ITALY'S POSITION.
GREAT BRITAIN has followed France in declaring war on Austria-Hungary. That is an act which we must all regret, as we have never before in our history been at war with Austria, but such a declaration was inevitable the moment the Austrians sent their troops to attack France. Our declaration of war on Austria has very naturally and properly been followed by certain orders to our Mediterranean Fleet. It is obvious from every consideration of policy and strategy that that Fleet must now seek out the Austrian Fleet and, if possible, destroy it. Further, it must give all the aid in its power to the Servians and Montenegrins, who are fighting against Austria, and who have, therefore, become our allies—and very brave allies they are, if we may judge from the stand the Servians are making to protect their native land. This is just a case where we shall be able-to show the world what a long way sea-power can strike inland. If the British Fleet and the Servian and Montenegrin armies between them cannot wrest Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia from Austria, we shall be very much surprised. These are important considerations, but even greater are those connected with the neutrality of Italy. Before we deal with them, let us say a word about the spirit in which we do so. We must, of course, approach them first and foremost as Englishmen. To make pretence of any other motives would be merely hypocritical. But we also mean, as far as possible, to approach them in sincere sympathy with Italy. All our Italian readers, and there are a good many, will, we feel sure, acknowledge that the Spectator has always been the true friend of Italy, both in adversity and in prosperity, and that is an attitude which we do not mean to abandon, even if Italy should at the present time take what we believe would be a mis- taken course. We are deeply anxious for her own sake, as well as for ours, that. Italy should do the right thing and the wise thing, and find herself in a good position and a safe position when the war ends. That Italy, placed as she is, ought to think primarily of her own security, independence, and welfare is obvious. She may well argue that the present quarrel is not of her seeking, and that she has a moral right to stand out. We agree, and we are not going to talk any high-sounding nonsense to Italy about her not pursuing a selfish policy, and so forth. In the abstract she has a perfect right to pursue a selfish policy, and to think of herself, and not to be hounded by rhetorical phrases into some fatal act. The problem for her is—what is the policy, selfish or unselfish, that will really make for her best interests ?
The obvious answer, the answer which is being pressed upon her at this moment by Germany and Austria, is : "Come in with us, even at the last moment. Observe your Treaty obligations in the spirit, and take no advantage of any mere technical loopholes in the letter. Be on the winning side and share the spoil with the victors. That would be the wise policy. But even if you cannot do that, and must for internal reasons choose the second best, then, at any rate, observe a strict neutrality, and do not listen to those who would tempt you with offers of Austrian terri- tory or with the bait of Albania." At the first blush that sounds well enough ; but can Italy trust those who talk to her in these terms ? Surely she must know at heart that the advocates of the policy of "ruthless, relentless, remorseless " will, if they are victors in the end, think very little of the fine words used to-day. Whatever may be said at the present moment, Germany and Austria will never forgive Italy for merely standing neutral at the crisis of their fate. If they Iose in the great war, this enmity will, of course, matter little or nothing. If, how- ever, they win, the position will be one so humiliating and terrible for Italy that we do not care to contemplate it any further. Let us assume, however, for the moment that Italy can really maintain a policy of masterly inactivity at the present crisis, an absolute neutrality, a neutrality which will give the Germans and Austrians no excuse to visit it upon her in harsh terms if they are the victors.
Let us next consider what will happen if Germany and Austria are not the victors, and if the rearrange- ments of the map of South-Eastern Europe which must follow the war are left to Russia, France, Britain, Servia, Montenegro, probably Roumania, and possibly Greece and Bulgaria. In that case no one will, of course, want to wreak any vengeance upon Italy for not having joined in the fray. Great Britain will be able to guarantee Italy against any attempt to punish her for her neutrality. Of that we are absolutely confident. Italy in the circumstances we have sketched will remain our friend and will have British protection. But that protection cannot possibly go beyond the status quo. With the very best intentions in the world, the British people could not, as many of them would like to do, and as we certainly should like to do, let Italy have her say in the new arrangements if she merely stands neutral. It will, we are certain, be impossible for us to do that. If the Servians and Montenegrins have borne the heat and burden of the day and have been fighting in con- junction with British fleets and British landing parties, as they may-be fighting within a very few days in Dalmatia; and if Italy has taken no hand in the game, then the Powers whose voices will be potent in the settlement of the Adriatic problem will be the Slav Powers—Servia and Montenegro—and not Italy. To put a concrete case, if the Servians and Montenegrins help us to take Fiume, Pola, the Istrian Peninsula, and Trieste, and use their troops to occupy these places and hold the thin edge of coast, in conjunction with British and French fleets, and if the Slavonic population of the hinterland rises to help them, it would be absurd to pretend that we could ever ask the Slays to retire from the best portions of that coast. For good or evil, they would have become Slavonic possessions. To state it in another way, if Italy decides on strict neutrality, then, whichever way the great contest goes —and, of course, we fully realize that it is just as possible it will go aeainst us as for us—Italy must abandon for good and n all her dream of dominating the Adriatic. Neutrality at such a moment as this is absce lutely incompatible with that dream. If Italy wants to play a great part in the future in the Adriatic, she must stand in with Russia, France, and Britain, for it is too late now to gain a dominant influence there through allying herself with Germany and Austria. If Italy were to do that at the eleventh hour, and these Powers were to prevail, it would be Austria, and not her Italian satellite, that in the future would dominate the Adriatic. If Austria wins in conjunction with Germany, she will be one of the greatest Powers of the world, and not in a mood to brook any Italian interference, however slight. If, on the other hand, Italy, realizing the great dangers she will be in from an Austrian victory, and also the impotence of neutrality, decides that the worst fate that could happen to her would be a German and Austrian victory, she will throw in her lot clearly and fearlessly with Russia, France, and Britain.
'But in that case she must in her own interests act quickly awl with all her force. Her position would be foolish in the extreme if she had the humiliation of knowing that if she had come in earlier she could have turned the scale in her own favour, but that she did it too late, and so lost her oppor- tunity. After all, the opportunity is a very great one. The moving of the two Austrian army corps to Alsace has practically left Innsbruck and the road to Munich viii the Brenner unguarded. It has also left the road to Trieste open. If Italy were now to act vigorously by land, and if the French troops on the Alpine frontier, in conjunction with the picked troops of Italy, were to make a lightning raid into Austria, and then push on to Munich or to Ulm, the Italian advance might prove of even more vital—importance than the Russian advance. Even the threat of such an advance must have a great effect. If within the next few days there were an Italian concentration upon the southern shores of Lake Garda, and the Italians were to seize Trent and the Brenner, as they could easily do, and two French army corps were also moved laid Genoa to Peschiera, the Austrians must send back the army corps which are now operating in Alsace on the French right, or else weaken the forces which are opposing Russia in Galicia and Servia on the Danube. How will Italy decide ? She has the chance of giving the coup de grdce to Germany and Austria in the present war, and she has also the chance of main- taining a precarious neutrality which may or may not later be rewarded by the contemptuous patronage of a victorious Austria and "Germany. Neutrality must, as we have explained, mean in any case the forfeiture of Italian ambitions in the Adriatic.
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