THE WAR IN MOROCCO N EARLY all the news which reaches
us from or con- cerning Morocco is of French origin or inspiration, and consequently presents a picture which the French Government believe, or hope, may be true. Some personal and local contact with the situation leads to a different con- clusion from that thus originated and disseminated. In the first place all through the autumn and winter the French have been losing ground gained in September last with great difficulty, and at unrepeatable cost. They then put in motion 15o,000 men, and in a campaign they could only sustain for three weeks went forward seven miles on a front of 40 miles only. On either side of this limited front they made no progress whatever.
Since September bad weather and unreliable troops have been responsible for a constant retreat, which has ended in the loss of positions and destruction of roads, and this leaves them with vastly diminished repute in the eyes of all Moors. These last know and remember, what is little realised in Europe, that if it were not for the Foreign Legion and for the black and coloured troops from Africa itself, France would long ago have been turned out of Morocco. The Legion, of whom some 40 per cent. at least are Germans, were, in 1924-5, the only force which really held the French line, and it is one of history's little ironies that only the fidelity of these Germans to their self-adopted step-mother enabled France to maintain her garrisons in the Fatherland, and her stranglehold on the Ruhr.
As to the black troops, there seem to be two views. One, which is French and official, reports them as the principal agents in the gradual consolidation of the French position. As this consolidation has so far been to the rear, this official certificate of worth is not very much to their credit. The native view is probably not much more accurate. It was given to me in the following sentence : " When these black fellows arrived, we were told they were very ferocious. Now we lead them about by the ear." Whatever their true fighting value in the hills and valleys of the Riff, as they number three to one of the actual French troops, they form an effective portion of the French army.
To arrive at a just estimate of the probabilities after the rupture which has just occurred at Ujda, one must remember two things : first, that the French have no permanent interests in the Riff itself, but are extremely anxious that peace shall be permanently established along their northern border, between which and the Riffi hills lies a plain some twelve or fourteen miles wide of fertile and debateable land ; secondly, that France has no money, and her army no stomach for a Moroccan campaign. Under these influences France forced Spain into an armistice with the Riffis, to which Spain only consented on the condition that if their peace terms were not accepted hostilities should recommence without delay. Both France and Spain, whether in truth or whether whistling to keep their courage up, have shouted to the world that their last year's gains had virtually eliminated Abd-el-Krim, and their peace terms would do so officially. It took hardly one day of discussion with the Riffi envoys to dispose of this pretence for ever. France and Spain had openly to agree that Abd-el-Krim's decision was necessary and final. Discussion has ended, as everyone not obsessed with French diplomacy knew it must end, in complete rejection of all the operative proposals. I believe myself that something of this sort will happen hereafter. France is bound to resume hostilities with Abd-el-Krim, with whom she is not necessarily in hostile touch. He is Spain's real foe. France is, however, free to adjust relations with the tribes on her Northern frontier, and I can conceive of such relations being established as will provide against forays into her territory by the border tribes, and for the grant of trading facilities to them so long as there are no such raids. Meanwhile the movement of French troops would be confined to a minimum, perhaps even to a formality. France would thus have a chance of reducing her expenditure of money, and her employment of men, and of re-establishing her prestige in the Sas region of the Attas, where her position, if not dangerous, is certainly uncomfortable and very difficult.
Meanwhile, Spain—or rather the Spanish army, who hated the armistice with its chances, however remote of peace—has regained freedom of action. It is difficult perhaps to understand how any Spaniard can desire to begin again war in Morocco ; but when one remembers that two-thirds of the Spanish army is in Morocco on war pay and allowances, and that some substantial part of the trade of the Spanish presidios is in the hands of officers on the active list, one grasps some of the difficulties of the Marquess de Estella in bringing the conflict to an end. To anyone but themselves their chances of success seem slight. They have been at it nearly eighteen years, and they hold with great difficulty four or five towns on the sea-coast, with a slice of hinterland round each, divided from the other by hostile territory. Their methods of war are archaic, and whatever may be their knowledge of the principles of war, their neglect of these is more noticeable. Their capital in Morocco, Tetuan, has only quite lately been freed from a daily shelling, and this freedom is as much due to money as it is to gun- powder. Last year, with not less than Ioo,000 men under arms, they did effect a landing at Alhucemas and advanced to the camp of Abd-el-Krim at Ajdir. It is some three or four miles inland, and they have not gone further. This success they owed wholly to the skill, courage, and constancy of Primo de Rivera. He is no longer in command, and they have removed, owing to a personal quarrel, another able commander, General Riquelme.
Spain has again about Ioo,000 men in Morocco. She has come to terms with the Anjera and has therefore freed her western flank. She may advance some half dozen miles in the short spring that remains, and she will retire in the long summer with more haste than dignity to her Primo line.
Abd-el-Krim, for his part, has gained a considerable diplomatic victory at Ujda. He has shown up the severity of the European designs, and his own domination over the tribes. On the other hand the harvest will not be satisfactory. The blockade is fairly effective, and losses and defections not inconsiderable. Given supplies he could hold out indefinitely against such Europeans as can be sent against him. But supplies are short, and therefore I am convinced that the border tribes will make peace with the French. And through the border tribes it will be very strange if supplies are not received in the Riff. Why will not some personality at Geneva force the attention of the League of Nations to this international, or rather inter-racial, war, due entirely to two international
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