CORRESPONDENCE.

GERMANY'S PERIL.—II. WILL THE GERMAN ALLIANCE BREAK UP 13 (To THE EDITOR or THE " SPECIT202."1 Sm,—In discussing the war, its duration and its probable outcome, people consider nearly exclusively the military and the economic factors, paying little or no attention to the most important diplomatic aspects. The war is being fought between two groups of States. It is being fought by two Alliances. Experience teaches us that in a war between two groups of Powers each tries to defeat the other by drawing neutral Powers within its own orbit and by detaching some State or States from the hostile Alliance. The Austro-German Alliance has been strengthened by the accession of Turkey and Bulgaria. The Entente group has been reinforced by Italy and Rumania. Conceivably the war may spread still further. The German group of Powers has no friends among the neutral States. Germany's violations of the laws of war and of civilization and the barbarities of her submarine campaign may force neutral States either to join the Entente Powers or to form a separate Alliance for their defence against Germany, another Armed Neutrality League.

The two Alliances which are fighting one another differ greatly in character. The Entente Powers are more or less of equal status. The German group, on the other hand, is absolutely dominated by Germany. It enjoys the great advantage that, owing to the vast preponderance of Germany, the war is conducted from a single centre by a single mind. The German Alliance is an Alliance of Powers of unequal strength, and it is based largely on fear. Not only Austria-Hungary but the South German States also obey the directions of Berlin because they are afraid to disobey. The unity of the group of Powers dominated by Germany is similar to the unity of the many nations which obeyed Napoleon's orders until he was defeated. After the Russian disaster of 1812 Prussia, Austria, the South German States, in fact all his allies except Saxony, not only deserted him, but made war upon him. Even part of the Saxon Army went over to the enemy. History may repeat itself, especially if the Allied diplomats know how to make use of their opportunities.

Germany's greatest statesman taught that Alliances are not unconditionally binding. Frederick the Great wrote in his memoirs :- " If the ruler is obliged to sacrifice his own person for the welfare of his subjects, he is all the more obliged to sacrifice engagements the continuation of which would be harmful to his country. Examples of broken treaties are frequent. . . . It is clear to me that a private person must scrupulously keep his word, even if he has given it rashly. If he fails to do so, the law will be set into motion, and after all only an individual suffers. But to what tribunal can a Sovereign appeal if another ruler breaks his engagements? The word of a private man involves but an individual. That of a Sovereign involves, and may mean misery for, whole nations. Therefore the problem may be summed up thus: Is it better that a nation should perish or that a Sovereign should break his treaty? Who would be so imbecile as to hesitate how to decide? "

Prince Bismarck frequently expressed views similar to those of Frederick the Great. In explaining the scope of the Austro- German Alliance, the text of which had just been published, the. Chancellor stated before the Reichstag :—

No Great Power can, for any length of time, be tied by the wording of a treaty which is opposed to the interests of the people,

and if it has done so it will eventually be compelled openly to declare : The times have altered. I cannot do it.' And it must justify its action before the people and before its ally as best it can. But to ruin its own people by fulfilling one's treaty duties to the letter, that is an action which no Great Power can assent to. However, this is by no means demanded in any treaty."

In his posthumous memoirs, his political testament, the great Chancellor stated :— " Even in the last century it was perilous to reckon on the constraining force of the text of a Treaty of Alliance when the conditions under which it had been written were changed; to-day it is hardly possible for the Government of a Great Power to place its resources unreservedly at the disposal of a friendly State when the sentiment of the people disapproves it. . . . All contracts between great States cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by ' the struggle for existence.' No great nation will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to contract when it is compelled to choose between the two.

The maxim ultra posse Iemo obligatur holds good in spite of all treaty formulas whatsoever. . . . If, then, changes were to occur in the political situation of Europe of such a kind as to make an anti-Gorman policy appear villa publica for Austria- Hungary, public faith could no more be expected to induce her to make an act of self-sacrifice than we saw gratitude do during the Crimean War, though the obligation was perhaps stronger than any that can bo established by the wax and parchment of e treaty. . . . The clause rebus sic stantibus is tacitly under- stood in all treaties that involve performance."

