THE ITALIAN ISANDLANA. T HE Italians have suffered their Isandlana. They
are trying to conquer Abyssinia province by province, and having established their authority to a certain extent ever the coast and over Tigre, the northernmost province, are -trying to break into and subdue Amhara, the central region. The Emperor Menelek, who has betaken him- self to Shoa, which is further south, resists, of course, and watches keenly for any opportunity of inflicting severe blows upon men whom he regards as unjustified invaders. One was afforded on December 8th. when Major Toselli arrived at a place called Ambalagi, with two thousand five hundred native troops, drilled and officered. like sepoys, under his command, and a mountain battery. Knowing of no enemy in the neighbourhood, Major Toselli seems to have scouted carelessly, and to have wandered too much in advance of the main body under General Arimondi, to which he belonged, and which had Makalah, a strongly fortified position, for its base. King Menelek's General, who had been ordered to defend Amhara, was, however, in the neighbourhood, and early in the morning of Sunday attacked Major Toselli with his -whole force,—twenty thousand men. The Abyssinians are good fighters, as they have often proved in their wars with Egypt ; and though the Italian officers did their best, three-fourths of them dying on the field, Major Toselli's force was practically annihilated, two thousand 'two hundred falling on the spot, and only three officers and three hundred men escaping to Makalah, which it is believed will be immediately attacked, but which, with its fortifications and its strong white garrison, may be considered perfectly safe, even if General Arimondi cannot as yet avenge the defeat. That this is the inten- tion of his Government is clear, for reinforcements to the number of four thousand men—one account says ten thousand—have been at once despatched from Italy ; and the best-informed journal declares that Signor Crispi will he satisfied with nothing less than the formal cession of the Province of Tigre, the disarmament of the Province of Amhara—the centre and core of the kingdom as a fighting Power—and the establishment of a general Italian Protectorate over the whole Abyssinian Monarchy. The Italian Administration, in fact, accepts the disaster as a reason for renewed exertions.
It is impossible to blame the Italian Ministry. They chose Abyssinia as the share of Italy in the partition of Africa ; they have expended great sums of money and many hundreds of lives in the effort to found their dominion ; and they cannot be expected to retire because one of the regiments which they have organised from among the natives within their own Colony has been cut to pieces. They must quit Africa if they do, for the Colony would be untenable ; they would diminish the spirit of the whole Army, which is very proud, and with reason, of some of its feats in Africa, and they would acknowledge that the King had out of ambition, or it may be out of a wish to test his troops on service, committed a serious mistake. They will not do those things until they are forced, nor would any other Power, except perhaps France, which has several times in her history receded from a tropical enterprise because it was difficult, apparently without loss either of energy or self-respect. While we recognise the force of the impulse, however, and bear of the renewed advance with respect, as the decision ei brave and determined men, we cannot but regard it with seep regret. We are utterly unable to see why Italy, overburdened as she is with taxation, and pressed as she is by a dangerous enemy on her North-Western frontier, should waste any of her diminishing treasure, or lock up aay of her fighting strength in an African Kingdom ink which she has no historic connection. The Emperor Theodore defied the British, and violated their safe con- strict, in the seizure of M. Rassam ; but what have the Abyssinians done to Italy ? The Italians are not war- slug for honour, nor are they animated by the idea -which never wholly quits Englishmen, that it is part of their business in the world to rule, and if pos- aale civilise, its dark races,—a work which they are at all events performing on an enormous scale. -The Italians expect some direct advantage from their African adventure, and what is the advantage to be ? It is certainly not strategical position, for Abyssinia is not in the Mediterranean ; nor in the event of war could the small corps d'armee locked up there afford the mother- country any effective assistance. The occupation may be defended as that of a training-ground invaluable to a new army, but not to mention that tropical training-grounds produce as many faults as they cure—as witness Lord Chelmsford's and Major Toselli's disastrous carelessness —it is very doubtful if a training-ground is of any use in the formation of a European army. The victorious army of our day is the German, which, previous to 1860, never for forty-five years saw a shot fired ; and the defeated one is the French, which possesses in Algeria the finest training- ground in the world. As for trade, Italy could have kept what trade there is by retainirg Massowah ; while as for colonisation, Abyssinia presents but a wretched field. Hers is a land of stony mountains and torrid valleys, fertile indeed, but culturable only by aid of a dark race. She will never rival Argentina in attractiveness to Italian peasants, nor in opportunities of obtaining a maintenance from agriculture ; and will never relieve the congestion of parts of Italy by finding occupation for a quarter of a million of Italians. If it is material advantage which is sought, ten times as much could be obtained, probably at less expense, by reducing Sicily to order, or removing the obstacles to agriculture in the old Neapolitan Kingdom, or even by curing the malarial un- healthiness which weighs like a blight upon the prosperity of Sardinia. The Italian statesmen may say, and we believe Signor Crispi would say, that they wish to show that Italy is alive, and capable of taking part in the general movement of Europe ; but who, when there is no disaster, watches Italian progress in Tigre, or believes in Italy one whit the more because she is spending money which, she cannot spare upon military expeditions on the shores of the Red Sea ? We cannot see that the Roman Cabinet gain anything by invading Amhara, or will gain anything if they establish a Protectorate over all Abyssinia, and regret deeply an incident which will be held to compel them to go forward, lest they should be accused either of cowardice or of indifference to the national honour.
But then we shall be told, and that first of all by our own readers, Abyssinia will gain greatly by being con- quered. We are not quite so sure. That savage Africa will gain by being placed for a century or two under European government we are very sure—at all events, if we can keep Africa from demoralising its governors—but we are not convinced that the best way to establish European as- cendency is to break up the half-civilised native States. It might be wiser to utilise those States, and so diminish the too vast area over which in the end the European effort must extend. We doubt if France will do as much in Madagascar as the missionaries would. have done without her. The Abyssinians are not like the negroes of the Congo. They have made some great steps forward ; they have a rough civil organisation; they can create good regiments of the modern type ; they are Christians, after a fashion,—that is to say, however de- graded their faith may be, they acknowledge Christianity to be true, and hold that if the world were less perplexing, Christ's laws should be the basis of their own. We cannot but think therefore that they might have been conciliated, and have been induced by subsidies to maintain endurable order, and if they had been, they would have been in- valuable allies in the work remaining to be done, in the extinction of Arab slave-raiding, for example—the Am- harics loathe the Arabs—and the reduction of the Upper Valley of the Nile once again to obedience to guidance from Cairo, that is, from a civilised Power. It is pos- sible, of course, that this dream could not be realised, though we do realise it pretty fairly as regards Nepaul; but it was an experiment worth trying, and we cannot, ,while it is untried, think the subjugation of Abyssinia by Italians a gain to the world that outweighs the burden which the effort to conquer Tigre and Amhara will impose upon Italian strength. We trust no Italian will miscon- ceive us. We have not the smallest jealousy of Italian advance in Africa, and wish most heartily we could give them Tripoli and Barca. We acknowledge to the full that in their attempt to conquer Abyssinia they are within the fair meaning of the agreement at Brussels, under which Africa is being partitioned. We have not the slightest idea of suggesting resistance to their advance on King Menelek, or even of criticising their policy in any malevo- lent spirit. We only doubt—strongly doubt—as benevolent onlookers, whether they are wise ; and regret an unfor- tunate incident, which, in the opinion of some of the best Italians, leaves them, as men with a military honour to maintain, no option. They will, we fear, do little good to Africa, and still less to the world, while they are exhausting resources which, as they know better than we do, are not limitless.
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