In the House of Commons Mr. Henry Norman raised the
question of the Agreement by moving the adjournment of the House. His main point was contained in the question : " By this Treaty was not British policy tied hand and foot to the wheels of Japanese policy ? " We might be bound under this agreement to go to war in support of Japan when Japan was in reality the aggressor. Lord Cranborne's answer on this point, one which we have raised ourselves, does not strike us as con- vincing. He says, in effect, that no obligation would arise under the Treaty unless Japan or Great Britain were attacked by the aggressive action of another Power, and that the ally would be the judge whether the cams belli was or was not an aggressive attack. Either Power, according to him, before it takes action may consider whether the condi- tions of the Treaty are, in its own view, fulfilled. This is certainly not how the Treaty reads, on the face of it. It seems to us to make each Power free to engage in war with a single Power, but if a third Power joins in the attack, and the subject of dispute is China or Korea, then the casus foederis arises automatically. But if Lord Cranborne's interpretation is sound, why was not the matter rendered clear and certain by a clause stating that no obligation would arise under the Treaty unless the Power that became engaged in war had apprised its ally of its policy before action was taken, and such prospective action had not been vetoed by the ally ? Either such a clause, or else a clause clearly making the ally sole judge of whether the con- ditions of the Treaty were or were not fulfilled in a given case, should surely have been inserted. Such a course would have avoided all risk of charges of bad faith and desertion which will now arise if ever we refuse to follow the lead of Japan.