WHY THE AFGHANS DO NOT FIGHT.
NOTHING—not even the readiness with which Asiatics pay unfair taxes, like the salt-tax, while they refuse to pay fair imposts, like the Income-tax—so perplexes European Sikhs, and Pathans have rivalled in all but motive the devoted Without trained officers, and with non-commissioned officers gallantry of the soldiers on the ' Birkenhead. These men, thus who are just private soldiers over again, a little more experi- qualified, are by nature obedient ; they are full of pride in eneed, and a little more inclined to make experience do duty histories which are long traditions of victory—the Afghans for military spirit, any army must be more or less of a mob, conquered. India, the Rajpoots were never subjugated, the and an Asiatic army has a defect which makes it very often a Sikhs were defeated only by ourselves, and the Pathans or cowardly mob. It sees spectres. In other words, it lacks Hillmen are sought by every Indian Prince to form the stolidity, or the perseverance, or the sulkiness, call the bones of his army—and they are usually well it what you will, which ignores the ultimate conse- supported by artillery. The Pathans have no guns, quences of resistance, and goes on resisting. All troops but their long jezails are nearly as useful for killing. become fidgetty when surrounded, but Asiatics—Afghans, it The Sikhs had splendid artillery, organised by French and is said particularly—get fidgetty when being surrounded does Italian officers. The Afghans in this war abandon guns by the not matter much. They will not go on resisting as long as score, which they serve with singular precision, though they can. Once surrounded, placed like sailors in a ship with slowly," and which they drag about, up hills and over ravines, no way out of it, they will fight like heroes or the Sikhs in the with a rapidity that every now and then utterly bewilders Arrah House ; but the prospect of being surrounded either stirs our own artillerists. For example, they carried every gun their imaginations, or creates the feeling that they have but one from the Koorum up to the top of the Peiwar, in done all that their code of duty requires, and should sight, or almost in sight, of the advancing British. As provide for themselves. The Afghans on the Peiwar for commissariat, they are, at all events, never impeded by it. could have stopped there for a month. They had How Nadir Shah's host lived, as it swept through Persia, the provisions enough. They had ammunition enough. They Desert, Afghanistan, over the Shaturgardan Pass, and down were in no more direct danger from the rear attack than from through the plains to Delhi, no man has yet accurately ex- the front attack, which they resisted so bravely—in the Ali plained ; but it did live, and so did the quarter of a million of Musjid case, all sides were exactly equal in possibilities of de- soldiers, brigands, blackguards, and thieves whom on its fence—but the notion of being closed in was too much for downward march it accreted to itself. The Sepoys in mutiny them, and the very men who fought so bravely with the used to march thirty miles a day, apparently without. coin- enemy to their south, ran away because the same men under missariat, and then turn up at the last--as, for example, the same conditions might attack from the north. It is the Tantia Topee's armies did—with everything ready for battle, absence of this defect,due, we imagine, to stolidity and fatalism, except the courage to fight it out. The secret lies, we believe, in which makes the Turk, though he has lost—we should an Asiatic's readiness to carry his food, his readiness to live on much like to know how—the true Asiatic mobility, or parched grain, his contempt for alcoholic support, and his power of rapid and continuous movement., sometimes entire callousness in stripping the villages of the last morsel so formidable a soldier. Even Sikhs would not have of sustenance they contain, but the fact is certain that corn- defended Plevna under Sikh officers with one road missariat is never an Asiatic difficulty. Yet these men, so open as the Turks did, and the Afghans would have fled brave, so full of historic pride, so well provided and constantly the moment they thought the one road fairly threatened. We so defended by their positions, have for a century never been cannot recall a battle in Indian history where a native force able to struggle with a fifth of their number of English or has stood after its rear or flank was fairly assailed ; and in Russian soldiers.' Why ? the Afghan war, the certainty of the defeat of the enemy The philosopher's answer will be sought in many facts when once "turned," without any reference to comparative which distinguish the Asiatic from the European character, strength, grew into an axiom. The defect is a for- but the politician or the soldier has an answer to offer, too. tunate one for the European nations, for it is one only In the first place, there does not now exist in any Asiatic to be overcome by regular discipline,—that is, in fact, by the State a good class, or even a regular class, either of commis- social reorganisation which would allow a trained body of sioned or non-commissioned officers. The latter, indeed, can officers to grow up. The Asiatic tribe which had fairly mastered be hardly said to exist at all. The materials are there, in the secret of Plevna, and