THE GAMBETTISTS AND ENGLAND.
TT is necessary that the country should make up its mind as to the amount of regard it intends to pay to French susceptibilities about Egypt. Very little has yet been said about them, there being a general and wise desire to leave that part of the matter to Lord Granville's long-tried skill ; but it will be needful, sooner or later, that the people should pro- nounce an opinion. It is becoming evident that the French are not willing to close the negotiations, that the Gambettists are exceedingly sore, and that the British Government may be compelled to go on in spite of that soreness. Before it goes on, it is essential that the country should perceive it has right behind it ; and we will endeavour, therefore, to state the French side of the matter, as it appears to moderate Gambettists, among whom we rank M. Gtambetta himself, with all the impartiality we can. They argue, as we understand them, in this way With great labour and pains, we built up a powerful and profitable interest in Egypt. Our citizens lent to her Government at least forty millions sterling at high interest, and invested at profitable rates twenty millions more, a mass of capital which French opinion, always solicitous about the " national fortune," holds Franco bound to protect. We also obtained an influence on all political arrangements in Egypt which made our opinion highly important,—so import- ant, that we seemed to our restless Moorish subjects in Algeria and Tunis to be masters in the country to which they look as the richest and the most learned of Mussulman States. In order to consolidate these important financial and political in- terests—which, remember, seem nearer to us as a Mediterranean Power than they do to you—and at the same time to avoid quar- relling with you, we devised and established the Condominium, to which your Government, by written agreement and subsequent action, formally assented. When the Egyptian Army revolted against that Condominium, it became necessary to enforce it ; and this we should have done, with your consent, and, indeed, on your express invitation, in conjunction with you, but for an explosion of panic among our electors. They feared an expedition, they believed Prince Birimarck to be at work, and through the Chamber they compelled the Government to refrain from action. You went on, and with your customary good-fortune in action you succeeded, and are now masters de facto—and, indeed, by European custom, de jure—in the Valley of the Nile. You, nevertheless, according to your custom, profess disinterestedness, but at the same moment you take advantage of our fear of Bismarck to deprive us of the Condominium, which has cost us so much, and thus claim all influence in Egypt for yourselves. Is that either generous, or fair ? We quite admit , that we deserted you ; but you know, as well as we do, that we did it under the compulsion of force majeure, of a vote of peasants misled by an unreasoning panic, such as has re- peatedly occurred in your own annals. Our desertion did you no harm, only made your movements more decisive, and, therefore, more successful ; and you ought not to take advantage of our accidental weakness, but as your first step to restore the Condominium, and not take every- thing 'for yourselves. Of course, you say you intend to take nothing, but to restore Egypt to itself ; but that is your subtlety, for you know that autonomous Egypt must rely upon you, that autonomous Egypt will not fully protect our Egyptian moneys, and that autonomous Egypt will, in all political questions that may arise in North Africa and Syria, favour you and thwart us. This is for us a loss and a humiliation, and though we cannot threaten, in the present state of opinion, still, we have long memories. Either restore the Condominium, or, by making compensation, acknowledge that you ought to restore it ; or whenever Bismarck passes out of the horizon, we will, in Belgium, in China, at Constantinople, wherever our interests touch each other—and they touch everywhere—make things unpleasant for you.' We do not think the lapublique Franpaise could put the case more favourably for France, though it might use brighter words ; but the answer to the plea thus presented is not diffi- cult to find. The English never attacked, still less overthrew, the Condominium.. On the contrary, they professed their readiness to defend it, and asked France, even with a certain urgency and importunity, to co-operate in the work. France, after apparently agreeing, suddenly and in a manner which, but for the general knowledge of the condition of the Chamber, would have suggested deliberate treachery, with- drew ; and England found herself pledged, not to set up the Condominium, which had disappeared, but to put down anarchy in Egypt single-handed. She did so put it down, and is now engaged not in recovering her wages, but in discovering some method by which Egypt may govern herself without European interference, and without the recur- rence of similiar catastrophes. The Condominium clearly is not such a method, for besides other objections, it was tried and failed, the first cause of failure being, as Lord Derby pointed out, that the Egyptians, seeing the incessant jealousies between the two co-ordinate Powers, firmly believed that they would neutralise each other. To ask Great Britain to go back to a scheme which has already broken down and helped to produce a war, is most unreasonable, more especially when the Power making the request was