quietly to see whether the Sultan has learned from those events any lesson. It will have learned one for itself of some importance,—that Europe, when in accord, is, even in the most disorganised corner of the world, an effective and, in- deed, irresistible Tribunal. Diplomatists knew that at Vienna sixty-five years ago, and it is well that their knowledge should be revived.
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