THE ROME CONFERENCE AND BONDS OF ALLIANCE. T HE decisions reached
at the Conference at Rome have not yet been given to the world. There is, however, strong evidence that they satisfied the representatives of all the Powers present, and that the Prime Ministers and Ambassa- dors went away, not only with the assurance that complete unanimity had been secured, but convinced that the course of action agreed upon was likely to lead to success.
But though we may and do feel more than ordinarily cheer- ful as to the bonds of alliance, we must not forget that those bonds do exist, and that no Power, not even a Power which, like ourselves, acts as a kind of- clearing-house of ideas as well as a treasury for the various interests of the Entente, can in any direction control the situation. The essential thing to remem- ber about the Grand Alliance is the old business maxim : "He who has a partner has a master "; i.e., "He who has many allies has many masters." This of course is not an argument against partnership with individuals or affiances with nations. There may be the greatest possible good, nay, even salvation, in partnership or alliance ; but the fact that partnerships and alliances do involve loss of free will, and that a man cannot when he is in partnership be wholly master in his own house or office, must never be forgotten. Yet, strangely enough, this is a fact which is constantly ignored even by our experts in foreign affairs, with results which are often not only exceedingly unfair to the British nation as a whole, but grossly unfair to individuals. Take, for example, an article published some ten days ago in a weekly newspaper issued by a very able group of British and foreign publicists, under the name of the New Europe. Our latest contemporary ever since its first appearance has con- tained articles full of knowledge, especially on the obscurer problems of the Near East and of the Slav nationalities. Yet in the number for January 4th there is an otherwise most useful article by Professor Hearnshaw, in which an attack is made upon the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in terms which suggest that the learned historian has for the moment entirely forgotten the existence of our Allies. Take the passage which stands at the head of the article :— " Viscount Grey, when History seta herself to prepare a balance. sheet of his merits and defects as Minister for Foreign Affairs, will have to face a heavy debit in respect of his stupendous and tragio failures in Balkan diplomacy—his persistent refusal to recognize the significance of the German Drang nach Osten, his incapacity to estimate the worthlessness of the• Young Turks, his: readiness. to accept and 'share the pro-Bulgarian, illusions of innocent sentimentalists, his tenderness to Constantine, kb' fatal slowness in sending help ta. the devoted Serbians and Rumanians.-" It-is true that Professor Hearnshaw goes- on topraise Lord Grey' of Fallodon for another aspect of his conduct of foreign affairs— namely, the steadfastness and far-sightedness, of his Russian policy—but while praising, quite as much as while blaming, he writes as if the rest of the Allies did not exist and as if we possessed a free hand in the matter of foreign affairs. Our comment, however, must be upon the passage quoted. We see no proof whatever that Lord Grey of Fallodon refused to recognize the significance of the German push to the East, and he certainly showed no special favour to the Young Turks ; while as for his readiness to fall into the pro-Bulgarian' trap, we have seen no-evidence of this which is in the very least degree convincing. His- " tenderness to King- Constantine-"' is in any case a blazing example of ignoring . the Allies. If' impolitic tenderness to King Constantine can be -proved, as- we are inelined to think it can, it was due, not to any personal predilections on the part of the late Secretary for Foreiga. Affairs, but solely to the-necessity of preserving joint action among the Allies. For good or ill, the Greek policy was the policy of the Entente, not of Lord Grey of Fallodon. His alleged fatal slowness in regard to. Serbia and Rumania is another example of the unfairness, unconscious of course, of his critics. We cannot, however, say anything on this matter without entering upon ground not only very.- delicate, but very dangerous; nor have we, anxious though we are that, justice shall be done, any right to trespass there. We may, nevertheless, without indiscretion, point out that no com- petent authority has ever ventured to allege that Lord Grey of, Fallodon took the lead in regard to the treatment of either, Serbia or Rumania , or that he had any special responsibility, for them. If the charge is that he .had a special Serbian ana Rumanian policy of his -own and forced it upon our unwilling, Allies, it is certainly, fiction. If, on the other hand, the charge. is that he failed to override the rest of the Allies, we can only say that it is most unfair to attribute the blame to him in: this particular. He was not, and never professed to be, the arbiter of the Entente. We do not, however, want to probe deeper into this matter, but merely to use it as an example of a.very dangerous tendency which has of late been apparent in the handling of foreign affairs by our publicists—the tendency to forget the bonds of alliance. But lest we ourselves fall into a kindred error, let us - say that, while defending the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs, we are not making the suggestion that any one of the Allies or any group of the Allies, if groups there are, which we do not believe, was specially responsible for the policy pursued or not pursued •in the case of Greece and Serbia or of Rumania An Alliance in which there are a large number of parties, like a large Cabinet or a large Committee; is bound to move slowly. It is one of its condi- tions of existence, and to fret at it or make a scapegoat or a whipping-boy of one particular man because of that slowness is not only not helpful but acutely dangerous. The essential maxims of statesmanship that must be ob- served when Allies are involved are patience, goodwill, and the avoidance of an in the nature of suspicion or the imputation of selfish motives or of dark and inexplicable. designs. Above all things, in the case of Allies secrecy must be maintained, for when unanimity of, action- is required by statesmen secrecy is essential to loyalty. But in applying these maxims we must never forget that secrecy prevents accused men from defending themselves. It does not matter how good a case Lord Grey of Fallodon may have against his assailants. He could not state that case without grave.danger to his country and its Allies, and therefore he must remain completely silent. Happily, he is a man who can be trusted absolutely not to be stung into making unwise. revelations. We venture to say that he would far prefer to sit mute under any load of obloquy than impair, even in the • very slightest degree, the efficiency of the Entente. The desire to place his own conduct in a better light, or even in a truer light, will not move him by a hair's-breadth. His friends must follow him here. It is, we fully agree, far better that he should suffer great injustice than that the bonds of alliance should be, we will not say strained, but even discussed. To return to the point at which we began. We must be content to know that the Conference at Rome gives us a new starting-point not only of amity, but of amity without the slightest friction in the present or cause of friction for the future. The Entente is of one mind, and he will prove himself a- bad patriot who refuses to accept the decision of the Allies on this basis, and instead strives to show that this or that Power insisted on this or that policy or act.
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