CORRESPONDENCE.
THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE BALKAN&
[To TEE EDITOR 07 SUR " SPECTATOR...1
Sut,—Excessive enthusiasm for the triumphs of Balkan unity has been replaced in Western Europe by excessive disgust at the fratricidal strife between the former allies, and by an inclination to ignore its underlying causes. Meaningless phrases about "the squalid war" blind the general public to the fact that Europe, by its interference in Albania, is at least as responsible for this new conflict as by its earlier neglect of Macedonia for last winter's war. By a real irony of fate Austria-Hungary was the first to enforce the principle of nationality in Albania, while trampling it under foot in Croatia and Transylvania ; and it was this very action which disturbed the balance of the alliance, and rendered a general settlement on the basis of nationality finally impossible. Bulgaria, whose true racial claims lie in Macedonia, was too shortsighted to back her Servian ally further west, and failed to realize that her own policy in Thrace knocks the bottom out of the whole principle of nationality. The first elementary condition of such a solution would be the restitution of Adrianople and a large portion of Thrace to the Turks, and the cession of Kavala and Sores to Greece. This is, of course, absurdly impossible ; but an admis- sion of its impossibility is merely another way of saying that the Balkan problem cannot he solved on purely eninographic lines. Bulgaria has merely confused the issue by asserting that it is purely a question of fulfilling the terms of the treaty of alliance. The situation which dictated those terms had already been radically transformed before the time for execution had arrived ; and other vital and compli- cated issues are involved on both sides. The real question is how to reconcile the rival claims of nationality, geography, and economic interests with the necessary balance of power in the Peninsula. The ideal solution, to-day as ever, would be the autonomy of Macedonia as a member of the federated Balkan States; but, unhappily, this is no longer practical politics, since all the rival States oppose it and Europe lacks the power or inclination to enforce it.
The charges and countercharges or treachery must not be taken too seriously. On the one hand, the fact that the first aggression came from the Bulgarian side cannot fairly be regarded as discreditable; for the Servians, being in posses- sion of the disputed territory, were able to say, "Come and take it," and the Bulgarians thus had the alternative of giving way altogether or taking the first step. On the other hand, Servia's repudiation of the treaty finds its justification in the fact that Bulgaria's pledge of assistance (100,000 men for Macedonia) was not carried out, while Servia without any obligation supplied fifty thousand men and ninety-eight guns for the siege of Adrianople, and continued the war for months after her own task was over, out of loyalty to her ally. In reality, however, all discussion of the treaty —especially so long as its terms are kept secret—is mainly academic. The two vital factors in the situation are Servia's need for an outlet to the sea and Bulgaria's bid for the hegemony of the Balkans. To Servia the retention of the Vardar valley is a matter of life and death ; its acquisition by Bulgaria would place Servia in a worse economic and political position than before the war, for the place of the weak and decaying Turkey (with whom, it must be remembered, Servia was on good terms till immediately before the formation of the League) would be taken by two States, one of them a young, vigorous, and probably aggressive Power, whose Possession of llonastir and Ochrida would mean the strategic impotence of Servia,. To Bulgaria, on the other hand, the line of the Vardar is, on economic grounds, a mere luxury; her real outlet from Sofia to the geau lies down the valley of the Struma to Sores and Kavala. In either case ethno- graphic and economic conditions are in open conflict, for racially the lower Struma and the Vardar would fall to Greece and Bulgaria respectively, while economically Bulgaria's retention of the Struma is as imperative as Servia's retention of the Vardar.
