LEGAL EDITING.* MR. SERJEANT STEPHEN, in a note to his
edition of Blackstone, describes Reeves's History of the English Law as a work "of high character, but less read, perhaps, than it deserves. Though its method is somewhat dry, its research and accuracy are exemplary ; and a continuation of it to the present day (if executed with equal ability) would be of great service to every student of law or con- stitutional history." It is Mr. Finlason's "ambition and inten- tion" to act on this hint. He agrees with Mr. Serjeant Stephen, whose evidence is confirmed by a quotation from Sir Roundell Palmer, as to the dryness of Reeves's method, and we may, there- fore, look to the continuation being made more interesting than the original in its style, as it must be in its subject. Whether Mr. Finlason is equal in ability to Mr. Reeves is another ques- tion. For his own part, he scarcely endorses the favourable view of Reeves's research and accuracy taken by Mr. Serjeant Stephen, and he would probably qualify the first half of Sir Roundel' Palmer's statement that Reeves was "valuable, though sometimes tedious," while fully agreeing with the second. The notes with which Mr. Finlason has illustrated the existing parts of the work which he hopes to continue show that he not only differs from his author in his opinions, but more radically yet in his nature. There can be no doubt that in some places Mr. Finlason has cor- rected slips or supplied omissions, that his research has been great, and that his views have been formed with all possible honesty. But such is the confusion of his style, if not of his mind as well, that it is often hopeless to guess what he is driving at, what is the fault he is trying to correct, what is his correction. Sometimes the notes have not the faintest bearing on the passage to which they are appended. Sometimes they merely confirm what they pro- fess to alter. Even when they contradict the text most flatly, they sometimes make amends by contradicting themselves. The length to which they run is another fault of a sufficiently grave nature, and seems likely to defeat their object. Mr. Finlason tells us that he has endeavoured to render the text more readable and interesting, while supplying what he considers its deficiencies. Yet it is a question how far a dry text is improved by the addition -of verbose and often irrelevant notes, unless it be that the redtmdance of the one serves to throw the conciseness of the other into stronger relief, and to show us that it has its advantages. If this be Mr. Finlason's wish, he is at least a self-denying editor. But his readers will require even more self-denial. They will find it a hard task to wade through notes of five pages each on the canon law, and the laws of Henry I., and King John's Magna Charts, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. They will find two of those notes the less necessary that the staple of them is religious controversy, while the other two rather display Mr. Finlason's learning than add anything material to Reeves's history. The
• Reeres's History of the English Law, from the Time of the Romans to the End of the Reign of Pdizabeth, A New Edition, in Three Volumes, with Numerous Notes and an Intro- ductory Dissertation on the Nature and Use of Legal History. the Rise and Progress of our Laws, and the Influence of the Roman haw in the Formation of our Own. By W. F. }Im- ago°, Esq., ilarrister-at-Law. Vol. 1. London: Reeves and Turner. 1869.
note on the laws of Henry 1. in particular is made up of a mere string of Latin quotations, and does not attempt to analyze the subject-matter. Nov is it in this note only that Mr. Finlason's fondness for quotation appears. We can hardly compute the number of places in which King Alfred's method of enforcing justice against his own judges is used as a terrible example. This may be Mr. Finlason's idea of enlivening a history, but we hardly think it will be found effectual. Indeed, the mere trouble entailed on the reader by the necessity of constantly skipping from text to notes and from notes to text, of following a sentence over the top of the page, and then going backwards and forwards with the notes at the bottom, while it has the effect of making him lose the thread of the story, is in itself peculiarly ungrateful. If so much had to be added to Reeves's book, and if so many correc- tions were needed, a fresh history would surely have been better. If all this is a work of supererogation, what becomes of Mr. Finlasou as an editor? We leave him to choose his own horn of the dilemma, while we point out some of the notes in which he has rendered himself most obnoxious to criticism.
