We are bound to record that, as far as can
be judged at present, the Alliance has been well received. The Unionist Press is almost, though not quite, unanimous in its favour, and many of the Imperial Liberals seem to endorse the agreement. We doubt, however, whether the country as a whole in the least understands the magnitude of the event, or how momentous a matter it must be to promise any Power that we will assist her, not if her cause is sound, but merely if she is involved with two Powers over what she deems to be her essential interests in a particular region. If ever the country does realise to what it is committed, and if by reason of some squabble over a Korean bank or railway we get involved in a war with France and Russia, we wonder what will be the attitude of the nation towards those who made the Alliance? In all probability, of course, the Affiance will not lead to a war of this kind, but if ever it does its popularity will cer- tainly suffer a very quick diminution. Abroad the news of the Treaty has been well received, and especially in America, . whose commercial interests in Korea are as great as, if not greater than, our own. But though America naturally ap- proves highly of our spirited defence of the " open door," we notice no movement in favour of joining it and making a Triple Alliance in the Far East. That would have been an Alliance indeed worth having, and worth making sacrifices to obtain. In Germany there is considerable satisfaction at the Alliance. Germany is very glad to see the status quo main- tained in China till her Fleet is ready. When it is ready, she will inform the world, both in the Far East and elsewhere, which side she is on.