Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who followed, was by no means effective
in his criticisms. His chief and best point was a demand for a definition of what was meant by " China." He ended by demanding proof that the entering upon so great and important an obligation as the Alliance was necessary in order to carry ont our Far Eastern policy, which in its essentials he did not appear to challenge. Mr. Balfour's speech, though we remain unconvinced, was most able and statesmanlike. His best point was expressed in the question, " Is it conceivable that we should permit two Powers to crush Japan?" He disclaimed any intention of hostility to Russia— a disclaimer which we fear will sound somewhat hollow in Russia, though doubtless sincere enough per se—and insisted that we were acting in the interests of the whole commercial world,—" not least of our American brothers." Sir William. Harcourt, who followed, put the case against the Alliance far better than it was put by any other speaker. He was moderate and reasonable, and gave the Gcivernment all credit for peaceful intentions, but he showed most power fully the
onerous and dangerous nature of the Treaty, and how under it war, and war with unlimited liability, might be forced upon us against our will and against our judgment. We cannot, however, go into his arguments at length, and will only say generally that the discussion as a whole confirms us in our view that even if some understand- ing to protect Japan seemed necessary in view of the policy in the Far East on which the Government had determined, the form of agreement and alliance chosen is one throwing far too great risks and responsibilities on this country. If the thing had to be done it should have done in a different way.
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