Poland and the Crisis
Coynmunication
[To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR.]
Sin,—Poland holds so decisive a position geographically in Europe that it is particularly important to understand hdr Government's foreign policy accurately. At the end of February M. Noel, the French Ambassador here, informed the Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, that the French Govern- ment was taking a grave view of the immediate future in the Rhineland. His purpose was, no doubt, to give the Foreign Minister a tactful reminder of Poland's obligations as an ally. These obligations arise out of the Franco-Polish Treaty of Alliance of 1921, reinforced by the Franco-Polish protocol of October, 1925, which accompanied the Locarno Treaty. Though none of these agreements makes explicit reference to the demilitarised zone, the French hoped that Poland would be sympathetic to their view in case of any flagrant violation of the zone. Colonel Beck listened to the French Ambassador's arguments politely but maintained an attitude of strict reserve. M. Noel -did not receive the impression that his Government could count on Poland's whole-hearted support.
M. Noel was right. When the denunciation of Locarno became known in Warsaw, the Polish Government maintained impenetrable silence for 10 hours. They realised that Hitler's acts and his proposals had together created a new European situation, to which Poland's attitude would have to be adjusted. They were searching for a formula which might satisfy the waiting diplomats and journalists without unduly limiting Poland's freedom of action. When, late on Saturday evening, the formula was at last released, it was found to strike a subtle mean between the French and German points of view ; each side could and did deduce a victory from its well-balanced phrases. A first reading suggested that Poland was more anxious to conciliate Germany than France. There was no reference to the fact of treaty-breaking ; the underlying motives of the German move received their share of sympathetic understanding ; Poland stressed her independence of the French by pointing out that these were " Western " problems, in which she only had an indirect concern. Nevertheless, when the French Ambassador called on Colonel Beck that night he received what appeared to be satisfactory assurances.
The contradiction, implicit in this attitude, arises from the fundamental dualism of the foreign policy of Poland. Colonel Beck sees Europe as already virtually divided into two opposing camps. He hesitates to lead his country into either camp until he is quite certain where the big battalions are to be found. True to the legacy of his master, the late Marshal Pilsudski, he carries on an opportunist policy of flirtation with both sets of suitors, hoping by these means to maintain the .r Ole of diplomatic arbiter. This policy demands that in any given case he should employ the favoured termin- ology of either camp. To Great Britain, France or the Soviet Union he talks of the " interests of Europe " ; he joins the Germans and Italians in emphasising the demands of the " have nots." The clearer grow the outlines of the two camps, the harder it becomes for Poland to be simultaneously collectivist and anti-collectivist, revisionist and anti-revisionist, for the League of Nations and against the League of Nations, for a German garrison in Cologne and against a German garrison in Cologne.
This policy of Poland is a policy of weakness. She would long ago have joined one of the two camps if she had felt sure that by her accession she would give it certainty of victory. For such a gamble Poland is too weak. Today, as in 1932, the Polish army has a strength of 266,000 men, indifferently armed ; neither numbers nor equipment can be strengthened without the imposition of almost unbearable burdens. In 1932 Germany had an army of 100,000 without either tanks or aeroplanes ; the Soviet Union had an army of 562,000, whose effective value was much reduced by the domestic difficulties of the first Five Year Plan. Today Germany has over half a million men, armed to the teeth, while Soviet Russia has 1,300,000, well armed and equipped. These three years have enormously reduced Poland's military importance in the East of Europe. Were she to join today with either of her neighbours, her military contribution would not be decisive and she would risk becoming the vassal of that neighbour. In remaining uncommitted to either, Poland, as the strategic cock-pit of any conceivable war in Eastern Europe, is of great potential value to both.
Each individual move of Polish foreign policy proceeds from the desire to prevent any irrevocable hardening of European relationships. Only so long as the situation remains indefinite, can Poland continue to draw that profit from her 'geographical position which other countries draw from wealth, large population or great military strength. Poland, therefore, opposes all attempts to force her hand. In her view the Franco-Soviet Pact is the most insidious effort yet made to commit her. In saying that she understands some of the motives for the action of Herr Hitler she has in mind his violent hostility, which she shares, to the Franco-Soviet agreement.
The Pact deprives her of the self-appointed mission as the eastern bulwark of Europe, which she has long exploited to her own advantage in the western capitals. The Pact advances Europe's frontiers from the Vistula to the Ural mountains, thus creating new proportions in Europe which reduce the relative magnitude of Poland. It resolves the Polish-Soviet rivalry for leadership in Eastern Europe in favour of the SOviet. It establishes the influence of the Soviet, which Poland has for fifteen years sought to shut oat beyond her eastern frontier, in the heart of Europe. It reinforces Czecho- slovak resistance to the revisionist claims of Poland. It reduces the value of Poland as an ally to the French. It facilitates the signing of a similar Pact between the Soviet and Rumania, thus threatening to empty Poland's alliance with Rumania of its principal significance.
The Polish statesmen are the more embittered in their opposition because they dare not push it to the dangerous point where France might have to choose between Poland and the Soviet. Hence their satisfaction when they saw the Germans take the lead in criticism of the Pact. They wel- comed, for what it is worth, Hitler's friendly reference to the Polish right of access to the sea. But there is little doubt that they were both surprised and frightened by the lengths to which he went. They cannot but take note of the distinction which he made in his constructive proposals between Ger- many's eastern and western neighbours. There is little to choose from their point of view between these manifestations of French and German statesmanship. The happenings of the week-end have enhanced Polish forebodings that the dreaded hour of choice between two systems cannot be delayed much longer.
Germany would have liked to see the Poles support her fully at the risk of sacrificing their alliance with the French. If she did not venture to make an open request on these lines, this was because Colonel Beck, in his recent talks with Baron von Neurath in Berlin and with General Goering in Warsaw, had made it clear that the alliance with France was indispensable to Poland. The Polish Foreign Minister was obliged to make this reservation lest he be finally drawn into the German camp. He has, besides, his doubts—and these are much more strongly felt by Polish public opinion—as to the durability of German friendship. They have been perceptibly increased by the series of incidents which began with Dr, Schacht's provocative speech on Silesia some weeks ago.
General Goering's recent visit to Warsaw, if it was intended to calm Poland's ruffled feelings, has not been a marked success. On his return to Berlin he was lavish with acid comments on " Polish reliability." Ludicrous though it may appear, it is nevertheless true that his disappointment was due less to the attitude of Colonel Beck than to the fact that his hosts surrounded him with less assiduous attentions than on the occasion of his former visit, General Goering was left to wander for four days in the remote forests of Bialovieza, accompanied only by a couple of unimportant generals. Neither the President nor any other leading statesmen, is dozen of whom had joined him in his former shoot, appeared this time. To till the General's cup of bitterness, he failed to get the lynx that was his heart's desire.
As to Poland, conscious that for a little longer she holds one of the master-keys to the European situation, she is desperately anxious to keep all doors ajar as long as possible. But the feeling grows in Warsaw that her time of.grace is drawing to an end.—I am, Sir, &c., A CORRESPONDENT IN WARSAW.
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