At What Price?
By JULIAN CRITCHLEY. MP
MR. THORNEVCROFT returns on Sunday from a week's visit to the United States. While his talks with Mr. McNamara have ranged widely, the principal question under discussion has been the relationship of independent deter- rents to America's strategic nuclear power. The emergence of France as a nuclear power in her own right is forcing a change in American policy. President Kennedy, prompted by Professor Kissinger, has realised that disapproval of what France has done is no substitute for policy, and that account must now be taken of the realities.
Mr. McNamara's speech earlier this year, in which he described independent nationally- owned deterrents as `dangerous, expensive and lacking in credibility,' has clearly had no effect upon General de Gaulle. There is little doubt that in private the General would Sgree with all that Mr. McNamara has said, for a national nuclear force that consists of a limited number of manned aircraft is dangerous in that it invites a pre-emptive attack, is certainly expensive and, if the result of its use against a superior power such as Russia is the devastation of France, then it is incredible as well.
But de Gaulle has not created his force de frappe in order that it might be used. It is not its military worth that he values, it is its political usefulness. De Gaulle has long resented that NATO, and thus the defence of Europe, has been the responsibility of what he has described as an 'Anglo-Saxon dialogue.' (Nor has he been happy that the British alone have had the ear of the United States.) It has become clear to Presi- dent Kennedy that unless he is prepared to assist France, de Gaulle will, first, 'go it alone' and try to make his deterrent the basis of a European deterrent, independent of the United States, and, secondly, he will refuse to co-operate in the build-up of conventional forces in Central Europe. The divisions that have returned from Algeria are stationed in Eastern France, but have not been ascribed to NATO.
It is now American nolicy to persuade de Gaulle to allow his nuclear force to be integrated into the American deterrent in the same way as is Bomber Command. In order to achieve this, what price will President Kennedy have to pay? At root, the President is afraid lest America be dragged into a war in order to protect an ally to whom she is obliged, and over whose nuclear forces she has no control. Thus a seat on a new three-man board for NATO may be the answer.
What is clear is that a Europe that will become more closely united, will not be content to remain dependent indefinitely upon American strategic nuclear power. The only way in which Europe can perhaps be prevented from aspiring to nuclear self-sufficiency is to evolve some form of European control over the American deterrent. This, of course, would mean that the power to initiate nuclear war would no longer remain solely in the hands of the President. He may be prepared to dilute his pow er providing America retained a dcrninant say in the use of the deter- rent This would, in fact, be the case, given the immense American nuclear superiority and her advanced state of technology.
Mr. Thorneycroft knows that above all else he must do nothing to upset either the French or the Germans. For if Britain is to enter Europe she will need the support of bath. It was %.N ideIY believed some months ago that Britain v‘ould use her V-bombers as a bargaining counter at Brussels. In fact the British deterrent has never been discussed. De Gaulle has no wish to share control of it. Nevertheless, the American desire 10 see Britain join Europe may well have streng- thened de Gaulle in his dealings with Washington. Then there is Skybolt. This is due to be fitted to the Vulcans some time towards the end of 1964. There are some doubts as 10 whether the Americans still want to fit Skybolt to their 1352s. If they cancel them, Skybolt Will become far too expensive for us, and will go the way of Blue Streak and Blue Water. Nor,. if satisfactory arrangements are made for allied
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control of the Western deterrent, will the Americans be so concerned to prolong the credibility of the V-bombers. But, failing such an arrangement, the Americans might conceivahlY have to accept a European force, which would include a British contribution. It would then be through Britain that America would be able 10 exercise an indirect control over its use. In that case it would be an American interest to sec that the British contribution is no less credible than anyone eIses.
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