TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE TIBETAN PROBLEM.
AS far as our knowledge of the facts extends, we believe that the Government are pursuing a. sound and reasonable policy in regard to the Tibetan problem. They are observing their engagements to Russia and to China, but at the same time they are closely watching the events which are happening on the further side of our Himalayan frontier. In a word, the order to the Government of India has been : "Stand by to prevent British interests from suffering." We do not wish to become involved in a new Tibetan imbroglio. But we cannot fail to be concerned with what is going on in Tibet. Again, we have got British garrisons at posts on the frontier which, alike from policy, honour, and humanity, we must safeguard from any risk of being overwhelmed. To make these garrisons absolutely secure in a time of upheaval like the present, the only safe plan was to bring a reserve of troops near enough to march to their rescue should any untoward incident occur, and this is what has been done. Probably the movement of troops which has already taken place and the presence of such reserves will be sufficient to ensure the safety of the garrisons. Such movement is the best kind of proclamation, alike to the Tibetans and the Chinese, that we cannot be indifferent to the events that are taking place, and that we do not mean to allow our rights to suffer or be infringed in the slightest degree.
In the matter of precaution we hold that the Govern- ment have done the right thing. We also hold that they are doing the right thing in refusing to be led into any policy which might result in the virtual "protection " of Tibet against China. It appears to us, indeed, that we could not enter upon such a policy without running a risk, if not of violating, at any rate of appearing to violate, our declarations to Russia, and also those made to China. At the time of our Tibetan Expedition we gave the Russians clearly to understand that we had no desire to take possession of Tibet, or to do anything but exercise our legitimate rights as a neighbouring Power. Again, we made it plain to the Chinese that we did not intend to interfere with their just claims over Tibet. It is evident, then, that we must be very careful not to take any action which would be, or appear like, an alteration of the policy then declared. If we look at the problem from a wider point of view, the action of the Government is no less sound. To begin with, it must be remembered that the Tibetan question cannot possibly be approached solely from the Indian point of view. That point of view is of course of great importance, and must be fully understood and recognised, but the fact remains that it is only part of a whole. We are bound to consider the Tibetan problem in the light of our general policy towards the Chinese Empire, a policy which must be fraught with considerations of the first moment. We do not by this mean in any way to suggest that we are on all occasions to give in to China or to pamper her with con- cessions. That is a policy which it is never wise to pursue with an Asiatic Power, however anxious one may be to secure its goodwill. While we play the part of a good friend to China, she must be clearly made to understand that we do not intend to tolerate any vague and shadowy claims of suzerainty on her behalf over States and. territories along the Himalayan rampart-wall or on the Burmese frontiers, which are unmistakably within our political sphere of influence.
But though our policy towards China must be firm, we must also be most careful not to give the impression to the Chinese that we are in any sense menacing the integrity of their Empire, or endeavouring to pursue a course of action which can in any way be regarded as one of "snipping off" pieces of that Empire. China at this moment is entering upon a period which, though it might be an exaggeration to call it revolutionary, is at any rate a period of great internal unrest. The people of China are becoming politically self-conscious. Now in all such cases one phenomenon is constant. The first result of a popular upheaval in any country is the unwillingness of the people to part with an inch of territory or an iota of their rights and claims in the matter of sovereignty. At the time of the French Revolution the world saw with astonishment that the Convention, as representing the sovereign people of France, was far more tenacious of its rights and claims, and far more difficult to deal with in such respects, than had been the old Monarchy. The same thing is apparent in Russia to-day. It would have been far easier to get the autocracy in the days before the Duma to yield in a matter of a "frontier readjustment" than it would be to persuade the Dame now. The Duma, as we have seen, will not tolerate for an instant what it believes to be separatist tendencies in Finland or Poland or any other part of the Empire. So in the case of Turkey. The Turk under Parliamentary government is far more unyielding in such questions as those which concern Crete and Macedonia than was the old regime. The same thing seems likely to happen in China. A reawakened China will assuredly not allow any diminution of what it believes to be Chinese rights. That is a reason for pro- ceeding very carefully in the quarrel between China and Tibet. We do not want to give the Chinese people the impression, especially as it would be so exceedingly false, that we are engaged in the work of truncating their Empire. To do that might seriously interfere with our general Chinese policy, which is to secure the safety and integrity of that Empire and to protect it from foreign partition.
Yet another reason for not adopting what can in any sense be called an anti-Chinese policy in Tibet is that the Chinese are much more likely to prove easy neighbours than a purely Lamaist Government. No doubt Tibet in the possession of China would be a great deal stronger than under a native Tibetan Government, and from this it might at first appear as though we should be more able to get our own way when dealing with the Tibetans than with the Chinese. As a matter of fact, however, we do not believe that this would be the ease. What we want is peace and quiet in Tibet, not a situation that would force us to do what would be extremely disagreeable,—undertake another Tibetan expedition. Such peace and security will be more likely to be secured by the assertion of Chinese supremacy than if Tibet were to remain in a condition of virtual independence. Remember that if the worst comes to the worst, we have always the power of " talking " to the Chinese without engaging in a campaign at altitudes of some fifteen thousand feet above the sea. Though we should be loath to have recourse to such action, still the fact cannot be ignored that in the last resort China is open to pressure from sea power, whereas no such pressure can be placed upon the Tibetans. We can bring China to terms in a way that is impossible in the case of Tibet, where if some fanatical ruler is in power, as we saw seven or eight years ago, a costly expedition is the only form of argument which we can pursue. For all these reasons, then, we believe that our best plan, granted that China shows a reasonable and friendly spirit, is to come to an understanding with her in Tibet, an understanding which of course must be so drawn as not to interfere with Russian interests or to give Russia any cause for alarm. In saying this we would repeat once more that we have no notion of giving in to China, or in any sense attempting to bribe her by weak or foolish concessions. While respecting China's rights, we would make it clear to her that we intend to maintain our own rights most rigidly, and that we shall not tolerate for a moment any attempt on the part of China or Chinese emissaries to tamper with the States on the Indian frontier which are under our protection and virtual, if not nominal, suzerainty.
Previous page