First, as to the bearing of some of the notes on the text. An amusing instance occurs in one of the earliest pages. "A history of the law," says Reeves, "would be incomplete without noticing the parts of a kingdom." Mr. Finlason observes, "Of this there can be no doubt ; and, therefore, the Romans always established a very complete and elaborate political organization in a conquered country, and thus Britain with other ' dioceses ' of the Empire were [? was] divided into 'provinces,' and these again were sub- divided into counties." What a curious notion of cause and effect ! The Romans divided a country in a certain way because a history of the law would be incomplete if it did not notice those divisions. Again, in the latter part of the first volume (p. 338), Reeves says, that criminal suits, if they concerned a private person, were to be determined before the justices in eyre or of jail delivery. Mr. Finlason observes that this is not a correct rendering of Bracton's text :—" What Bracton seems to mean is, that actions are necessarily, in fact, and in a certain sense, limited, because in course of time the proofs fail." We can imagine law students of more diligence than acuteness being hopelessly puzzled by such a statement. How can Bracton "seem to mean" something about limitation of actions when he talks of particular judges ? And bow can Mr. Finlason discover such recondite meanings ? Of course, it is plain that the note has been misplaced, and if we turn back to the preceding page we find the passage to which it belongs. But ibis not always that Mr. Finlason provides us with such an easy solution. In many places he leaves us to make out for ourselves whether Reeves is right or wrong, and whether the correction sup- plied really alters the original sentence. Thus Reeves says, "How- ever, deeds or charters were in use." Mr. Finlason observes, "It is plain, however, that deeds were in use." Reeves says that among the Saxons land which was held by charter was called bocland. Mr. Fin- lason adds a long note beginning with the words "The learned author is not quite accurate here," and showing by a mass of quota- tions, so far as we understand them, that boclaud was held by book, writing, or charter. In these two instances Mr. Finlason is not difficult to follow. When he is good enough to embalm a contra- diction in a single sentence he can hardly be called misleading. So, too, in his notes about wills among the Saxons, we have merely to copy out four short phrases which occur in the course of two pages and of three notes, to put him at issue with himself. Ile says first, "It does not appear that wills were used among the Saxons." Then a statement in the laws of Canute "implies that there were wills at that time." Then, "there is no trace to be found of wills in the Saxon times ;" and yet the laws of the Conqueror, "professedly founded upon the Saxon customs," speak of persons dying without a will. Lastly, "The law, however, implies that wills were sometimes used." If these are Mr. Finlason's notes upon his own notes, we can hardly wonder if his remarks on Reeves's history are often wholly unintelligible.
Even the way in which Reeves's mistakes are amended shows signs of this mental confusion. There is one place in which Reeves slightly alters the sense of Bracton by an insignificant transposition of his words. We refer to the subject of estates in land at p. 340, and the distinction between property and posses- sion. Reeves says, "A possession for term of years, as it gave nothing but the usufruct, was considered in a degree higher [than usurpations, though lower than an estate for life] as having aliquid possessionis but nihil juris ;" while they had either minimum or parum possessionis and nihil furls. Bracton's account of the term of years is, "eat et alia qua aliquid possessionis habet, et nihil juris, sicut ilia qua conceditur ad termiuum annorum, ubi nihil
ex.igi potent nisi usufructus." The only mistake in Reeves is the use of the word as, for the term of years was not a lower estate than an estate for life merely because it gave nothing but the usufruct. Mr. Finlason's note, however, confuses the whole sub- ject so hopelessly that Reeves's small mistake is lost in a cloud of words, and the meaning of both Reeves and Bracton is likely to follow. The same is the case with regard to the laws of Henry I. One of these laws, says Reeves, is to the effect that "upon a person dying intestate those who were entitled to succeed should divide his effects pro anima ejus." Mr. Finlason is indignant. "There was no such law ; and if there had been, it could not have been carried out consistently with canon law, which requires that the obligations of justice should first be satisfied before those of piety." We are glad to hear it, but we read on, "The law of Henry was the charter of that king recognizing and promising to observe the law of the land settled long before the Conquest." Then, if not exactly a law, there was something like a law, and in this, which Mr. Finlason cites from the " Leges Henrici Primi," there was a provision that the wife or children of an intestate should divide his effects pro anintil ejus sicut eis melius visunt fuerit. Mr. Finlason goes on to explain what this means, and in that he may be perfectly right, but how does he maintain his direct con- tradiction of his author? These unfortunate " Leges Henrici Primi" seem to be always a bone of contention between Reeves and his editor. Later on Reeves says, "there are no laws re- maining of Henry I. except his charter. Those that usually go under the title of the laws of this king, and are entered in the Red Book of the Exchequer, seem to have been reduced into that form by some person of learning as containing a sketch of the common law then in use ; a manner of entitling treatises not then uncommon." The note, which professes to contradict, has the air of confirming this passage; but in reality it refers us to the longer note on the Laws of Henry I., to which we have already alluded. Mr. Finlason's personal regard for the subject of so elaborate a dissertation does him credit as a student. He does not commend himself to us so much by his zeal for the ecclesiastical authorities and their treatment of intestacy, nor is his note on martial law more convincing than his books on the same subject. But the main objection to the present work is that it puzzles when it should explain, and bewilders instead of clearing, that it exag- gerates mistakes into nonsense, and ends by making us doubt both author and editor.
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