Nothing could more emphatically prove the right of a nation to abandon an ally if it has to choose between life and death, between

prosperity and defeat, than the emphatic opinions expressed by Frederick the Great and Bismarck. The right of an ally to withdraw from an Alliance is, of course, particularly strong if

such a step is not only demanded by the law of self-preservation, but if the State which wishes to secede has cause to complain that its ally has dragged it into war against its will. To Germany's misfortune Austria-Hungary is not only entitled to say, as

Bismarck put it, " The times have altered. I cannot do it," but the Dual Monarchy may likewise claim that it has been forced

into the war against its will, and that Germany has violated the Austro-German Treaty of Alliance of 1879. It is well known to all who have studied the diplomatic correspondence that

Austria did not desire a conflict with Russia, that at the last

moment she was desirous to negotiate with Russia regarding Serbia, but that Germany, which was determined upon war,

precipitated a conflict by addressing to Russia the celebrated

ultimatum. Perusal of the Austro-German Treaty of 1879 shows that it was not a defensive and offensive treaty, but a purely defensive one. It is superscribed " Defensive Alliance." The

official Note in the German Government Gazette introducing it described it as a " purely defensive " instrument. In the

preamble of the Treaty we read that it had been concluded " to consolidate the peace of Europe," and in its body we find state- ments that it is a "purely defensive agreement "—that it is "an

alliance of peace and mutual defence." Austria, which had a quarrel only with Serbia, and which had no desire to be involved in a war with Russia over Serbia, had no reason to support

Germany when that country made war upon Russia, although this was done nominally on Austria's behalf. Austria is therefore fully entitled to withdraw from the Alliance, and can in justification of her action quote the views of Frederick the Great and of Prince Bismarck.

Germany is not a single State, but a Confederation of States, an Alliance of States. The German Emperor is not the Emperor of Germany, but merely the President of the Confederation. According to the Constitution, the German Emperor is entitled to begin only a defensive war. He can declare an aggressive war only upon the authority of the Governments of the German States which are represented in the Federal Council. The Imperial Constitution of 1871 expressly limits the Emperor's authority to defensive warfare, for it states with unmistakable directness :- " The Presidency of the Confederation belongs to the King of Prussia, who bears the name of German Emperor. The Emperor has to represent the Empire internationally, to declare war and to conclude peace in the name of the Empire, to enter into Alliances and other treaties with Foreign Powers, to accredit and to receive Ambassadors. The consent of the Federal Council is necessary for the declaration of war in the name of the Empire, unless an attack on the territory or the coast of the Confederation has taken place."

This most important extract from the German Constitution clearly shows that the German Emperor has violated the Constitu- tion in attacking France and Russia without the consent of the non-Prussian States. We may therefore witness not only the disruption of the Austro-German Alliance, but even a revolt of the South German States. Not only Austria but Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, and other non-Prussian States as well may revolt against their =staid ally as soon as they can do this with safety. Vienna, Munich, Stuttgart, and Dresden are at present overawed by the armies commanded by the King of Prussia. Germany's allies may secede after a great disaster as did Napoleon's allies in 1813. Austria holds the key of the position. Austria's retire- ment from the war would cut the connexion between Germany on the one hand and Bulgaria and Turkey on the other. The latter two States, being thrown on their own resources, could not hope to resist successfully, and would have to make peace, and the

South German States might then begin negotiations with the Entente Powers in the hope that these would at the settlement discriminate between Prussia, which caused the war, and the non-Prussian States, which were forced into it against their will.

The German Alliance is held together by fear. Disaster would probably lead to its dissolution. This is all the more likely as nations fight unwillingly for a bad cause. The people of the German group of Powers have learned that they are not engaged upon a war of defence, but upon a war of ambition; not upon a just war, but upon a war of conquest and of adventure. While the German Alliance, though apparently impregnable, may break up as soon as the fear of Germany is removed, the seemingly less solid Alliance of the Entente Powers may prove the stronger of the two. Britain and her Allies are united not by fear and the hope of gain, but by the determination to defend themselves against unjustified aggression, by the determination to preserve their liberty and independence, by the knowledge that they have a just cause. The story of 1813 may repeat itself. The apparently unbreakable Alliance which obeys a single will may be defeated by a number of equally strong Powers which make war perhaps amateurishly but whole-heartedly. The diplomats of the Entente Powers may accelerate the process of disintegration within the German Alliance by following the policy which Prince Metternich adopted against the group of States dominated by Napoleon.— [We have ourselves dealt this week in our leading columns with certain peace possibilities connected with Austria and the Southern States of the German Confederation. Here we must add that, though we note the interest and importance of the quota- tions from Frederick the Great, we strongly regret our correspondent's failure to censure his abominable duplicity and his initiation of the " scraps of paper " view of Treaties.—En. Spectator.]