EUROPE ON THE BRINK
By ELIZABETH WISKEMANN
WHEN Ciano's diaries were published one was constantly exasperated by finding that the most interesting political talks were minuted "elsewhere." A new Mondadori publication* has now appeared, containing a number of Italian Foreign Office documents (some of which were published in the Corriere della Sera nearly a year ago), and the patience of historians is revtfarded, for " elsewhere " is here revealed to their eyes. Not quite in its entirety, unfOrnmately, for there are various gaps. For instance, there are no documents in this volume dated between September 23rd and October 22nd, 1938; in other words, no Italian light is thrown upon the Munich Conference and the German occupation of the territories the Czechs were forced to cede at that time. And whereas the collection is rich in the earlier years after Ciano's appointment as Foreign Minister in June, 1936, it tapers off sadly in 1941 and 1942 without reaching his dismissal in February, 1943. These minutes of Ciano's are far less outspoken than his diaries, partly, of course, because they were written as formal records, but also because they were liable to be passed to Allied Foreign Ministers for their information.
One of the most interesting and important documents in this collection is the record of a secret interview on September 23rd, 1936, between Mussolini and Hans Frank who, from being Hitler's solicitor, had become Reich Commissar for Justice, but was also one of the Nazi Party's hommes de confiance in Italian matters ; no one associated him with Poland in those days. Between the Nazi leaders and the Fascist gerarchi, declared Frank according to Ciano, "direct relations are necessary outside and above official diplomacy." The Mussolini-Frank interview was historically decisive, however, because Frank brought the Duce an invitation from Hitler to visit Germany as soon as it could be arranged, and this led to Mussolini's expedition the next year, which impressed him irrevocably with Germany's strength. At the same time as he delivered the invitation to the Duce Frank asked that Ciano should visit the Fiihrer immediately, and thus instigated Ciano's journey to Berlin and Berchtesgaden, . which was almost equally important, for it led to the halo-German Agreement of October, 1936, which was proclaimed to the world by Mussolini.
*L'Europa -verso la Catastrofe. The History of Europe from 1936 to 1942 in 184 conversations . . . minuted by Galeazzo Ciano, together with , 40 unpublished diplomatic documents. Mondadori. Milan, 1948. (1,100 lire.)
It was Ciano's first political encounter with Hitler, who excited him- self inordinately against Russia and Britain by turns. He was con- vinced, he said, that Britain wished to attack Germany and Italy, but together they would soon be strong enough to force her to abandon this ambition. Germany would be ready for war in three years (i.e., in 5939), said Hitler, but would be still better prepared if she had four or five years' delay. Ciano noticed that the Fiihrer, nevertheless, showed uncertainty about Britain, and Neurath told Ciano jealously that it all depended on Ribbentrop, who tried from time to time to inject Hitler with pro-British optimism. "Any success of Ribbentrop's in London—anyway very improbable—would spell the failure of Neurath," Ciano commented.
From a British point of view the most remarkable paper in this collection is a very long despatch from Grandi to Ciano dated February 59th, 1938, which describes two interviews he had had with Chamberlain and Eden the day before. "I have made . . . for Your Excellency," Grandi wrote, "this careful and detailed record of these two conversations because I consider that . . . no comment could better reproduce the present political situation here." Although it seems that no actual notes were made during these interviews, and although one naturally hesitates to accept Grandi's testimony, he can have had little interest in inventing the story he tells of the help which Chamberlain gave him ; it was obvious that if Chamberlain asked him for ammunition against Eden, as he said, he gladly provided it. The moment was critical. The Spanish policy of Germany and Italy had reduced the labours of the Non-Intervention Committee to absurdity, and the Anglo-Italian "gentleman's agreement" of January, 1937, had consequently broken down. And finally, six days before the meetings which Grandi describes Schuschnigg had visited Hitler at the Berghof.
It was clear that Austria was in the gravest danger, and, with Austria, most of Eastern Europe. Eden, therefore, was prepared to approach Italy strictly on condition that she committed herself in some way to the defence of Austria. But in accordance with his instructions from Rome to emphasise Italian loyalty to the Axis Grandi absolutely refused to discuss Austria, and implied brusquely to Eden that it would be waste of time to meet. This was the moment which Chamberlain chose to make unconditional advances to Italy, begging Grandi to meet Eden with him at No. to Downing Street. The Prime Minister hoped, it appears, that a London-Rome rapprochement might inhibit Hitler's descent upon Vienna ; many people believe, on the contrary, that Chamberlain's policy precipi- tated the Anschluss.
It is particularly interesting to find recorded by the Fascist Ambas- sador himself how resolutely Eden now refused to go behind the back of the Non-Intervention Committee and demanded in fact that Italy should withdraw her" volunteers" from Spain if she seriously wished to come to terms with Britain. Over this point, too, Chamberlain seemed to take Grandi's part rather than that of his own Foreign Minister. " Chamberla:n.and Eden," wrote Grandi in his account of February 18th, "were not a Premier and Foreign Minister discussing a delicate international situation with the Ambassador of a foreign country. They were, and revealed themselves as such to me, . . . enemies face to face like two cocks fighting one another." Every question which Chamberlain put to Grandi—one sees in reading the dispatch that this was so—was asked in order that the Italian should deny Eden's contentions. In fact the two men were duelling, Grandi thought, for "their future position in the Government and in the Conservative Party." "I would not wish to leave the impression with your Excellency," continued Grandi, " . . . that Chamberlain has in mind any plan of resistance to Germany in the matter of Austria." The British attitude would remain, as he had always indicated, one of "indignant resignation." "In any case neither Germany nor Austria provides the issue between Chamberlain and Eden at this moment. It is Italy alone." While Chamberlain wished to recognise the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and come to terms with Mussolini, Grandi considered that Eden was trying to play the new Pitt to the Napoleon of Italy, an indictment of which any man might surely be proud, the more when pronounced by a personal and political antagonist. One understands more precisely than one has before why Eden resigned two days after these Grandi interviews.
The political atmosphere of London as he wrote his dispatch was, Grandi said, the same as that of the days which preceded the Hoare- Laval crisis in December, 1935. "Churchill, the personal enemy of Chamberlain, is again gathering the Left-Wing Conservatives for a declaration of solidarity with Eden and a vote in his favour in the Commons. . . . For his part Chamberlain has mobilised and is mobilising the City, the members on the Right and of the Centre and all the political forces at his disposal." It comes as something of a shock to discover, if Grandi may be trusted with regard to this detail also, that Chamberlain had been in secret communication with the Fascist Ambassador behind Eden's back since October, 1937, and in almost daily contact since January 15—he had only become Prime Minister in the preceding May. "Simply to put it on record I may inform Your Excellency that yesterday evening after the Downing Street meeting Chamberlain secretly sent his man to me (we met in an ordinary taxi at a taxi rank) to say to me that he greeted me heartily, that he had appreciated my state- ments, which were extremely useful to him, and that he was sure that everything would go better in future." What, one wonders, had become of the solidarity of the Cabinet? Was this the way to defend constitutional government?
Previous page
