THE GERMAN MILITARY MIND.

ALL Englishmen are now agreed that Germany made the war, and that the moving force within the German nation was and is German militarism. The astonishing thing in looking back is that any one here should have doubted what would happen if we either weakened our Navy below the safety point, or hesitated in the support of France and Russia. Our Navy, we admit, was not " let down," but Germany

thought she had enough evidence that Britain would remain neutral if France were attacked. For the German military

mind this was good enough. Before Germany had discovered her mistake she had committed herself to war. Liberals, who never believed what we have been saying for years was bound to happen if their extreme policy were adopted, are at last convinced that Germany has been playing a cynical and unscrupulous part. Mr. Massingham, who has worked perhaps harder than any Liberal writer for cutting down the Navy and denying all obligations to France and Russia, made a public retractation of his confidence in Germany in the Daily News of Monday:— " I think those of us to whom the idea of a European war, and of our country taking part in it, has brought a measure of personal distress which exceeds even our private griefs, must say with frankness what is in their minds. I confess that Sir Edward Grey's speech left me unconvinced and hostile on the subject of our individual intervention, and that my ultimate reserves as to policy remain. But I must say, too, and publicly, that the reading of the White Paper produced a tremendous revulsion. Things being what they were, engagements standing as they stood, the character of the ruling power in Germany being revealed for what it was, nations being subject to their engagements and line of action which do actually influence and control them, I could not resist the evidence that we were being forced into war. . . . The die has been cast. Who cast it ? Apparently one of the least intelligent and moral groups in the world. With what result? To give over Europe to the temporary control of such influences. A grievous, a terrible conclusion. Religion, science, art, literature, all voiceless and powerless. Ruthless, senseless force—tearing up treaties, disregarding neighbourliness, and every decency and every nobility of life—in supreme control."

Mr. Massingham, not for the first time, has had the courage to say that the facts are against him. Mr. Bernard Shaw, also, having ridiculed every kind of preparation for war, now

urges his country on in a letter to the Daily News without apparently suffering from any embarrassment or any sense of incongruity :—

" Prussian militarism," he says, " has bullied us for forty years; and a month ago neither Germany nor France believed that we would fight when it came to the point. That is why there was such a wild explosion of delighted surprise when the French Chamber learnt that we were game after all. That is why the Kaiser, though reckless of every other interest concerned, offered us the best excuse he could invent for our neutrality, believing- that we were only too ready to snatch at it. And that is also why we had to tako off our coat and sail in. . . Our immediate business is therefore to fight as hard as we can; for our weight when the settlement comes will depend on the part we shall have played in the conflict."

Blindness is now at an end, though the cure of it has indeed been such a risky one that, but for a series of fortunate accidents, it might have endangered the life of the patient.

There has never really been any secret as to how the German military mind works and as to what it aimed at. In 1904- German military preparations took a new and deeply signifi- cant turn. In that year the German General Staff came to the conclusion that, as France must be virtually crushed before Russia could bring her weight to bear, Germany must deliberately ignore the neutrality of Belgium, Luxemburg, and, if necessary, Switzerland. Strategic railways were built up to the frontiers of Belgium and Switzerland and along those frontiers. Great camps were constructed on the same frontiers. It was impossible to hide these preparations, and the Germans did not attempt to do so. The strategy of envelopment required the use of neutral territories, and the law of necessity was openly preached as sufficient excuse for violating treaties. The doctrine was explained by the Emperor himself. On January 1st, 1908, he read to the highest Army officers a document which had been drawn up by Field-Marshal von Schlieffen, and which expounded and justified the necessity of going round the French defences through neutral territory. This document was puhlihed. It was no secret.

Another very good example of the working of the German military mind is the book by General Friedrich von Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War (Edward Arnold, 10s. 6d. net). It has become famous, yet we suppose that few of our readers could call to mind the ruthless arguments which the writer employs with a horrifying frankness. He tells us at the beginning that war is not only a biological necessity,, but that it is a cultural and spiritual necessity. He says : " The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a political means has always led to happy results." Aa to the character of war he writes :-

"Finally, the relations between two States must often be termed a latent war, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a position justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, and deception, just as war itself does, since in such a case both parties are determined to employ them. I believe after all that a conflict between personal and political morality may be avoided by wise and prudent diplomacy, if there is no concealment of the desired end, and it is recognized tha the means employed must correspond to the ultimately moral nature of that end. Recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action. But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable.. . . As regards the employment of war as a political means, our argument shows that it becomes the duty of a State to make use of the ultinia ratio npt only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of other States the power of the particular State is threatened, and peaceful methods are insufficient to secure its integrity. This power, as we saw, rests on a material basis,. but finds expression in ethical values. War therefore seems imperative when, although the material basis of power is not threatened, the moral influence of the State (and this is the ultimate point at issue) seems to be prejudiced. Thus apparently trifling causes may under certain circumstances constitute a fully justifiable casus belli if the honour of the State, and consequently its moral prestige, are endangered. This prestige is an essential part of its power. An antagonist must never be allowed to believe that there is any lack of determination to assert this prestige, even if the sword must be drawn to do so."

