It is stated, and we see no reason to doubt
the fact, that the genesis of the Alliance is as follows. Japan determined that she must come to terms either with Russia or England. Russia offered her certain terms, which she considered would be acceptable if she could not get better. Of this the Marquis Ito when here informed the British Government, and accordingly we bound ourselves to Japan rather than let her join hands with Russia. If that is the true story, then we are strengthened in our belief as to the ineptitude of our policy in the present case. In such circumstances we should have told Japan not only that she had better make terms with Russia, but should have proposed to both Powers to become parties to the suggested agreement, which, no doubt, dealt chiefly with the future of Korea. But it will be said that this would have meant our handing over all China to be devoured by Russia. We cannot agree. We believe China to be perfectly well able to protect herself, and that our fussiness and anxiety as to her future is entirely unnecessary. One other point remains to be noted. We assume that neither we nor the Japanese
contemplate as the first act of the Alliance the ordering of Russia out of Manchuria. If we do, and the continuance of the Russian occupation is to be held to constitute a violation of the integrity of the Chinese Empire, then we have indeed plunged into a whirlpool. But surely that is impossible. The Agreement cannot mean to refer to the status quo ante the " Boxer " troubles, but only the status quo of January, 1902.
