THE KEY TO PEACE
MR. KHRUSHEELEV'S proposed peace treaty with the Ulbricht regime cannot have any bearing on Western rights—or duties. The question at issue is a different one. It is very simple: will the Russians order, or permit, inter- ference with our air communications? If we remain absolutely determined, and make our position quite clear, they will not—peace treaty or no peace treaty. In that case the signing between Mr. Khrushchev and his puppet of a hundred clauses of impressive rigmarole will be meaningless. It may be objectionable to us in principle, but we can do nothing to prevent it, and it can do us no harm. If, on the other hand, the Russians were to make a false estimate of our determination, encouraged by the venal or panicky cries of a few unrepresentative and impotent voices in the West, whether they acted themselves or through their agents would not be
Nevertheless, if the'ltanding-*er of any especially relevant.
Russian responsibilities to East Germany is not rfieaningless, then it is dangerous. If it really means that any power of decision is to be given to Ulbricht, then clearly this is a deplorable step. We can be certain that Russia will not risk war over Berlin. Even the complete collapse of Soviet German policy, let alone a stalemate, would only be a partial defeat. With Ulbricht the case is different. With his regime falling to pieces, he might be tempted to try to pull us all down with him.
This has been used as an argument in favour of the Wall, and now in favour of surrendering West Berlin. If we do not, it is said, the East German regime will remain dangerously un- stable and this might lead to war. The argument is a 'false one. The Ulbricht regime will remain unstable whatever we do. To encourage an un- stable regime to seek a solution in expansionism notoriously encourages it to further expansion.
The significance of the Berlin crisis, both from our own point of view and that of the Soviet Union, is as a test of the strength and solidarity of the Western Alliance. This has stood up firmly over the past few years to a continual series of provocations in and around the city. If Khrush- chev is mad enough to do what even Stalin thought too risky, and attempt to nibble at our communications, we must as Aneurin Bevan urged in the similar crisis of 1948, protect them by force if necessary. That such a possibility needs to be mentioned at all shows that the position remains dangerous. We do not in fact believe that the Russians will take such appalling risks. If they do, it will be because they think they can shake us.
On all world issues, a few politicians and journalists here continue to direct their main spleen at the Americans—as can be seen this week in some of the treatment of the latest U2 incidents. The Americans are fair game for criticism, and so is our own government. But what of the good faith of those who utter such criticism while condoning the activities of the Communist bloc? The nonest Communist is one thing: those who affect an attachment to political liberty and national freedom while attacking the Western Alliance and having nothing, or only the minimum of formal rebuke, to utter against the imperialist apparats of Moscow and Peking, merit only contempt.
If the Russians want to attack us, they always can, Berlin or no Berlin. It is quite beyond our powers actually to prevent their starting a war if they are mad enough to do so. On the other hand. Berlin or no Berlin, it has been shown that they are in fact deterred by the power of the Western Alliance from any frontal assault on us. All that is necessary to ensure peace, and thus preserve our liberty and independence, is to make clear what we should regard as an attack. Once the lines are drawn, they will not be crossed.
Naturally, the pressures are put on at what appears to be the weakest spot politically and militarily. At present this appears to be Berlin. But if we abandoned_ Berlin, it would be the turn of the next weakest point. Moreover, once it is treated as•part of our world front, the weak- ness of Berlin's position fades away.
We are not against negotiations on Berlin, or even limited de facto recognition of the practical position in the Eastern Zone. But the essential points are not negotiable: complete political freedom in Western Berlin, the maintenance of Allied military and political rights there, and the complete integrity of our communications. A concession on any of these basic points would in effect mean complete surrender. We believe that surrender on Berlin would greatly increase the chances of war.
In any case, the proposed treaty is either harm- less—if the Russians will take it as a face-saver and not indulge in or sponsor further danger; or i. is dangerous—in that a measure of freedom of action might be given to the Eastern Zone authorities. But there can be no doubt about our own response; we must stand firm.
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