The War Surveyed
IMPENDING EVENTS
By STRATEGICUS GREAT developments are now impending. Apart from their general bearing upon British and Imperial interests, theSe must concern us more intimately than any perhaps since the events of the western campaign. The German offensive in Russia has produced a situation of that character, and while we wait for its resolution it may be wise to cast an eye on the balance-sheet as it is suggested in Hitler's Munich speech. Even now this is not known in full detail, and what is known is of so provoca- tive a nature that only a context can give it any reasonable explanation. The losses attributed to the Russian army, for instance, are only to be understood as reflecting the order of the German casualties. , Otherwise they have no significance ; and they scarcely deserve discussion. Indeed, most of the esti- mates of casualties are only of psychological value.
But Hitler directed attention to the blows 'inflicted upon Russia territorially ; and, as he was dealing with a matter that affects the power of our ally to continue the war, it is imperative that we should form an estimate of the situation with as much detachment as can be summoned. Objectivity in this matter is very far from easy. It is certain that Russia has lost a con- siderable part of her industrial potential, lost also much raw material ; and it was one of von Rundstedt's points against the chances of a German victory in a war with Britain that, in addition to lacking the industrial capacity of British and American factories, in default of an alliance with Russia, Germany must be short of raw material. It seems to be true that the Russian industrial capacity which Germany has not touched, and cannot touch, is greater than has been commonly thought A large proportion has been transferred out of the enemy's reach.
If we wish to be thoroughly objective we must write off a considerable part of the Russian loss against the losses suffered in Germany through the careful and persistent air-offensive. It is easy to ignore the effect of this campaign, which has been in progress so long ; but it can scarcely be doubted that it was one of the reasons for Hitler's movement towards the east. If, as appears to be the ease, the air-campaign has detained in the west, Or brought back, nearly a half of the Luftwaffe strength, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it has materially affected the development of events in Russia. But if it has had that effect, surely it cannot be doubted that it has had the more obvious result of seriously damaging the industrial potential of Germany. The mobilisation of the Continent, it may be urged, will make good any loss that has been suffered. That is a dis- putable thesis, since, apart from the eastern parts of the Reich, industrial objectives in occupied territories have also been visited repeatedly. As far as mere industry gdes it is probable that on balance the devastation of Russia has not been of an order different from that which Germany has herself suffered ; and this loss of Russia will certainly be made good if the British and American factories work up to their capacity. It does not seem possible that Germany can make good her loss .of industrial potential to anything like the same extent and with the same speed.
What Russia has lost Germany may gain ultimately ; and this appears to be particularly true of raw material. Germany has already secured a considerable supply of oil in parts of Poland, and she may gain more but in this connexion it is necessary to remember that her consumption must have increased enormously. In attempting to estimate the difficulties of Germany in her lengthening communications, it is frequently forgotten that a very great proportion of hrr supply-service must move upon oil. In any country in the world the supply of a front which cannot be much less than a thousand mules in extent must depend upon oil ; but in Russia, which is comparatively poor in railway,commtmications, the proportion of the supply-service dependent upon motor-transport is inevitably higher. When it is remembered that before the Russian cam- paign began the German railway-system was already showing signs of the need of fresh rolling-stock, this factor of motor- transport assumes larger proportions. Germany must be using her reserves of oil at a very heavy rate While military operations are making such demands.
The same is true of her chances of utilising other raw material. They are not matters of immediate concern. The possibility of making use of some part of the industrial plant which Russia left in ruins behind her is also a question for the future ; and it must not be forgotten that in every direction she is at present compelled to draw on a supply of labour which, great as it may be, is far from unlimited. Indeed, it ought to be recognised that the blockade works in this way. Germany has developed the art of providing substitutes that serve their purpose ; but the pro- vision of all of them makes demands upon labour. The body of labour available can be used, so far as it can be adequately fed, in one or other way ; it cannot all be applied to every purpose. The material wastage of the war has been immense. Some part of it may be made good in Germany by captured raw material and impressed labour. It does not appear to be possible that the re-supply can attain the volume or the pace which Britain, with the assistance of the United States, can command when fully mobilised. If their industrial potential is called upon more heavily than was expected before Russia became involved in the war, it must at least be remembered that the increase is due to the necessity of supplying armies of a size that no one at that time expected to be available to the Allies, whereas the Germans, having extracted as many troops as the subject-nations can be persuaded to supply, are faced ,with the need to rearm their own sadly depleted armies. The Russian reserves of man-power remain almost unlimited.
It is, however, the present moment that causes us the most anxiety. The German armies are on the verge of Asia, and the Prime Minister has warned us that they may soon be actually in that Continent. If they can overrun Transcaucasia, they will either secure all the oil they need or cause Russia to destroy the wells. In either case they will deprive our Ally of one of the essentials of civilised life today, at least in the quantities she has been accustomed to use. If we could do anything to keep her out of Caucasia there can be no doubt that we should do it. But there are considerable difficulties in that direction. Germany is threatening not only the north of Caucasia but also, from Kerch, the west. If the Russian armies were to be driven out of Rostov and needed the help of the Imperial armies to bold the Germans to the south of that position, one of their flanks would rest upon the Turkish frontier ; and no doubt the attempt to embroil the last great European neutral in the war would again gather way. Turkey has repeatedly declared her determination to defend her independence, and this means; presumably, the violation of her territory by the enemy. It is probable that the implementing of this resolve depends upon air-support more than upon any other single factor ; and it is for this reason that Mr. Churchill's reassurance about the relative strengths of the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe is of so much importance.
In a situation of so vague a character, in which even the combatants are not certainly known, it is perhaps profitless to speculate further. But at least it is well to note that two objects in this area are of critical importance : the maintenance of the communications that connect us with Russia and the preserva- tion of the inviolability of Asia. Much of what has been said of the Russian position would be irrelevant if the Germans could cut her supply-line, and this is clearly now one of their immediate objectives. But, in any case, the other object of Imperial strategy remains, and it is in this area that the Imperial armies can meet the German on terms that advantage the enemy least. A German campaign undertaken in the Middle East would necessarily be mounted on communications of a length and complication almost without parallel, and from the most distant bases, whereas the Imperial armies would have much better 'and simpler supply-lines and would be very much nearer their advanced base. It is an object of strategy to engage the enemy on terms such as these; and, with the reinforced and well-supplied armies in this area, we should stand a better chance of success than anywhere else.
There is another direction in which the Imperial armies might engage the enemy under promising conditions, and this is sug- gested by the brilliant achievement of the small naval force in the Mediterranean the other day. The attempt to reinforce the enemy in Libya has been pursued with the utmost per- sistence and with varying fortune. If we could be sure that it had always met the fate it encountered on Sunday we could look forward to the dash with the fullest confidence. But it must be recognised that some of the convoys, have got through, and, though this does not perhaps affect the chances of the sort of success we desire, it may affect the speed and the cost. But, examining the general position dispassionately, can we say this is a discouraging balance-sheet?
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