TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE PLEBISCITE.
SEVEN-TENTHS of the adult males of France acquiesce for the present in the continuance of the Empire. Any comfort which he may receive from that acquiescence seems to us all the comfort Napoleon can derive from the result of his last appeal to the people, for every other fact connected with the plebiscitum must be more or less discouraging to one who, whatever the occasional failures of his policy, is rarely the victim of illusions. The vote has revealed to him that one- fifth at least of all Frenchmen—taking only one-third of the abstainers to be hostile—so detest his re'ginte, that they risk alike the certainty of official anger and the chance of revolu- tion to announce their disgust, and that this fifth includes the majority of every great town ; that, in short, the vote which would be given to any government has been given to him, while the independent electorate has pronounced for his dismissal. It reveals that Paris, which in 1852 elected him by two to one—Paris, the city in which he lives, on which he has spent sums that might have built it from the foundation—Paris, the representative city of France, the one municipality in Europe which is a living, thinking, separate entity in politics, has by more than two to one expressed its desire that he should fall. And above all, it reveals that disaffection has spread into the Army, on which he has so relied, which he has so courted, with which he has accomplished so much, and has hoped to accomplish so much more. Nothing is more strangely suggestive than the identity of proportion between the vote of the people and the vote of the Army. In spite of the officers' presence, in spite of the dosed barrack gates, in spite of that wonderful discipline which seems to make of obedience a nature, one- fifth of the French Army has voted the dethronement of its Sovereign. The conscription has been perfected till the Army and the people are one in sentiment as well as organization, and whenever France is unanimous the weapon of despot- ism will transfer itself from the individual to the nation. Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Rouen, and sixty thousand soldiers all for the Opposition,—well may the Republicans exult in the diffusion of their principles, and look forward eagerly to the victory for which they now need only leaders, time, and moderation. The Emperor, who knows well that the Nons are an active, the Ouis only a passive voice, who understands that in France quantity is no compensation for quality even in votes, who, above all, desires to be a Cmsar and not a mere tyrant, must be pondering these facts with the pained weariness which comes to men who feel that time is against them, that sooner or later defeat must come. It is defeat for the Emperor, even if his system lasts his life, for he has laboured to found, he cares to establish his dynasty, he has to the full the father's feeling for the future of his son. It must be weary work for him to learn, as he is learning, that after all his work and his success, there is hatred for him wherever there is intelligence ; that his capital detests him ; that as the men of the old re'gintes disappear, the men of his own time, men trained beneath his own rule, glide into opposition ; that even his soldiers no sooner enter a great city, no sooner come within the current of living ideas, than they are eager for his overthrow. A Hapsburg might not mind, for he is in his place by "divine right," but a Bonaparte must, for he claims to rule also "by the will of the people." The plebiscitum shows that the future is against the Bonapartes.
Nor if the Emperor has lost much, has France gained any- thing. She does not gain order, for the affirmative vote is not general enough to crush all opposition, while the defection of so many soldiers, and their victory in the towns, will not only embolden the Reds, but improve their moral right in their own eyes. Those incidents will inspirit them to eineutes, for they give hope that the soldiers may not fire ; while they show that within the towns Republicans have the sympathy of the population. The riots in Paris do not come to mach, but they prove, with their shouts of " Vive la Ligne !" that the Revo- lutionists have been relieved of a dread, and that the soldiers, just as impressible as other men, are exposed to a new tempta- tion. The Reds, too, though a minority, are a very strong one. A million and a half of men, mainly collected in towns, can do anything ; and there are a million and a half of towns- men in France who are willing to endure some suffering in order that the throne may be overturned. It is no light thing to a Revolutionist, for instance, to know that in Paris, Marseilles, and Lyons, a clear majority of the people are disaffected to the rigime, to be able to quote official proof that in all the grand centres his opinions have been accepted by the citizens. On the other hand, constitutional liberty has gained nothing by the plebiscitum, for the vote, while nominally sanction- ing Parliamentary government, really undermines it. Let us suppose for a moment that the Emperor employs the vote as M. 011ivier sometimes hints it will be employed ; that he summons Liberal Ministers ; that he allows free debate ; that he endeavours to secure a majority in the Chamber, and still Parliamentary Government will be very unreal. The Chamber will always feel that it is not guiding the Sovereign, but debating with him ; that if the question becomes serious, the Emperor can at will strike a civil coup d'etat. A power stronger- than itself has decided that the recent votes of the Chamber shall be rescinded ; that Napoleon shall govern ; that the majority of Members shall not be, in the words of the late King of Prussia, the "pivot of political authority." The Chamber must feel as a Chamber under a perpetual threat of dissolution, a feeling fatal alike to the dignity and the inde- pendence without which government by a debating club must always fail. There will be a sense of unreality in the action of the majority, even if it is allowed to act, and there is little proof that it will be so allowed. The Emperor may summon back the devotees of personal power. M. 011ivier himself has. professed himself impatient of discussion, interpellations,. obstacles to his free action for the benefit of the people, and he may choose to make his individuality felt by inducing the majority to register his decrees. They are perfectly willing, they can appeal to the plebiscitum as their justification, and they may, and very probably will, abandon the effort for independence. Even if they do not, they can do very little. They were sent up to abolish or limit personal power, but the plebiscitum has cancelled that mandate. They may reject a law or refuse a grant, but if they do they will leave things where they were, and they can initiate nothing successfully if it is displeasing to the Emperor. Any power he may leave them he leaves them of his own will, to be exercised in an accordance more or less perfect with that will. That will may tend towards liberty,—for example, the Emperor may leave the newspapers to say very much what they please,—but it certainly does not tend towards self-government, the admin- istration of France through responsible Ministers, and in strict accordance with her desires. Ministers cannot be responsible, for the Constitution avers that "they depend on the Emperor," and the Constitution, like the Emperor, has been sanctioned by the supreme vote. Power, in fact, cannot be secured to the Chamber except by delegation, and France is too logical to respect merely delegated power ; while Chambers so limited in action, so menaced with a loss of their authority, always lose heart to insist that their vote shall be supreme. It is not supreme, and they know it, for there is a power beyond them, a legal power to which the Sovereign at his discretion can appeal. If the Emperor is to rule, Frenchmen will say, let him rule without wearying himself and us with unreal formalities.
The chance which three months ago seemed so good that France might obtain self-government without a revolution has been, therefore, destroyed by the plebiscitum, and its destruc- tion can hardly fail to operate as a gain for the Republic. No compromise, it is clear, can be made with Napoleon. He will not consent to efface himself, to give up his exceptional position, to leave the Chamber master without appeal. Consequently, those who desire that France should be governed by a Sovereign Chamber,—not merely legislated for, but governed,— must break with Napoleon, must as their first step denounce the dynasty, must surrender either their cherished political ideas or their dread of radical change. That is an immense force gained for the Revolution ; for although the Liberals may not be men willing to descend into the streets ; they will not when once convinced that compromise is impossible help to defend the throne which is thus left to be protected by bayonets alone,—a protection which has never availed any master of France, and certainly will not avail a boy Emperor.
However long it lasted, a military Government could not be perpetual in France, and the effect of this plebiscitum has been to make any peaceful method of transition almost us- workable. The Emperor and his Minister may try one ; but they have by this appeal deprived any possible government, except that of the Emperor himself or of the Republic, of the one necessity of governments,—stability.
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