The present war is surely an exquisite example of the "apparently trifling cause" constituting "a fully justifiable casus bend." 1 General von Bernhardi carries to its logical extremity the principle of Frederick the Great that negotia- tions without armies are like music-books without instruments. When this working of the German military mind is appre- ciated there is nothing surprising in General von Bernhardi's judgment that Britain committed an " unpardonable blunder" in not supporting the Southern States in the American Civil

War. For him the welfare of America and the question of slavery need count for nothing in English calculations. The point is that the United States might have been shattered by permanent disunion instead of being allowed to grow into a

strong and compact trade rival!

From General von Bernhardi's book we also see the German military mind comparing its own strategy and tactics with those of Britain. It is well known that German military experts think our open order in attack and our choosing of cover merely absurd. They say that a great army should be a machine and work like a machine. Unless it can work according to a programme and a time-table, it cannot work at all. If they are asked how men can stand up in dense bodies before modern weapons, they reply : " We can better afford to lose a whole army corps in front of a particularly strong position than to throw our machine out of gear." Thus

General von Bernhardi says :—

"It is very questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively acting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In South 'Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and stood great losses ; on the other hand, they completely failed in the offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the generalship was equally deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale, held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not, according to available infor- mation, show the English army in a favourable light so far as strategical ability went."

We may now quote some of General von Bernbardi's remarks as to the methods which Germany ought to employ against Britain at sea:—

"In the view of these dangers and the circumstance that we are not strong enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the question remains, What are the means of defensive naval strategy to secure protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually to become its master The plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack, instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening the war as the Japanese did before Port Arthur. In this way the English fleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, its superiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effective blockade delayed at least for a short time. It is not unthinkable that such an attempt will be made. Such an under- taking, however, does not seem to me to promise any great success. The English have secured themselves against such attacks by comprehensive works of defence in their exposed harbours. It seems dangerous to risk our torpedo-boats and submarines, which we shall urgently need in the later course of the war, in such bold undertakings. Even the war against the English commerce holds out less prospects than formerly. As soon as a state of political tension sets in, the English merchantmen will be convoyed by their numerous cruisers. Under such circumstances our auxiliary cruisers could do little ; while our foreign service ships would soon have to set about attacking the enemy's warships before coal ran short, for to fill up the coal-bunkers of these ships will certainly be a difficult task. The war against the English commerce must none the less be boldly and energetically prosecuted, and should start unex- pectedly. The prizes which fall into our hands must be remorse- lessly destroyed, since it will usually be impossible, owing to the English superiority and the few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing our vessels to great risks. The sharpest measures must be taken against neutral ships laden with contraband. Nevertheless, no very valuable results can be expected from a war against England's trade. On the contrary, England, with the numerous cruisers and auxiliary cruisers at her disposal, would be able to cripple our oversea commerce. We must be ready for a sudden attack, even in peace-time. It is not England's custom to let ideal considerations fetter her action if her interests are at stake. Under these circumstances, nothing would be left for us but to retire with our war-fleet under the guns of the coast fortifications, and by the use of mines to protect our own shores and make them dangerous to English vessels. Mines are only an effective hindrance to attack if they can be defended. But they can cause considerable damage if the enemy has no knowledge of their existence. It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communications will be completely cut off by the English. The simplest and cheapest way would be if we obtained foreign goods through Holland or perhaps neutral Belgium ; and could export some part of our own products through the great Dutch and Flemish harbours. New commercial routes might be discovered through Denmark. Our own oversea commerce would remain suspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of trade."

General von Bernhardi is less optimistic about a naval war than about the land fighting. But be has no doubt that the right will triumph. And how right Germany is in his inter- pretation of her appalling policy ! He says :-

" We shall in this struggle, as so often before, represent the common interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win recognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas. `This was the great aim of Russia under the Empress Catherine II., of France under Napoleon I., and spasmodically down to 1904 in the last pages of her history ; and the great Republic of the United States of North America strives for it with intense energy. It is the development of the right of nations for which every people craves.'* In such a contest we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on this vast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join us in this campaign against the overweening ambitions of one nation, which, in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and a philanthropic policy, has never sought any other object than personal advantage and the unscrupulous suppression of her rivals."

Happily all on this vast globe see the situation in quite another light and admit from the bottom of their hearts that it is Britain which fights in the common interests of the world. They know German militarism now for what it is—though there has been little excuse for not knowing what it was for years— and they feel that the cause of the Triple Entente stands for a Europe in which treaties are honoured, diplomacy is honest,

and small nations are respected. This war will be fought in vain and all the blood and money wasted if the result is not to free Europe from the terrible influence and dictation of the German military mind. That is the whole object of the war.