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REFORM OF PARLIAMENT. 6th August 1858.
Sin—We are led to presume that some measure of Parliamentary Reform will be brought forward next session : a change may then be probably pro- posed and adopted ; but, judging from the statesmanship evinced during the passing of the recent act for the government of India, we have no reason to in- dulge in the anticipation that such change would turn out one to impfore much the present system of representation. The fact is, that the dominant parties in the State do not appear to desire any reform of Parliament what- ever ; moreover we may rest assured that, if a measure of reform be in- troduced, it will have been elaborately framed by either party with a view to promote their own individual electioneering interests. It behoves, there- fore the reflecting portion of the community to study during the recess the theory and the practical working of representative institutions, assisted, as they would be, by the history of ancient and of modern republics so as to be fully prepared to express a well digested opinion thereon when the period shall arrive for legislation on the subject. In the absence of any better plan, it might be advisable simply to insist upon the repeal of the Septennial Act, and upon the extension of the suf- frage to all persons in the enjoyment of a certain fixed income, Bay of fifty guineas per annum, or—as gold may rise or fall in value, possibly the latter—say rather of the annual average money value of twenty-four _guartere ef wheat.
In conjunction with this measure of reform, it would be advantageous to enact that each of the Ministers of the Crown should have ex officio a seat in the Commons' House of Parliament, with the privilege of debate without that of voting on any question unless—at the same time that he may be a Minister of the Crown—he shall have been duly elected a Member of the House by some constituency.
This provision would, on many occasions, facilitate opportunely a change of persons in the several executive depertments of the State, and would remove every reasonable objection to there being necessarily frequent elections of members of Pailiament ; which the Repeal of the Septennial Act—limiting thereby the duration of Parliament to three years—would most beneficially ensure. It appears to me that it would conduce to the thorough efficiency of our constitutional form of government were an understanding arrived at by both Houses of Parliament, by resolution or otherwise, that a Ministry should not be expected to resign office except in the ease of a direct vote of censure or of want of confidence ; for it is well known that, under the present system, many Members are sometimes obliged to vote in favour of or against a bill, contrary to their judgment, merely in order to upset a Ministry or to retain it in power. Such a proceeding must therefore have occasionally been the cause of measures having been adopted or rejected pre- judicially to the interests of the country. I will conclude by suggesting that the people's cry should be Repeal of Me Septennial Act and Extension of the Suffrage.
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