herself by her own action the immediate cause of the failure. The Gambettists allege that she was not, because she was dominated.by panic ; but what Government could entertain a plea like that ? Sup- pose the British Parliament, under orders from the con- stituencies, declared war on France, and then pleaded that the electors were in a panic about invasion, would Frenchmen forgive us on that account ? France, not England, destroyed French prestige in Egypt. That the retreat of France would give England no right to confiscate her material interests in Egypt may be admitted ; but then, who proposes anything of the kind? If Egypt were annexed to-morrow, French financial inter- ests would be as safe as before ; and we are not about to annex. All that England desires to do is to start a sound Native Govern- ment in the country, and to receive from Europe such a recog- nised right of guiding it as shall ensure that it will remain sound. She would not ask even that, if there were a chance of enduring order and good government without it ; but there is no chance,—and this the Gambettists admit. The very root of their complaint is that Egypt cannot stand alone ; that without Europe she will fall either to the Sultan or into anarchy ; and that, consequently, England and France ought to govern the Valley together, which Arabi's rising of itself showed they were unable to do. The Condominium was in full working strength—was, in fact, succeeding— when Arabi and, perhaps, half Egypt assigned its existence as their reason for revolt against European influence. There is no reason in the French demand whatever, and if the Government conceded it, they would lay the foundation of an irritation on this side more dangerous to the French alliance than any irritation in Prance. The English, whether they want Egypt or not, do not want the Condominium; and they would say with reason that alliance with France was worse than useless, for whenever anything was to be done, France refused her aid, and whenever anything was to be got, France demanded half as her pay for deserting her ally. As the alternative alliance is with Germany and Italy, the seriousness for France of that condition of opinion may be readily understood.
But,' some of our friends may say, ' allowing that France is unreasonable, that unreasonableness may, under the circum- stances, be pardoned by politic men. Considering that France faces us everywhere, at Shanghai, in Newfoundland, in the West Indies, in the Pacific, and that in Constantinople she can be an invaluable ally, and considering also that she is the only Power whose hostility would seriously increase our military difficulties, is it not well to soothe away any sense of injury or humilation, even though produced by circumatances, and not by ourselves ?' Certainly it is. We have maintained in- variably that no alliance is so valuable to Great Britain, even when it is only passive, as that of France. While France is friendly, England is not only safe—for that she will remain, in any case—but thinks herself safe, and can perform her work in the world without preoccupations. A hostile France may not menace. England, but she diminishes almost incalculably the
power of England, while increasing indefinitely her burdens. With France sulking, England must keep a great army at home, a great fleet on the seas, and abstain from any . work whatever which would even momentarily leave her coasts or her colonies exposed. We have no possession anywhere, except, perhaps, Canada, -which France could not threaten, and there is no water-way in the world across which France could not throw herself. Recognising these facts, we are the last to depreciate the entente cordiale, but then the entente cordials is not to be secured by creating in every Englishman an angry dislike of France. Both people must accept it, to render a permanent alliance anything but a form. Every nation has its own defects, as well as its own qualities ; and if we once take up a suppliant attitude towards France, she will begin pressing claims which, if we understand our country- men at all, will in a few years provoke an im- patience ending, on the first occasion, in an attitude of angry defiance. It is useless to submit to France at a cost of self-respect, and in Egypt, after all that has occurred, self- respect leaves us only two alternatives,—to go forward alone, or to go forward under a well-understood agreement to abide by a European award. Either of those courses is feasible, and it is only the pressure of circumstances, the sulkiness of France, the complexities caused by the Sultan's suze- rainty, and the fear lest Europe should want England to do too much, which force the Government into the former. The British Government has many alternatives in Egypt ; but the restoration of the Condonzinizan is not one of them, and if M. Gambetta cannot or will not see that, and prefers to break off the alliance rather than allow that France, whether she retreats or fights, can be anything but victorious, this country must put up with that result. She has done everything in her power to soothe her friend, short of giving away territories not her own, or granting a Commercial Treaty as a bribe, and must just wait until that friend has recovered her temper or her sense of dignity. Nothing is to be gained in diplomacy, any more than in common life, by buying friendship through submissions which leave your own self at heart thoroughly unfriendly.
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