The Mind in War
The Decisive Wars of History : a Study in Strategy. By B. H. Liddell Hart. (Bell. 12s. 6d.)
CAPTAIN LIDDELL HART has proved his ability as a military historian by several attractive volumes on Scipio and other commanders. In his new book he attempts and achieves a far more difficult task by reviewing the great wars of ancient and modern times in order to show that " through the ages decisive results in war have only been reached when the process has been indirect." Mind counts for more than brute force ; " the moral is to the physical as three to one," in Napoleon's phrase ; the great commanders have gained their triumphs by surprising and confusing their adver- saries, so as to make victory certain before the armies engaged.
It is a stimulating exercise to follow Captain Liddell Hart in his rapid survey of famous campaigns from Marathon and Salamis, down to Port Arthur and Mukden. Specialists in the various periods of history will find that he is as familiar with Cromwell's Civil War as with Caesar's, with Edward IV.'s daring strategy as with Turenne's and Marlborough's and Sherman's. Moreover, he is unconventional in his judgments. He praises the young Bonaparte but criticizes the mature Napoleon for depending unduly on mass attacks. He singles out Cromwell for special commendation, and he is very far from repeating the ordinary platitudes about Wellington, whose victories he values far less than the defence of the lines of Torres Vedras. But all through this vivid review of twenty-seven wars the author never allows us to forget his theory. He finds that only in six battles—two of Alex- ander's, two of Napoleon's (Friedland and Wagram), and two of the elder Moltke's (Sadowa and Sedan)—was a decisive result achieved by a direct strategic approach to the main army of the enemy. And these cases were all exceptional. Alexander had a superb army, confident of victory over the Persian ; Napoleon trusted in his massed artillery and yet suffered terrible losses ; Moltke was greatly helped by the Austrians' feebleness of will and by the mistakes and hesita- tions of the French command. It is surely very remarkable that in so many and various campaigns from the Persian War of the fifth century before Christ to the American Civil War the facts should, on the face of them, support Captain Liddell Hart's doctrine.
In the second part of the book he applies that doctrine to the late War. Here, of course, highly controversial issues are raised. The author obviously regards the so-called " Western" school of strategists with disfavour and thinks that the policy of " attrition " by mass attacks on trenches in France was as unscientific as it was costly. He suggests that the mere threat of a British landing on the Belgian coast had a serious influence on the result of the Battle of the Marne, by making the Germans nervous about their rear. He stresses the impor- tance of the blockade, as a form of indirect approach, in weakening the German will to conquer. He examines other campaigns and points out, for instance; what great results followed from the German surprise of the Italians at Caporetto, from Lord Allenby's masterly stroke at Megiddo and from the sudden attack on the Bulgarians that dispelled their dreams of invincibility and sent them in headlong flight. Captain Liddell Hart's reading of some chapters of the War will provoke dissent, no doubt, but his criticisms of prominent generals are never ill-natured, though they are very frank.
Underlying the whole argument is the belief—and it is surely reasonable—that success in war, as in every other human activity, demands intellect as well as mere courage or obstinacy. Moreover, the author is careful to point out that a general must do his best with the means placed at his disposal for particular ends by his Government, and that, in modern times, as in ancient Greece, he must pay attention to public opinion. We may hope that war will not recur in our time. But the hope does not make the study of military history unprofitable. On the contrary, Captain ' Liddell Hart's brilliant book, by exposing the grievous and expensive blunders that trusted generals have made, helPs to show that war is a wasteful and uncertain method of settling differences between nations.
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