GERMANY AND THE INVASION

By STRATEGICUS

THE German High Command are daily expecting the opening of what it is customary to call the " Second Front." As far as their outlook can be read in the reflections of the German mili- tary commentators, it has varied considerably since the opening of the air offensive. It has varied as to the time of the "invasion," and it has varied as to its relative importance. So much may be read between the lines of what are deliberately designed reflections. Behind all the statements and comments there is a systematic attempt to represent the event as simply an episode in a long and so far still successful war. At all costs the German people and the German army 0 must be prevented from thinking that it has the "ultimateness " which we know it to have ; and to conceal the real nature of the issue political and propaganda considerations have been developed as never before. Every suggestion of internal disunity in this country is seized on and emphasised as a convincing sign of the war- weariness that may indicate collapse in case of a decisive check. Every sign of dissension between the Allies is represented as symptomatic of the chance of general collapse. The Japanese cam- paign in Burma is used to show that the faithful eastern ally is operating on Indian soil ; and it has to be admitted that the prize of Imphal has not yet been placed beyond his reach. The Tokyo radio is even suggesting that the Indian frontier has been penetrated in the south. In case there should still linger among the troops any inclination to surrender, stories of cruelty to German prisoners are being circulated. Looking back on the last year, one can readily appreciate the basis for this fear. The mass-surrender in Tunisia and the repeated surrenders in Russia are red lights to the German Staff. For they know that it is not so much a " Second Front " that is about to open as the final phase of the war. Be it long or short,

though they have not abandoned all hope, they know it to be that.

For they recognise that what impends is a general engagement, in

which such advantages of fighting on interior lines as survive the

immense distances and involved communications must be finally

destroyed.

They have apparently come to the conclusion that the Russians can be held off vital objectives during the critical period while they are dealing with the first impetus of the Allied ground-attack in the west. They probably think that if they can hold up the Russians they should be able to check the Allies in the west, whom they do not regard as equally skilful and experienced. It is the gamble on time again ; and, now that we can look back on the Russian offen- sive, it is not difficult to discover the basis of their conclusions. Their counter-attack on the Kiev salient about Fastov and Zhitomir lasted over a month, and held up Vatutin's great offensive for that period. The Russians were within two and a half miles of Krivoi Rog on October 266, but it was almost exactly four months before they could take it. Zhukov pushed his finger into the Jablonica Pass and was promptly ejected, and the Germans are still striking at the hinge of the First and Second Ukranian groups.

It is recognised that during the six weeks of the great offensive the Russians travelled a distance that, repeated now, would carry them as far as Cracow and Warsaw. But, if they could be held to a front that went no farther west than that, the High Command might not regard it as vital. Russia began the last war farther west than Warsaw ; and the gamble on war-weariness and disunity might s.em to offer chances by the time those -positions were reached. At least, that seems to be the risk which Germany is prepared

take and, reconciled to it as the lesser of two evils, she has apparently increased her concentration in the west. It has been reported that she has recently even moved some of her best generals there—Manstein, Kleist and others as famous. She has to oppose to the freshness, versatility and material superiority of the Allies the experience of her troops, the advantages of fixed defences ad of the numerous obstacles which the present war has revealed. The well-worn expedient of the road-block which does such fine service for the Japanese_ will be useful in the west ; and, of course, there are many known, and perhaps some concealed, deterrents to landings and rapid advance. It is unlikely that the German Staff underrate the very considerable advantage of freshness and fine physique which the Allies can dispose of when the flower of their own troops is under the soil ; the Allies themselves arc more likely to depreciate it. Neither will they underestimate the numbers on which the Allies can depend. It is on the moral and political repercussions of expensive checks that their hopes rely.

Nothing can be said about the time or place of the landings which the Allies will make within a reasonable period now. But we can see the broad nature of the problem that faces them. It is not a of text-book exercises, not a problem that one can set and trim actable shape. Geology and geography have set the problems over e west and the south. In the west the conditions arc almost the exact opposite of those in Italy. This country is comparatively easy to enter, but difficult to penetrate ; the western countries are difficult to enter, but comparatively easy to penetrate. There is also the historic southern avenue into France, which shares the general characteristics of the western approach. These conditions cannot be changed. Anyone who expected a swift exploitation of the land- ings in Italy was either forgetting the geography of the country or imagining that the same expedient that had taken the Japanese down the peninsula of Malaya so rapidly would carry the Allies past Rome to the Alps. But a succession of exploited Anzios could hardly be expected against the skill and experience of Kessclring, particularly when he was dealing with a country the defensive advantages of which have written their pages in military history. Anyone who expects a bloodless landing in sufficient force in the west is similarly dreaming beyond the book. Amphibious operations have their special difficulties in any case, where an alert enemy stands on guard.

All these considerations have been taken into account by the Allies, as also by the High Command. The nature of the defence is also probably known to the Allies. Whatever Rundstedt may have said of the defences, he knows that it is not the fixed defences that count, but the troops. But the map of western Europe is no closed book.

When the Allies were directing their air-offensive on Tuesday against the main junctions of France, Belgium and Luxemburg, particularly in the German frontier area, they were not aiming in the void. They had fixed objectives, which are almost as well known as the junctions in this country. It is because the distribution of the troops must be made with such knowledge in mind that the junctions interest the Allies. Surprise, as I attempted to show last week, is not so difficult of achievement as might at first sight appear. Modern warfare has budded off so many instruments and weapons, so many fresh expedients and technical applications, that there is an immense variety in the sort of composite force that can be concentrated against any particular objective.

What is surprise expected to provide? It is a means to achieve superiority of force ; and, of course, that condition is a wasting asset. What is asked of surprise is a number of hours of opportunity, a number of hours during which the landing-force will be in such superiority that it can elbow out a living-space for itself and its reinforcement. That is all that can be expected and hoped. If twenty-four hours could be gained it would be an immense advantage. The Dieppe commando raid secured for itself immunity of about eight hours. Even that might be of priceless value ; for, regarded from the German side, the problem is essentially obsta principiis. It is in the first hours that a sea-expedition is most vulnerable ; and, if granted a respite to establish itself for a few hours, the main critical phase will be over. To check the landing at once is perhaps almost beyond hope, if it is not confined to one place. In case of a number of landings either the defender must strike at all or he must

seize upon the main threat and stamp it out. He dare not split up his force too much, he glare not wait too long.

He has, it has been suggested, recently reinforced his concentra- tion in the west. It is against this that the recent development of the air offensive is striking. When it hits the main junctions by which forces can be moved to the western front, it is diminishing their mobility ; it is immobilising the armies ; it is diminishing to that extent their effective strength. It should by that means be compelling the Germans to reinforce and disperse ; but there is a limit to the former process, and there are clear perils in the latter. For it is not merely a Second Front, or a Third Front; that is threatened. It is not even a " two-front war " ; it is, in effect, a many-front war, a general engagement 'in which the Allies hope at last to deploy their immense numerical and material superiority, their freshness and their versatility. The western Allies will, for the first time, place in the field their full strength ; and the enemy, who knows the true issues involved, however much he may seek to con- ceal it from the German people and Army, will fight with all the energy Of desperation.