TOPICS OF THE DAY.
ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND WEST AFRICA. THE close-time for Boussa and the West African question is nearly over. It was tacitly agreed that neither England nor France should insist upon progress being made with the deliberations of the Frontier Con- ference, which is sitting in Paris, until the French elections bad been well over, and the Government of M. lifeline knew whether they or some other set of statesmen would be entrusted with the work either of fighting England or else coming to an agreement with her in regard to the Niger and the Lagos Hinterland. Now that the elections are over, and that it seems pretty clear that the Maine Ministry, and, above all, M. Hanotaux, has received a new lease of life, it is necessary to revert to the question of delimiting the Hinterland of Lagos beyond the ninth parallel. That is the problem expressed in its simplest geographical terms. But though the matter when put in this way sounds so innocent, we are well aware that it is fraught with very tremendous possibilities, and that it is quite conceivable that on it the peace of the world, and even the future of Western civilisation, may depend. At present we have no wish to consider, even in the most general terms, the merits or the details of the geographical controversy. All we want to do is to urge upon the Government the need for dealing with the matter before them on strong and well-thought- out, rather than on opportunist, lines.
What we desire that the Government should do is, in a word, to give the country a lead as to Boussa and West Africa, and not to pick up an inspiration for its policy from that vague and uncertain voice which men call public opinion,—a deity with a fine name, but too often the mere creature of newspaper paragraphs, prejudice, and ignorance. The country is, we believe, fully prepared to fight France about Boussa and the Lagos Hinterland, provided always that the Government will tell it that it ought to fight, and that there is something worth fighting for either in the matter of prestige or of great material advantage. What the country is not prepared to do is to settle for itself the question whether we ought or ought not to insist upon carrying out to the full the British claim in West Africa. The country is the master, but it wants its servants, the Cabinet, to say whether Boussa is a case for fighting or not. What, in effect, the British people mean to say is something of this kind :—‘ If our trusted servants and agents, the Government, tell us that France has taken places which in reality belong to us, and if the Government further hold either that those places are worth fighting for in themselves, or that an impression of weakness injurious to our national position will be given by abandoning our claim to them, and therefore advise us to enforce our claim by war, we are perfectly willing to go to war, for that is the only reasonable and businesslike course. The details of the problem are, however, too com- plicated and too minute to allow us to decide the matter ourselves. We must in this case accept the judgment of our confidential servants, who know the facts which we do not know.' If the Government will only loyally accept this position, and make up their minds clearly what they mean to advise the country to do, we are perfectly certain that the conntry will give them all the backing they require. What we are most anxious to see avoided is an attitude on the part of the Cabinet like that of the irre- solute servant who is always looking over his shoulder to see whether his master is approving of what he is doing, and of the way in which he is doing it. It was this anxiety not to go beyond what they imagined was the state of public opinion in regard to Russia which, unless we are greatly mistaken, got the Government into difficulties over China. In reality, they were not in the least perturbed at the idea of Russia getting Port Arthur, and indeed all Manchuria, but they did not . quite like to take the bold and wise course of bowing Russia into Port Arthur without a word of encouragement from the country. They therefore in the middle of the negotiations began to look over their shoulders and "to watch master's face." The result of this was that they formed the notion, quite erroneous, as we believe, that the master would be annoyed if they did not manage somehow or other to make things a little unpleasant for Russia, or at any rate to make a show of resistance. Accordingly, instead of attending to their main work—the direct furtherance of British interests—the Government took up the task of making things as unpleasant as they could for Russia, and so showing the master that they were carrying out his supposed orders. But in reality "Make it as hot as you can for Russia" was not the master's order. When Ministers were obviously looking to the country for a, lead, the country, which did not know the details of the business, could only make a guess at what its servants wanted. It imagined, though quite erroneously, that it was being urged to back its own servants against Russia. Of course, it loyally replied by taking an anti-Russian line. Thus, by an inherently vicious policy, the Govern- ment first brought into existence a bogus public opinion in regard to Russia, and then followed it,—somewhat, as we take it, against their own will. This is what we want to avoid now. If the Government think we ought to fight France, let us fight, but do not let us be told when the war is over that the Cabinet never really thought war was necessary or worth while, but that they felt they could not so far oppose the strong trend of public opinion as to make terms with France. We come back, then, to this. Let us leave Lord Salisbury and his colleagues entirely alone in regard to the details of the West African negotiations. Let us, that is, give them a blank cheque, and honour it for peace or war as they choose. It is a matter in which Lord Salisbury's judgment may, we think, be implicitly trusted. If he advises the nation that war is to be preferred to giving way, then let us accept even that dread decision. Depend upon it, if so grave and wise, and also so patriotic, a statesman—Lord Salisbury, though not a spouter or a sentimentalist, is one of the most genuinely patriotic Englishmen who has ever lived—decides that war, or at any rate the true and genuine threat of war, is the right course to pursue, we may be sure that his advice is sound and ought to be accepted. If, on the other hand, Lord Salisbury advises our yielding to France, even in matters which appear essential, let us cheerfully accept his decision. He knows his Europe, his Asia, and his Africa ; and if he and his colleagues think the national interest will not be injured, then let it be peace. We do not write either for or against peace in this particular case, for we frankly confess that we have not the means of judging what is the right course to pursue. All we plead for is a free hand for the Government from both sides. Our peace-at-any-price men, on the one hand, must stop giving the French the impression that we shall never fight about Boussa, and, on the other hand, our Jingoes must not hurry the Govern- ment into a war Ministers may think useless merely in order to show that we can fight. Let us, in a word, leave the matter in the hands of the old and trusted servants of the country, confident that their advice will be the best we can adopt. There are some cases, no doubt, where the master must decide for himself, but this is not one of them. The electors cannot tell whether it is worth while to fight about Boussa, which they never heard of before, and can scarcely find on the map. Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain can, and if they say we ought to fight, fight we will, and with a clear conscience. All we ask is that over this West African business the Government should lead public opinion, not a sham public opinion the Government. We want to follow our leaders, not our leaders to follow us.
Previous page
