:Hack to Cairo
' it is unfortunate that the latest British proposals for settling the outstanding points in dispute with Egypt should have been debated in the Press and public of both countries before they came under discussidn by the two Governments concerned. It is difficult to understand why the nature of the instruction given to our Ambassador in Cairo could not have been kept reasonably secret, at least until he had had time to return to his post, par- ticularly after the example provided by the Bevin-Sidky negotia- tions gof the harm that can be done by premature disclosures. However, the harm is now done. It is generally agreed that we are to make the offers of terms for a new treaty which, appar- ently, fall short of what the Egyptians claim as the minimum necessary to satisfy their honour, but which equally exceed what we usually claim to be the minimum necessary to satisfy the needs of our security. In other words, another compromise has been found. and since we are a nation which believes that politics are an expression of the art of compromise, we shall probably be surprised and pained when the Egyptians reject the new formula (as they almost certainly will). But in spite of the reports which have already appeared, much more needs to be known about the new offer before its merits can be assessed. Since the Bevin-Sidky discussions the emphasis has shifted away from the Sudan to the defence of the Canal Zone, but it would be rash to hope that, even if the defence problem was somehow settled, a satisfactory settlement of the Sudan's future could be reached:. The Bevin-Sidky formula regarding that was so subtle as to be meaningless. But no one has yet (as far as is known) suggested a better one.
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