could fight as Turks fought, would "thousands of experienced old soldiers ; but these men, who retain its independence for another two hunched years. It could be made most effective, remain, in war after war, will be quite that time before either we, or the Australians, privates in all but name,—the comrades, not the instructors of who may succeed us, or the Russians, are able to place round their men. They are exactly like them in their conception of Plernas in Eastern, or Central, or Southern Asia, the masses military duty, they have not the rudimentary idea of difference of men by which alone they can be securely besieged. We of rank, they do not care greatly for their positions—why should are invading Central Asia with" fewer white men than are they, when the serjeant has no advantage over the soldier in plun- numbered in three German regiments, and could no more dering ?—and they will not, unless coerced by a discipline like envelope seventy thousand men than we could conquer India our own, take trouble. The notion of eight hours' work a day, if every man threw sand into our soldiers' eyes. expended in teaching troopers and their horses is utterly re- pugnant to an experienced native trooper. He simply will not take rank at the price, and either refuses it, or taking THE BISHOPRIC OF DURHAM. it, lives indistinguishable from his comrades, except by THE See of Durham is vacant. The news will not cause an indolence in quarters a little more complete. The officers, that flutter in Episcopal hearts and among Episcopal on the other hand, are usually just a little worse. They have wives that it would have excited in the old days of the Prince- plenty of authority, and often not only courage, but a real Bishopric. There is no Palatine jurisdiction attached to disposition to win at the sacrifice of their lives ; while in some the office to raise its holder above the heads of his brethren, States—Afghanistan, for example—they have claims to rule, and the vast revenues which once satisfied more material observers as the failure of Asiatic States to turn out effective either of birth, or favour, or personal showiness, which their soldiers. Those States send forth armies which, judged by inferiors are perfectly ready to acknowledge. But they are many standards, ought to be effective. They are composed of not trained as officers, they have no supreme notion of duty— extremely brave men, they are supported by adequate artil- though they frequently have of honour—and they are ruined lery, and they are, with a striking exception or two, by the incurable Oriental idea that the superior ought by the singularly mobile. We do not want to raise the vexed laws of nature to have an easier and pleasanter position than the question of the martial courage of the soldiers of Hindostan subordinate. They do not lead, but command; do not provide, Proper, who performed such exploits under their own but order providence; do not work, but expect results. There Sovereigns, but yielded so easily to us, for examples beyond are of course exceptions, this Nuwab Gholam Hussein, the dispute are ready to our hands. Nobody of experience has Envoy, being, we believe, one of the most marked ; but as a ever questioned that the tall Sikhs, two inches taller than rule, the officers in Asiatic States resemble accurately the worst average Englishmen, the little Goorkhas, " five feet high and idea formed in the Franco-German war of the worst French three feet broad," the gaunt sinewy Hillmen, with their inca- officers. Even in Turkey every observer, however philo-Turk, pacity of fatigue, or the clean-limbed, active Afghans, are in decries the officers ; and the Turkish officers, besides possessing individual bravery the equals, if not the superiors, of English a rough training which no other Asiatic officers enjoy, are in soldiers. They will in certain circumstances rush on death or possession of the Janizary tradition, the tradition, that is, of await death like English sailors, or men who have volunteered what was once the most completely regular " of standing under trusted leaders for a forlorn-hope. There is noadventure of armies. No other Asiatic army has that advantage, unless it which an Afghan isinca.pable, and the whole history of Northern be a small section of the Tartar army of China, the army India is choked with stories of deeds in which Rajpoots, called up just before we last approached Pekin. Sikhs, and Pathans have rivalled in all but motive the devoted Without trained officers, and with non-commissioned officers gallantry of the soldiers on the ' Birkenhead. These men, thus who are just private soldiers over again, a little more experi- qualified, are by nature obedient ; they are full of pride in eneed, and a little more inclined to make experience do duty histories which are long traditions of victory—the Afghans for military spirit, any army must be more or less of a mob, conquered. India, the Rajpoots were never subjugated, the and an Asiatic army has a defect which makes it very often a Sikhs were defeated only by ourselves, and the Pathans or cowardly mob. It sees spectres. In other words, it lacks Hillmen are sought by every Indian Prince to form the stolidity, or the perseverance, or the sulkiness, call the bones of his army—and they are usually well it what you will, which ignores the ultimate conse- supported by artillery. The Pathans