RUSSIA'S POLICY IN THE FAR EAST. most intimate relations which
it is possible to establish with another nation. When one nation guarantees the debt of another it means in reality that the guaranteeing nation lends the borrowing nation the amount of the loan. Russia thus becomes the creditor of China. But nations only enter into this relation when one is dependent upon the other, or when there exists so close a community of interest, so intimate an alliance, that the richer nation feels it cannot serve its own interests better than by relieving the necessities of the poorer. The moment the guarantee for a loan is given, the two nations interested enter upon a perfectly new relation- ship. Of necessity the guarantor becomes the protector of the guaranteed Power, and the beneficiary State has to seek direction and advice from its patron. Take an ex- ample of what we mean. China, in order to give security for the loan, is going to mortgage the receipts of the Maritime Customs. They will pay the coupon. Now, suppose Japan threatens to renew the war with China, and to block& le the ports, and so stop the payment of Customs-dues. Russia a year ago might have taken up an attitude of indifference, and declared that the matter was nothing to her. She could not do that now. She would have to consider whether a Japanese war would not make her liable for the coupon by stopping the payment of customs. If she decided that it would, she must almost necessarily intervene either to make China yield to Japan or else to prevent Japan from attacking China. In other words, the guarantee makes Russia the arbiter of the fate of China for the next thirty years and more, and allows her, nay, almost compels her, to say the final word in all China's diplomacy. " We cannot, as guarantors of your loan, allow you to rush into bankruptcy." It is with these words that the Russian Ambassador at Pekin will be able to exercise a veto on all Chinese foreign policy. The guarantee of the loan will then give Russia a preroga- tive vote in matters of external policy. It is a notice that, on the one hand, Russia will not allow China to be con- quered, and so her security against having to make good her guarantee destroyed, and, on the other, that China must con- form herself to the Russian standard of political conduct.
It is suggested that there must have been some secret quid pro quo given by China as consideration for the guarantee. Very possibly ; but it seems to us a mistake to argue that the Russians must necessarily have got a visible material concession. The guarantee was its own consideration. It carries with it, as we have shown, something very like the tutelage of China in foreign affairs. It is by no means impossible, indeed, that Russia enjoys the right of guaranteeing the loan as pay- ment for her services in restraining Japan. We should not be in the least surprised to learn that when Russia agreed to prevent the further advance of Japan, she made one of her terms the guaranteeing of a Chinese loan. But though Russia may have considered the guarantee quite a big enough success for one year, we do not, of course, suppose that her ultimate aims are thus limited. Whether or no she extracted further concessions from China last spring, it is certain that her policy in the Far East will, sooner or later, necessitate a whole series of sacrifices from China. To begin with, Russia wants a slice of Manchuria, in order to prevent her having to divert her Siberian railway by several hundred miles. The short cut to Vladivostock is across Chinese territory. The more immediate ulterior aim of Russia is, of course, to keep Japan in her place. It was to get Japan out of the Liau-tung Peninsula and to prevent any risk of her seizing Pekin by a rush that Russia came to the aid of China and organised her new triple alliance. Russia is determined that Japan shall not play too great a part in the North Pacific, and she means to keep up China as a makeweight against Japan. We may feel sure, then, that Russia will try in the course of the next three or four years to make China a useful ally in resisting the growth of Japan as the dominant Power in the Far East. But though Russia has clearly gained a great deal by forcing her assistance upon the Chinese, she has not escaped the inevitable counter- balancing evils. The first item on the other side of the account is the putting of Japan into the immediate posses. sion of £16,000,000 in hard cash. Russia may, no doubt, argue that even if she had not intervened, Japan would have obtained this, the first instalment of the war in- demnity. China's unaided credit, it may be argued, was good for such a sum, and could have been raised by her without difficulty on the security of the maritime Customs. Possibly ; but still there are many slips between the cup and the lip, and the hard fact re- mains that Russia is virtually handing over £16,000,000 to Japan, which will at once be spent on creating a fleet capable of beating Russia in the North Pacific. Japan has learnt a bitter lesson from the interven- tion of Russia. She realises as she never realised before- that Russia is her real enemy, or at any rate, that he who would China win, must with Russia first begin. She knows now that if she is to carry out her dream of supremacy in the Far East, she must first settle accounts with Russia. Look forward a year or two, and see what is likely to be the course of events. Japan will, during- the next three or four years, be busy creating a great fleet. Her army is a sufficiently satisfactory weapon already, and need give her little or no trouble. When she has a. fleet of first-rate ironclads, she will no doubt open the ball by virtually annexing Corea, or else by making some new demand on China. The prompt payment of the un- paid instalments of the war indemnity will always give- her an excuse for quarrelling, for it is certain that China will make very slow progress in meeting fully her finan- cial engagements under the Treaty of Simonoseki. Russia will then have to do one of two things,—either to stand by and let China be despoiled, or else to intervene once again to protect her. But the task will then be a far harder one than it was last spring. Japan, if our argument is correct, will be in a position to fight, and to dispute with Russia the command of the sea in the Far East. Russia, in three or four years' time, will then have to meet the £16,000,000 she has just provided, turned into ironclads and torpedo-boats. If Russia means, as we cannot doubt she does mean, to step across the path of Japan, would it not have been better for her to have pre- vented Japan getting the indemnity rather than to have facilitated its payment ? If she means to back China, as she must mean since she has guaranteed the loan, why did she not back her at once, and order Japan out of Port Arthur without compensation ? That course might have pre- cipitated hostilities; but Japan would have fought under worse conditions than she will fight when the inevitable struggle comes. We suppose that the Russian Govern- ment, which must have considered the matter, argued that it was better to wait till their railway was finished, or nearly finished, and held that time, though it would help Japan, would help Russia still more. Again, it is possible that French and German help could only be secured on the lines of the present arrangement, and that Russia could not resist the temptation to get a momentary triumph on the cheap. But though we understand the temptation for half-measures, we do not believe that Russia has really acted wisely. Let us once again see how things stand. Russia, by postponing the struggle with Japan, has acquired a position of predominance in China which may conceivably convert China into a useful ally. On the other hand, she has made Japan an implacable enemy, has helped to furnish her with the sinews of war, and has post- poned hostilities to a time which will almost certainly be more, rather than less, favourable to the Island Power. In any case, it is impossible not to feel that we are only at the beginning of great events in the Far East. It is a truce which may last for four or five years, but it is only a truce. No one can, of course, prophesy exactly how and when the struggle will break out afresh ; but that it must come is certain. Two possibilities of conflict may,. however, be worth noting. Suppose, two years hence,. that the Japanese Fleet is almost, but not quite, ready. Is it not extremely likely that the military advisers of the Czar may say, 'These ships are meant, directly or indirectly, to injure your Majesty. You had better then attack Japan while there is yet time, and wrest from her the weapon- which she is fashioning for your hurt' ? We do not say for a moment that Russia would succeed in doing what we did at Copenhagen, taking possession of a fleet, for fear it might be used against her ; but it is not difficult to see that such a policy might• seem a -wise one at St. Peters- burg. Again, suppose the Japanese get nearly ready unmolested, and notice that the Trans-Siberian Railway will be finished in a year. Will they not argue, At all costs we must strike before Russia has so effective a means of pouring her troops into Corea However we look at the matter, a struggle between Japan and Russia, with predominance in China for the prize, seems imminent.
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