TOPICS OF THE DAY.
WHY SHOULD WE GO TO WAR? THE question which moat puzzles us, amidst these daily " scares" is the reason which the anti-Russian party, if it succeeds in its efforts, will assign for declaring war. Even when the Cabinet has been reconstructed again, and Lord Beaconsfield is master of the situation, and the country is hot with war-fever, he must still assign some intelligible reason to Parliament and the people for asking them for millions,—and what is it to be ? Everybody who is crying for war gives a different reason, but not one of them is consistent either with sound policy or the actual position of affairs. A good many say that Russia in reducing Turkey to vassalage has so greatly increased her own strength, that it is necessary for this country to reduce it, but then that is an argument for fighting Germany, or still more France, which, within twenty-five miles of our shores, has increased her regular Army, as Sir Garnet Wolseley shows, to 750,000 men. The mere increase of the strength or prestige of any Power is no sufficient reason for fighting it, even if it were absolutely certain that the end of the war would be its reduction. If it were so, England, which within the century has built up an Empire covering the world, ought to have been persistently attacked by Europe until she surrendered it again. Others say the development of Russia injures England directly, because England is an Asiatic Power, and her road to Asia may be endangered ; but that is an argument not for wasting strength in fighting Russia, but for using it to occupy the only road worth having, the road through Egypt., which we could obtain with decent management without war, and with the formulated consent of Europe. France objects at present, but her objection is mainly sentimental, and would, if she were fairly compensated, either in Syria or Tunis, disappear. Why should we protect either Syria or Tunis from the grasp of any Western Power, eager to act on the principle which, after all, is the first justification of our own acts in India, that the civilised world must undertake for a time the government of the semi-civilised ? A third party, again, affirms that Russian influence over Eastern Europe will be a barbarising influence, and that the Slav domination crushes instead of fertilising. Well, we do not see that in Roumania, where there is certainly more civilisation than in Turkey ; but allow that it is true, and it is an argument not for setting up Turkey again, which will be the object of our policy if we accept an Austrian alliance, but for raising Greece into a strong Power, which, if she possessed Turkey up to the Rhodope range and all the Islands, she would be, and standing forward as protector of the new nationalities of the Balkan peninsula. Then a fourth party cries out that Constantinople is the key of the world, and if it is given to Russia, either as a possession or as a vassal State, she will develope into an irresistible monarchy, fatal to civilisation. If that is fact,—and it is so absolutely con- trary to the fact, that two successive races in possession of Constantinople have slowly decayed away—that is a reason for bestowing Constantinople on some Power able to protect it, but not able to master the world—that is, a Power like Greece—or for depriving it of status by making it a free city, and not for disabling ourselves by protracted war from in- fluencing the decision which, after all, combined Europe and not any single Power must pass. But a still more numerous body declare we are pledged to keep the Russians out of Constantinople. We have examined that state- ment at length elsewhere, and can only say here that we are not so pledged,—that if we fight, it is for our convenience merely, and not for our word's sake. As to the Straits, we would fight against their being closed to the world but open to Russia as readily as any fanatic for war, but then this is a European interest also, and we can secure it without rushing into war before Russia has made any such unendurable demand. And lastly, we are told—and this is the real feeling of that great body of people which desires war—that we are insulted, that Russia is hopelessly untrustworthy, and we must thrash her till the insult is avenged, and Russia's diplomatists acquire the habit of telling the truth. The mere statement of the last proposal demonstrates its absurdity ; and as for the former, no one has ever yet shown wherein the insult has consisted. All that is alleged is that Russia is about to com- mand Constantinople with an army, just as we ourselves com- mand it with a fleet. That may be a just cause of war for other and graver reasons ; but how is it more an insult than the French occupation of Paris or the German conquest of Duppel, neither of which achievements was acceptable to this country ?
Another and an equal puzzle is the reliance which all Con- servatives are expressing upon an Austro-Hungarian alliance. Nothing can be more noteworthy than their tone upon this point. They all affirm that England can defeat Russia single-handed,—which we do not dispute if we are willing to give ten years, half a million of men, and £500,000,000 sterling to the undertaking ; if we are united, and if we are willing to bear military service,—but they all end by asserting that we shall have in Austria the ally we require by land. Where is the proof of that ? That Austria is so jealous of a new Slav State south of her dominion, and so sensitive about the Danube, that she is willing to risk a war for existence rather than permit Russia to reign, directly or •indirectly, in Bul- garia, or to retain for any time the fortresses which command the great river. Admit that this is the case, and still why should Austria fight for our interests, which have no• relation to the Danube, and receive absolutely no injury from a free Slav Bulgaria ? Why should she not, at the conclusion of war, treat us as Napoleon did, say that she cannot go on without rousing Poland, and make a peace which satisfies her- self, and not us ? Or why, three hours before the war, should she not accept a compromise which would remove her own suspicions, but do nothing for us at all ? The theory is that Russia is a very subtle Power, unguided by any prin- ciple except self-interest. Very good ; then, if Russia has to fight England, she will not want to fight Austria too, and will at the last moment offer her almost any terms. Suppose she abandons Bulgaria, or if that be too dishonourable, suppose she accepts as Bulgarian Prince an Austrian nominee, and places Widdin in Austrian hands, so getting rid of the diffi- culty of the Danube. Would Austria fight on then, at the risk, if defeated, of actually ceasing to exist, for her Ger- man subjects would instantly meet defeat by annexing them- selves to the kindred Empire, which is too strong to be defeated? And even if she would fight, would the German Chancellor perMit her to fight ? It seems to us that, wholly apart from the question of Austrian strength or Austrian fidelity, it is madness to rely so much on a Power which, by the law of its existence, must be so averse from a Slav war, must be so tempted by Turkish provinces, and must remain so completely under the control of a Power whose interests, whatever they are, are certainly not as yet identical with our own. We are not at this moment and in this article deprecating war—though we do most strongly deprecate it, believing that a Conference may be held in which all " interests " except those of Turkey can be reconciled—but we want our readers, before they join in the clamour for war, to look the subject once more steadily in the face, and ask themselves what they are going to fight for, what in their own minds are to be the ultimate terms of peace f Is the Treaty at the end of the war to reconsecrate Ottoman authority, or to substitute for it a new authority, or to contain an apology to England for a temporary occupation of Constantinople, or to be only a solemn promise from the Government of Russia that it never,. never, never will be tricky any more A war, to be justifiable at all, should have at least some definite object, some goal to which men may point, and say, "When this is attained, there shall again be peace." What is the object or the goal in the war now so eagerly demanded f There was one in the Crimean war, namely, to secure the independence and integrity of Turkey ; but that is gone, and it remains for the Government, if they decide on war, to define its end and describe its justification. That has not been done yet, and that ought to be done before any one of those who are now half-carried away by the popular excitement should give up his resistance to a policy which, if pursued, will within a few months be more deeply repented than any policy which ever yet stirred the nation. It is a European war into which we shall plunge, without a single serious interest of our own having been so much as threatened—for we regard the free- dom of the Straits as inevitable—and with a certainty that when peace comes again, ours will be the interests which will be the least regarded.
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