The need for a balance of power between the independent Balkan States, so far from being a mere phrase, is an inevitable result of the virtual expulsion of the Turks from Europe and
of the obscure and provisional arrangements on the Adriatic coast. The acquisition of ltionastir and Ochrida by Bulgaria would, of course, destroy all idea of a balance. (Before the war the territorial relations of Bulgaria and Servia were 48: 96; even if Servia keeps the Vardar they will be 84 :145, and if she loses Ochrida„ 72: 164.) It would not merely frustrate one of the main aims for which the Balkan League was founded—the union of the Servian and Greek frontiers— but would convert Bulgaria into a dangerous rival to Servian aspirations and at the same time reduce Servia to a state of complete vassalage. It might, indeed, prove fatal to the still embryonic Albania, since Ochrida is regarded by the forward party in Sofia as a mere stage on the road to Elbasan and Valona (indeed they dream of "the four seas "—Black, Marmora, .tEgean, and Adriatic). This is the main reason why Austria-Hungary, though backing Bulgaria privately with money, munitions, and advice, is by no means convinced of the wisdom of creating a Big Bulgaria.
There is, of course, another factor of the first importance— Roumania, to whom the Balkan balance of power is indis- pensable. It is an open secret that in no circumstances will Roumania allow Servia to be crushed; if there is to be any hegemony in the Balkans, she is resolved, and rightly resolved, that it must fall to herself, as the most powerful and developed of the Balkan nations. A month ago the order of mobilization had already been signed in Bucharest ; and it was only the Tsar's telegram, appearing a few hours later, which induced King Charles and his Ministers hurriedly to revoke their decision. Roumania's subsequent hesitation has been due, not to any softening of her attitude towards Bulgaria, but to considerations of the harvest (which is expected to be a record this year) and to the lingering, though baseless, fear that Servia, instead of acting in pursuance of her own well-considered interests, may be a mere cat's-paw in the hands of the Panslav party in St. Petersburg. Roumania is perfectly willing to work with Russia, where interest marks out such a course, but she has no inducement to break with Austria-Hungary merely to favour the Panslav idea. Circumstances have placed in Roumanian hands the scales in which the rival Balkan claims must be weighed, and the natural aim of her statesmen must inevitably be to secure for her not the hegemony but the leadership of a new Balkan League, extended and emancipated alike from Russian and from Austrian influence. That Roumanian policy is at last being dictated neither by Vienna nor by St. Petersburg, but by Bucharest, is the true explanation of the present situation. Roumania never shared the exaggerated views of Bulgaria's military power which ill-informed Western critics accepted under the suggestion of a skilful censorship ; indeed, military opinion in Bucharest tends to the opposite extreme of under- estimating Bulgarian achievements. Thus Bulgaria's victory over Servia—a victory which for many reasons is highly improbable—would merely make the direct intervention of Roumania inevitable. And in such a war the exhausted levies of Bulgaria would be confronted by an army equal in discipline, superior in numbers and equipment, and absolutely fresh. The issue could hardly be doubtful.
The short-sighted and stubborn policy of Bulgarian states- men has placed their country in a situation from which it will he difficult to extricate her without material sacrifice and loss of prestige. It is to be hoped that Bulgaria will at the eleventh hour substitute statesmanship for mere unreasoning tmbition, and avert the disasters which threaten her from north, west, and south. Prompt action in favour of peace is needed ; further bloodshed and delay might endanger more than Monastir and Ochrida. Bulgaria has made her gambler's stake in the hope of smashing Serb and Greek before Roumania was ready ; she has lost, and will do well to rise from the table instead of attempting another mad stake. Her sole hope lies in the intervention of Austria-Hungary, and here again Roumania holds the game in her hands. Vienna (which has many other urgent reasons for remaining quiet) is well aware of Roumania's firm resolve to uphold at all costs a balance between Bulgaria and Servia; and this knowledge will decide the neutrality of Vienna, to whom Roumanian friendship will be of immense potential value in the event of European complications. Austro-Hungarian neutrality happily means the localization of the war.
A speedy settlement on the lines of actual possession seems to be at last attainable, and would best correspond to the true
needs of the Balkan situation. If the victors exercise a wise moderation such as inspired Bismarck after Koniggratz, and if full liberty is accorded to the schools and churches of all the rival nationalities of Macedonia and Thrace, then there is still hope for a Balkan confederation, under new and more durable forms. But the only possible political friendship is one between equals, not between a grasping overlord and dependent vassals.—I am, Sir, &c., SCOTUS VIATOR.
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