have no guns, quences of resistance, and goes on resisting. All troops but their long jezails are nearly as useful for killing. become fidgetty when surrounded, but Asiatics—Afghans, it The Sikhs had splendid artillery, organised by French and is said particularly—get fidgetty when being surrounded does Italian officers. The Afghans in this war abandon guns by the not matter much. They will not go on resisting as long as score, which they serve with singular precision, though they can. Once surrounded, placed like sailors in a ship with slowly," and which they drag about, up hills and over ravines, no way out of it, they will fight like heroes or the Sikhs in the with a rapidity that every now and then utterly bewilders Arrah House ; but the prospect of being surrounded either stirs our own artillerists. For example, they carried every gun their imaginations, or creates the feeling that they have but one from the Koorum up to the top of the Peiwar, in done all that their code of duty requires, and should sight, or almost in sight, of the advancing British. As provide for themselves. The Afghans on the Peiwar for commissariat, they are, at all events, never impeded by it. could have stopped there for a month. They had How Nadir Shah's host lived, as it swept through Persia, the provisions enough. They had ammunition enough. They Desert, Afghanistan, over the Shaturgardan Pass, and down were in no more direct danger from the rear attack than from through the plains to Delhi, no man has yet accurately ex- the front attack, which they resisted so bravely—in the Ali plained ; but it did live, and so did the quarter of a million of Musjid case, all sides were exactly equal in possibilities of de- soldiers, brigands, blackguards, and thieves whom on its fence—but the notion of being closed in was too much for downward march it accreted to itself. The Sepoys in mutiny them, and the very men who fought so bravely with the used to march thirty miles a day, apparently without. coin- enemy to their south, ran away because the same men under missariat, and then turn up at the last--as, for example, the same conditions might attack from the north. It is the Tantia Topee's armies did—with everything ready for battle, absence of this defect,due, we imagine, to stolidity and fatalism, except the courage to fight it out. The secret lies, we believe, in which makes the Turk, though he has lost—we should an Asiatic's readiness to carry his food, his readiness to live on much like to know how—the true Asiatic mobility, or parched grain, his contempt for alcoholic support, and his power of rapid and continuous movement., sometimes entire callousness in stripping the villages of the last morsel so formidable a soldier. Even Sikhs would not have of sustenance they contain, but the fact is certain that corn- defended Plevna under Sikh officers with one road missariat is never an Asiatic difficulty. Yet these men, so open as the Turks did, and the Afghans would have fled brave, so full of historic pride, so well provided and constantly the moment they thought the one road fairly threatened. We so defended by their positions, have for a century never been cannot recall a battle in Indian history where a native force able to struggle with a fifth of their number of English or has stood after its rear or flank was fairly assailed ; and in Russian soldiers.' Why ? the Afghan war, the certainty of the defeat of the enemy The philosopher's answer will be sought in many facts when once "turned," without any reference to comparative which distinguish the Asiatic from the European character, strength, grew into an axiom. The defect is a for- but the politician or the soldier has an answer to offer, too. tunate one for the European nations, for it is one only In the first place, there does not now exist in any Asiatic to be overcome by regular discipline,—that is, in fact, by the State a good class, or even a regular class, either of commis- social reorganisation which would allow a trained body of sioned or non-commissioned officers. The latter, indeed, can officers to grow up. The Asiatic tribe which had fairly mastered be hardly said to exist at all. The materials are there, in the secret of Plevna, and could fight as Turks fought, would "thousands of experienced old soldiers ; but these men, who retain its independence for another two hunched years. It could be made most effective, remain, in war after war, will be quite that time before either we, or the Australians, privates in all but name,—the comrades, not the instructors of who may succeed us, or the Russians, are able to place round their men. They are exactly like them in their conception of Plernas in Eastern, or Central, or Southern Asia, the masses military duty, they have not the rudimentary idea of difference of men by which alone they can be securely besieged. We of rank, they do not care greatly for their positions—why should are invading Central Asia with" fewer white men than are they, when the serjeant has no advantage over the soldier in plun- numbered in three German regiments, and could no more dering ?—and they will not, unless coerced by a discipline like envelope seventy thousand men than we could conquer India our own, take trouble. The notion of eight hours' work a day, if every man threw sand into our soldiers' eyes.
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