TOPICS OF THE DAY.
MR. DISRAELI AT THE GUILDHALL.
DISRAELI'S speech at the Guildhall on Tuesday differs 111 markedly in tone from his previous speeches in the same locality, and his usual speeches anywhere. It is not audacious, it is not epigrammatic, and it is not bombastic. There is not a line in it—unless it be the one in which he claims credit for having lowered the death-rate of the country—which rural squires just able to catch the orator's meaning can throw at their adversaries' heads, and not one which hostile critics as they denounce it can roll under their tongues, deriving a half- distasteful enjoyment from its sharpness. It is the speech, unless we misread it, of a man who feels himself face to face with a heavy responsibility, about which he cannot say much ; who knows that the immediate future is not clear, and who, were not the dangers of publicity so great, would relieve his own mind by giving his audience a warning. Home affairs are quiet, and Conservatives at the top, but the Premier is not elate. India is all agog with loyalty; the Colonies are respond.: ing to British advice to federate themselves; war with China, which a month ago was "imminent," has been averted by Chinese good-sense, and Mr. Wade's energy and skill ; but, nevertheless, Mr. Disraeli is not jubilant. Like a man who has had a warning from his doctor, he runs over the list of his domestic pleasures and remains not glad. He " trusts " that when next year he addresses Alderman Cotton's successor in the Mayoralty, he may have to congratulate himself on a suc- cessful prophecy, and the citizens on the maintenance of peace; but he sees, and does not dissemble that he sees, a heavy cloud in the near distance. " It would be affectation to say " the in- surrection in Bosnia was the danger. The insurrection in Bosnia might have been got over. The "wise forbearance" of the "Im- perial Powers "—a most adroit and honorific phrase for Germany, Russia, and Austria, the only States now ruled by Emperors— had produced effects so happy that at one moment, " some months ago," it seemed as if the disturbances in Turkey would cease, but "an unfortunate event which I will not dwell upon —the financial catastrophe of one of our allies—revived the expiring struggle, gave a new aspect to all the circumstances, and created hopes and fears in quarters and in circles which before that did not exist. It is impossible to deny that cir- cumstances of this character are critical, but for my own part, I have still great confidence in that forbearance to which I have referred. I believe that it will continue to be exercised, and I have myself not only a trust, but a conviction, that , means will be discovered which will bring about a satisfactory 'ult,—a result which will be consistent with the maintenance and wl ^h will be satisfactory to the public opinion of Europe. My i.c r.I Mayor.,-1 will not contemplate any other result, and therefore I will only say that the interests which the Imperial Powers have in this question no di., abt are more direct than those of Great Britain, but, though more direct, they are not more considerable ; and those to whom the con- duct of your affairs is now intrusted are deeply conscious of the nature and the magnitude of those British interests, and those British interests they are resolved to guard and maintain." Considering both Mr. Disraeli's position and his character, and the language recently employed in Eastern Courts, and the rumours every day becoming wilder in all capitals, those are very grave words, and require to be most attentively studied. They signify that Mr. Disraeli, though most anxious, like any other British Minister, for the maintenance of peace, is seriously uncertain as to its continuance; that he perceives in the East the reawakening of old ambitions; that he recognises an accord, however temporary, among the States whom he groups to- gether as "the Imperial Powers ;" and that while "refusing to contemplate war"—the regular English phrase, when war is near—he is aware that England may be suddenly compelled to form most serious resolutions. Those resolu- tions do not point, perhaps, to war, for in view of war, the Premier would probably have selected an occasion when Ambassadors were not present for his deliverance, but to some very serious action,—it may be the one that has been rumoured ever since the Cabinet met, the occupation of Egypt and Crete as material guarantees. He is prepared to "guard and maintain English interests,"—a promise which, except when those interests are threatened, English Premiers do not make, and English people take for granted.
