THE NEW FRONTIER POLICY IN INDIA. T HE orders issued by
Lord Curzon for the manage- ment of the North-West Frontier mark an im- portant change in the policy of the Government of India. The Forward school, who have governed the Empire for the last ten years, have received a severe check. They reject with contumely the idea that the vast range of the Himalaya, a gigantic wall some 15,000 ft. high, will, if its gates are closed, do sufficiently well for a frontier, contend that the whole range of mountainous country from Peshawur to the Hindoo Koosh is the glacis of the Indian fortress, and desire that it should be thoroughly subjugated and garrisoned. With this view they have built forts, occupied Quetta, seized Chitral, and fought a war in which they employed sixty thousand men to sub- jugate the wild clans holding the valleys between the Punjab and Afghanistan. They intend avowedly to reach the Hindoo Koosh in the end, and their preparations have already cost the Empire a permanent addition of four millions a year to its military expenditure, and a "lock up" of at least eight thousand of our best troops,— Europeans, Ghoorkas, and Sikhs. The gain is certainly not equal to the expenditure of energy and treasure, for Afghanistan is still only kept friendly by a heavy subsidy, the restless clansmen are as devoted as ever to the amuse- ment of war, and our power of mobilising rapidly and easily has not been improved. Indeed, it seemed to distant observers of the recent Frontier War as if the Indian Army had suffered somewhat in its organisation, and as if the supply departments, more especially that of transport, had become more cumbrous and inefficient. Tales were told of the difficulty of moving artillery, of the numbers of camp-followers, and of the cost of getting the hosts of animals required which revived the shameful recollections of the Crimea. Still, the Forward party was full of hope, and accepted Lord Curzon's appointment as a guarantee that it would at last be let loose, and allowed, at a cost which, as Lord Roberts said in the House of Lords, was no business of theirs, to carry out all the operations necessary to prepare for a future conquest of Afghanistan. It had already obtained either full sanction or provisional consent to very large plans "which involved the construc- tion of large fortifications and the maintenance of an unreduced garrison in the Chitral Valley, to the expendi- ture of several lakhs on the construction of a new fort at Lanai Kotal and other fortified works on a large scale in the Khaibar, to building or laying the bed of a. Khaibar railway, to considerable additional expenditure on the forts and garrisons on the Samana range, and, as regards the Tochi Valley, to maintaining a large permanent garrison of regular troops, to establishing a central cantonment at Miranshah, and there and elsewhere to acquiring sites for the accommodation of the proposed garrisons. Similarly, Wana was to be maintained with a regular garrison to guard the Gomal route and Waziristan."
Lord Curzon, acting, as appears from Lord George Hamilton's speech of Monday, in full accord with the home authorities, has thrown tbe Forwards over, and has substituted for their plans, with their vast expense and heavy demand upon the regular Army, another, which will cost comparatively little, yet increase, if an emergency arises, our means of striking rapidly and hard. The Regulars are to be drawn back within our own dominion, and the impor- tant places within the clansmen's territory entrusted to Militia regiments raised from among the clans themselves, but trained and commanded by British officers. These new regiments, which will be filled at once by clansmen eager for pay, excitement, and fighting, which is to them what hunting is to English squires, will be supported by two or three movable columns organised within our own frontier, but always ready to start at twelve hours' notice, and with power of movement assured by a system of light railways on the 2 ft. 6 in. gauge connected with each other and with the railway system of British India. When they are complete, which will be speedily, for the Empire, as Lord George Hamilton explained on Monday, has "a. record surplus" of nearly five millions, the whole army stationed throughout Northern India will be in touch with the frontier, and will be able to reinforce any threatened point exactly to the extent which the officers on the spot conceive to be required. There will be no necessity for the immense effort made in the late war, no dislocation of all permanent arrangements, no calling out of entire corps d'arniee, but a transfer of troops from safe points to menaced points which ought to be effected as readily, and almost as rapidly, as it would be effected in Germany if Paris elected a military Dictator. The result of these measures, it is stated in an explana- tory telegram, obviously a communique; "will be a net annual saving of many lakhs to the Indian Exchequer, the restoration to the offensive strength of the Indian Army of the very considerable quota now habitually lost by service in advanced garrisons, and the conciliation of the tribes by the offer to secure to them well-paid employ- ment in the defence of their own country," and will also be the change of the whole frontier policy from a series of spasmodic and ill-considered efforts, made too large by fear lest any reverse should shock English opinion, into a scheme of steady and permanent defence, working easily at small expense and admirable for everything except further conquest. No source of strength is surrendered, for the moment the railways are completed the mobility of the Indian Army towards the frontier will be greatly increased, while the frontier force itself will be concentrated on threatened spots more quickly than it could be while locked up in scattered and distant mountain fortresses.
We need not say that we cordially approve of the new policy. It has always been our contention that the Himalaya furnishes a natural wall to the huge Peninsula, and that if the passes in that range were strongly held, no enemy would be able to invade through them. Russians or Tartars, they would have to conquer Afghanistan and all the fighting frontier clans before they reached us, who would be posted in full force at the debouchures of the passes, with all India, that is, with one of the greatest and best provided of military Mon- archies, for our base. If in such a position we could not defend ourselves against an enemy who must cross eight hundred miles of the worst country in the world, swarm- ing with enemies whom we should arm and direct, while we obtained assistance from England and called the Sikhs to arms, India is indefensible from the North, and we must submit to our fate. We have always, we say, maintained this, and now this policy appeals to our reason more than ever. We are expanding in every direction, and though that expansion is, for the most part, unavoidable, and may produce brilliant results, there can be no doubt that it is beginning even now somewhat to strain our resources in men. To hold the Nile, and the Niger, and perhaps the Yangtse, in addition to all we held in 1857, is a most serious and exhausting effort, and to add to obligations so vast that of garrisoning one of the wildest regions of earth, held by a population which loves battle, which is universally armed, and which is intermittently moved by bursts of religious fanaticism, must be most unwise. India already locks up seventy thousand of our best men, and to compel ourselves to raise that garrison to a hundred thousand without absolute necessity seems to us reckless almost to fatuity. Almost any alternative would be preferable, and the one which Lord Curzon now offers will leave us in a stronger position than we ever occupied before. That it will save millions is a subordinate advantage, but still it is an advantage. We cannot hold India without money, or do our duty to our subjects without it either, and though the revenue of India is large and its trade beginning to prosper—it is still absurdly small when compared with the trade of Ceylon—the Empire is liable to sudden calamities, its Treasury has no reserve worth mentioning, and its financiers so far have made no effort to extinguish or reduce its Debt. In a country whose taxation cannot be suddenly increased a surplus is one condition of safety, and the quickest road to a surplus is to abandon the policy of the Forward school, and by connecting the practicable passes with the Indian railway system render them impassable for any foe who has not previously defeated the entire Indian Army.
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