THE SITUATION OF THE PAPACY.
THE Roman Catholic Bishop of Salford has published, in the form of a Lenten pastoral, a very able summary of the Roman Question from the Catholic point of view. In many of its aspects, this point of view is identical with that from which the question is regarded by reasonable men of all religions, and in only one aspect are the two points of view different. We fear, however, that in the opinion of the Bishop of Salford, this single difference will outweigh all the agreement. The points on which reasonable men are of one mind on the subject, are the international character of the Roman Question, and the value to the Italian nation of a full under- standing with the Pope. The Roman Question is inter- national, because it involves the liberty and independence of the Pope. The contention of the Italian Radicals is that the Pope is free and independent now, and accidentally, no doubt, this is true. The Pope says what he likes, and holds unchallenged intercourse with his spiritual children in all countries. He may denounce every act of the Italian Executive and every measure of the Italian Legislature, and no one will interfere with him. But he enjoys this freedom only accidentally. A majority in the Italian Parliament, gathered together perhaps on some issue wholly unconnected with the Roman Question, might repeal the Law of Guaran- tees, and thereupon the Pope would, in the view of Italian Municipal law, be only an Italian subject. The Pope's freedom from the control of the Italian Government rests on precisely the same footing as the freedom from agrarian oppression which is now enjoyed by honest Irishmen. The sanction in each case is an Act of Parliament. Take away the Crimes Act in the one country, and the Law of Guarantees in the other, and there is no more security for either. Nor is it easy to feel convinced that this latter step will never be taken. Signor Ciispi has consistently denied the international character of the Roman Ques- tion, and claimed for the Italian people the right to settle it as they choose. In this he has gone directly counter to the best traditions of Italian statesmanship. When the Italians seized Rome, all foreign Governments were assured that they would be consulted as to the means of securing the liberty and independence of the Holy See. In the words of Signor Visconti Venosta, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, "the Pope possesses all the rights of a Sovereign not by grace and concession of the Kingdom of Italy and thus his title of sovereignty cannot be withdrawn from him by any act of violence." In form, the Law of Guarantees is an admission of this sovereignty; but in fact, it is a denial of it. It declares the Pope a Sovereign, but inasmuch as it does so by a purely municipal act, it makes him a Sovereign "by the grace and conces- sion of the Kingdom of Italy,"—a concession which can be withdrawn as easily as it was granted. From the point of view of Italian law, he is in fact, and for the moment, a Sovereign ; but if a particular statute were repealed, he would at once become a subject.
The inconvenience of this state of things has hitherto been concealed by the prudence of the Italian Government in not challenging the Pope's sovereign character, and for a long time by the inoffensive position of Italy among the Great Powers. The Bishop of Salford asks very pertinently how France and the French Catholics would regard the Pope if he were a Prussian subject, how England and the English Catholics would regard him if he were a dependent of the Czar, how the Irish Catholics would regard him if he lived at Malta under the protection of the British Government. "It is manifest that for the Pope to be the subject of a King would be the same thing in the eyes of men as for him to be the creature of a King ; unless he should continue to live, as at present, in open hostility." In any one of these cases, the friction likely to be engendered is at once evident. In the case of Italy, until lately there has been no such obvious antagonism with any other Power ruling a large or discontented Catholic popula- tion. But her entrance into the Triple Alliance has created one such antagonism in the present, and more than one in the possible future. France would be hardly more willing to acquiesce in the subjection of the Holy See to Italy than in its subjection to Germany ; and as Germany is a Power not unlikely to make enemies, other nations besides France may at one time or another find themselves holding a position towards Italy, as the ally of Germany, which would make the Pope's subjection to her exceedingly distasteful to them.
Every well-wisher to Italy must desire to see her arrive at some modus vivendi with the Pope. So long as the two remain at war with one another, two elements of great im- portance to the well-being of any country must be wanting. The really conservative feeling of the nation is estranged from the Government, and under constant temptation to coquet at least with revolutionary movements, while the religious feeling of the nation, instead of being on the side of law and order, offers a constant if passsive resistance to the institutions by which law and order are maintained. This state of things is aggravated in the present instance by the Pope's refusal to allow Catholics of the devouter sort to vote at elections,—a refusal which seems to us as shortsighted from the point of view of his own interests as it is injurious to the interests of Italy. We agree, then, in part, with the Bishop of Salford, and if his appeal were addressed to Italy alone, we might readily support it. But underneath the Bishop's argument there lies the assumption that it is the business of the other Powers to impose the abandonment of Rome to the Pope upon Italy. It is a matter of international concern that the Pope should be free and independent, and as he cannot be free and independent unless he is a territorial Prince, Italy must not be permitted to oppose an arrangement which is for the general good of Christendom. In dealing with this argument, there is no need to enter upon the difficult questions which arise out of a conflict between the right of a nation to manage its own affairs, and the obliga- tion laid upon it not to manage them to the injury of other nations. There is a preliminary objection to the Bishop of Salford's plan in the fact that it would give Europe no guarantee for Papal independence which may not be equally well obtained at a smaller cost. Europe is no longer broken up into a multitude of small States. She is more and more becoming an aggregate of a few great States, which main- tain towards the small States that remain an attitude either of protection or toleration. If the Pope were made a territorial Sovereign to-morrow, what real guarantee would there be that he would be left in the peaceable enjoyment of his possessions ? The guarantee of material force would plainly be wanting, for the Papal Army would be too small to resist an attack from the weakest of European Powers. The choice would be, therefore, between two kinds of protection,—protection by a single Power, such as Pius IX. enjoyed for twenty years previous to 1870, or protection by international treaty. The first of these methods is open to the obvious objection that it cannot last very long, and that it does not answer the purpose while it lasts. Amid the shifting contingencies of European politics, there can be no assurance that there will always be some nation willing to supply troops for the support of the Papal throne, or that it will always suit the purpose of the Great Powers to allow this duty to be undertaken by one of their number. Moreover, a Pope maintained in a sovereignty by a single Power will always tend to be, or—if the Bishop of Salford likes the phrase better—will always be supposed to be, under the exclusive influence of that Power. Consequently, the only guarantee for the Pope's territorial sovereignty that would be of any real value would be the guarantee of a European treaty. It seems to us that it would be very much easier and quite as effective for Europe to guarantee the Pope's independence as to guarantee his territory. The sanction in each case would be the knowledge of any Power possessing the means of interfering, whether with lus territory or his independence, that such interference would not be permitted ; but we put it to the Bishop of Salford whether, if a treaty has to be obtained, the chances of obtaining it would not be very much greater if no transfer of territory were involved.
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