Let us look a little at the facts in the East, and see how far the few events known to the public justify the vaticinations of
the Premier. It may be taken as certain, more especially since his speech, that the Turkish financial default sud- denly reinvigorated those Russian statesmen who look to the possession of Constantinople as necessary to the future of their Empire, which, while Constantinople is independent, is shut up to the Black Sea, and that they succeeded in infusing their own hopes into the mind of the Czar, who allowed a serious change of policy. The article in the Moscow Gazette must have been sanctioned. The ominous language said to have been held by General Ignatieff to the Sultan must either have been held, or the statement that it had been held must have been circulated with his authority for a purpose. The report has never been denied, and he alone was present at the conference. The sudden renewal of agitation in Servia, a renewal which has produced a second calling-out of the militia, must be due to an increased sense of freedom to act. That Russia is moving troops into Bessarabia may be• considered certain, though her officials find it decent to speak merely of " a despatch of stores rendered needful by recent reorganisations,"—that is to say, Russia is ready to take ad- vantage of the Turkish default, if she sees a chance. Again, it seems clear that Germany, for reasons which it is not necessary to discuss, has no vehement objection to her great neighbour taking such advantage. If this were not the case, St. Peters- burg would scarcely be so menacing, and Mr. Disraeli, with a most susceptible German Ambassador listening to his words, would have preferred much less definite expressions. Finally, it may be assumed that Austria, willing or unwilling, is for the present in accord with Germany and Russia. She may be so unwilling as to be a dangerous ally, but still she professes adhesion, and as she cannot resist both Empires, may think it most advisable not be outrun in an adventure in which her Slav- populations are passionately interested. Mr. Disraeli, with Count von Beust sitting next him, would otherwise hardly have spoken of " the Imperial Powers " as one. All the signs, many of them no doubt confused, and many more obscure, seem to point to the conclusion Mr. Disraeli indicated, namely, that the- Imperial Powers are sufficiently united to exert a terrible pres- sure upon Turkey. They are not yet resolved upon arinedi intervention, but they may resolve upon it at any moment,, and armed intervention must be answered at Constantinople by war. Are, then, the resolutions of which Mr. Disraeli speaks- resolutions to resist the action of " the Imperial Powers ? " It is- most difficult, it is very nearly impossible to believe it. There is no particle of evidence that France would agree to enter on. such an undertaking, even in our company, at a moment when her internal affairs are so unsettled and her reorganisation sa incomplete. There is very little evidence—not quite none, but very little—that Austria, even if secure of English sup- port, would proclaim herself the defender of Turkish independ- ence. Her German subjects would not desire such a policy, her Slav subjects would be profoundly irritated by it, and we see no sign that the Emperor, who still rules the foreign policy of Austria, is ready for so tremendous an under- taking. On the other hand, we may, we think, doubt. most strenuously whether England would undertake the work alone. She could not without material aid from France save the provinces North of the Balkan from any destiny which "the Imperial Powers" thought fit to allot them; and she has no interest, sentimental or material, in loading herself with debt and changing her military system, in order to save. a Power which she knows to be unworthy, which has spent 200,000 millions of borrowed money in twenty years without increasing its material strength, and which has just robbed Western Europe of six millions a year. The conduct of Turkey has released us from the necessity of consulting any interests except those of Great Britain and the world at large, and both point to the same line of action,—the taking some definite' securities that Egypt shall pass into no other hands. Thin course has the single, but the all-sufficient recommendation- that, granted the realisation of Mr. Disraeli's fear, there is no other to be adopted. Of course, that fear may prove as unreal as the Premier hopes. "The Imperial Powers " may fall apart. Their interests are not identical, and their objects are very different.. They may, at the last moment, decide to wait, and merely stop bloodshed in Bosnia and the Herzegovina by securing those provinces autonomy. They may—and considering the character of the Emperor Alexander, this is by no means improbable— shrink from action altogether, leaving the fate of Turkey onedhe more to the operation of natural causes. But if the danger should present itself in the form which the British Premier "refuses to contemplate,"—that is, if the three Emperors, managing to stick together, deeide that Turkish oppression must
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