POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS Sia,—The confusion of arguments and ideas
which was re- leased by the fiasco of the Finnish War and the wishful pursuit of new " trends " and " hints " which has accompanied the recent diplomatic events seem to reveal a dangerous muddle of political strategy and tactics. We should be on our guard, therefore, against enthusiastic handling of ad hoc develop- ments which may, actually, be traps and only serve, by con- fusing issues, to perplex and divide opinion at home and abroad, by drawing it away from fundamentals.
We must, for instance, beware of that wishful thinking which, right up to last August, based European politics on the " in- evitable " antagonism of Nazi Germany and the U.S.S.R.—and which now seeks evidence for itself. The well-meaning enthusiasts who believe that the Soviets are anxious to be received into the European comity and are cnly waiting for a sincere invitation, have as their exact counterparts the admirers of Goering, who assert that he is only waiting for his opportunity—only just round the corner—of making Ger- many decent. Both may be right, but let us, also, examine quite another possibility.
The U.S.S.R. and Germany are the most highly developed forms of revolutionary dictatorship, with economic and social structures more and more closely resembling each other. Their common enemy must be the freer communities, whose con- tinuous existence and power are a visible proof that the world does not belong to dictatorships. Obviously, if- the great democratic Powers are destroyed, however, the smaller units cannot survive. Therein lies the significance of the German and Soviet propaganda—which during the last year or so have become strikingly alike—against the " pluto-democracies," &c. Thus Nazism and Bolshevism may well have a primary aim of political strategy—the destruction of the freedom conception of society, and, therefore, the common enemy must be the great democratic Powers. Such a strategical objective can best be pursued by undermining democratic morale everywhere, and it leaves the two partners almost complete tactical freedom —including that of safeguarding themselves against each other's possible treachery.
If that is the main aim, then, a German victory is not necessarily against the Soviet's interests: Germany then becomes a maritime Power, with outlets to the Atlantic and Colonial loot—her energies are much more likely to be employed in the West than to be turned back to seek a new quarrel in the East. On the other hand, an unsuccessful Germany may be more liable to be persuaded by the Allies to "switch the war" and turn-East. To a successful Germany, also, Soviet domination of the Baltic and Black Seas is unim- portant, as long as she holds the exits and controls the oceans: in fact, if by limited successes, the U.S.S.R. can be kept out of major adventures and build up supplies to Germany, this is to the latter's advantage. Why, in fact, should Germany attack and the U.S.S.R. get engaged in the war? Is it not much better to build up a ring of terrorised neutrals and develop supplies between the two factions : this will take time, and for that " peace " is essential. Meanwhile, the campaign of frustrating and deceiving the democracies will go on: the real significance of the Finnish War is the demonstration that democracies, in spite of their professed ideals, &c., are either unwilling or incapable (or both) of effectively helping each other.
The confusion of ideas on aggression is also stressed by playing on the uncertain attitude of the Allies to the U.S.S.R.—whereby aggression by Germany is somehow made the greater crime : this is suggestive of the war being, in fact, an Imperialistic one against Germany, and the neutrals are invited to draw their own conclusions. This technique by the dictators has had effect, and the morale among the neutrals is bad ; if we are now to "intensify the war," we must he careful to define our aims and build up our case. We must, however, build up our case in such a way that all peaceful nations can see in it a genuine hope for the future.
Above all, let us beware of divided counsels by trying to foresee possible alternatives. Obscurity of aim and motives and lack of appreciation of political strategy and tactics cap so confuse public opinion that it may press the Government to acts which may be costly at home and abroad.—Yours faith-
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