THE MOROCCO DESPATCHES.
THE official correspondence between Lord Salisbury and Sir Charles Euan-Smith in regard to the mission to Fez, which was published last Monday evening, affords yet further proof of how careful and competent a director of our foreign relations we possessed in the late Prime Minister,—for so we must call him now, though he will perhaps not have actually given up his office before these pages are in our readers' hands. Lord Salisbury's policy in regard to Morocco has been described as "bullying" and "jingo," and we have been given to understand that he sent Sir Charles Euan-Smith to Fez in order to extort concessions from the Sultan which the Sultan was very unwilling to make. Nothing could, in reality, be further from the truth. Lord Salisbury, it is clear, was quite as fully aware as any of his critics of the importance of main- taining the status quo in Morocco, and the very last thing he desired was any act of Jingoism on the part of our repre- sentative at Tangier. When Lord Salisbury was arranging the' details of the treaty to be proposed to the Sultan, he laid -the greatest possible stress upon the necessity for caution. It is thus,he defines the attitude to be taken up by Sir Charles Euan-Smith :—" With regard to the language that you should hold to the Sultan in the event of his refusing to accept your proposals, I should wish you to abstain from anything in the nature of a menace, which would be doubly dangerous, because, if resisted, it might bring about a serious crisis, and, if successful, would place her Majesty's Government in the position of having undertaken the pro- tection of Morocco. You should therefore [he concludes] confine yourself to urging your recommendations in moderate and friendly terms, and supporting them by such arguments as may best show to the Sultan that his own interests would be promoted by their adoption." Here was no vestige of a desire to obtain influence in Morocco or to get the Sultan into our power. Do anything, he said in effect, rather than put undue pressure on the Sultan, or incur fresh responsibilities in regard to Morocco. That was the essence of Lord Salisbury's instructions, and the late Government are therefore free from the charge of having rashly plunged into complications which it will be necessary for the incoming Government to get out of as soon as possible. If a situation of difficulty has been created, it has been created by chance, and not by any act of omission or com- mission on the part of Lord Salisbury. In Morocco, as elsewhere, he, it is clear, has been working for peace and the status quo, and doing his best to check any movement that might threaten the peace of the world.
That Lord Salisbury's policy of keeping as quiet as possible was loyally carried out by Sir Charles Euan- Smith, we see no reason to doubt. Given the necessity for negotiating a treaty, it would have been impossible for him to have acted more prudently and cautiously than he did. A man with less self-control and less power of carry- ing out his instructions loyally, would probably have grown impatient at the perfidy and procrastination with which the eight weeks' negotiations were carried on. Had Sir Charles Euan-Smith wished to act the part of the great Eltchee, and to imitate the behaviour of Sir Stratford Canning, he might have found plenty of opportunities of doing so without infringing the letter of his instructions. For example, he might have made the offer of a bribe which, it is to be noted, the Sultan assured him it was the custom of all foreign representatives to receive "when they with- drew measures which he [the Sultan] disliked," a ground for closing all negotiations and returning instantly to the coast. Instead, he went patiently on with the endeavours to get the treaty signed. Perhaps, however, it will be said that no attempt should have been made to get a new treaty agreed to by the Sultan, and that it was useless for Lord Salisbury to use moderate language, while at the same time ordering an act which was certain to bring trouble. At first sight, this view sounds plausible enough ; but we believe it nevertheless to be absolutely without foundation. Those who know intimately the condition of the Empire of Morocco, and understand the relations between the foreigners who live in Morocco and the native Government, are clear that something had to be done to put the position of the European residents and of European trade on a more satisfactory basis. The necessity for this was admitted at the Madrid Conference twelve years ago, and regulations were then agreed on in regard to the acquiring of land by Europeans. These regulations were, however, never carried out by the Moors, and thus the need for some new arrangement grows daily greater. It is all very well to say that the Sultan ought to be allowed to do what he will with his own, but unfortunately this argu- ment does not apply in the present case. A series of im- portant and complicated European interests have grown up at Tangier, and in the other coast-towns of Africa, and these must be secured and protected. Possibly England need not have been the first Power to move, but con- sidering that her trade is more important than that of all the other Powers,—Gibraltar, besides, is partially victualled from Tangier,—it was reasonable that she should take the lead. After all, the Sultan is only asked. to do what is done by all European Powers. No one wants him to give up his land, but merely to allow Europeans in Morocco to do what Frenchmen can do in England, or Englishmen in France.
Before leaving the subject of Morocco, we must note two points of importance. The first is the continued failure of the Sultan's troops to subdue Hammam and the spread of the insurrection. The fighting and the political importance of the rebellion has no doubt been much exaggerated. For instance, the newspapers lately announced that Hammam was within three miles of Tangier, and that the town was in danger. To Londoners this sounded like Mr. William O'Brien being at Hampstead at the head of an Irish army. In truth, however, there is no such analogy. Hammam is always three miles from Tangier, when he is not in prison, for the very good and sufficient reason that he lives there. Still, though Hammen,. is not the sort of rebel who will overthrow the Sultan and become a copper-coloured Cromwell—he is merely resisting the misgovernment of the Sultan's officials in the matter of taxes, &c.—it is possible that a failure to overcome the Angera, revolt may so weaken the Sultan's power, that real pretenders, like the Shereiff of Wazan, may be tempted to try their hands at a revolu- tion. This is the real danger, and, therefore, as long as Hammam is not what the Boers call "damped," or else made terms with, the situation must be considered. criticaL The other point of importance is the activity of public opinion in Spain in regard to Morocco. The Standard of Wednesday contains a long letter from its Madrid correspondent, setting forth the claims of Spain on Morocco, and showing how Morocco is the one question that unites Royalists and Re- publicans, and men of all shades of opinion. In spite of the unsuccessful war of 1859-60, the Spaniards still cherish the hope that they will be able to conquer Morocco. The Atlas mountains are held to be one of the natural boundaries of Spain, though, as in the case of Gibraltar, they are in the temporary occupation of foreigners. Spain is, therefore, the fierce defender of the status quo. She feels that at this moment she is not strong enough to attempt the conquest of Morocco. She dreams, however, that the time will come when she will be strong enough, and therefore" Hands off, Morocco !" is the keynote of her policy. Morocco is the one point of foreign policy which she regards as vital.
As to the future of the treaty which Sir Charles Euan- Smith failed to negotiate, it would perhaps be unwise to prophesy. In all probability, however, it will ultimately be signed. The "letters from Tangier," received on July 14th, which finally decided the Sultan not to sign, no doubt con- tained the latest electoral returns that had been telegraphed to Tangier. These, the Sultan was doubtless told, made it certain that he would not be asked by the new Govern- ment to sign any treaty. When, however, he finds that this is not so, and that Lord Rosebery's policy is identical with that of Lord Salisbury, he will probably think it wiser to submit, and a treaty will then be negotiated sub- stantially on the lines of the treaty presented by Sir Charles Euan-Smith.
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