THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUDAN.
TT is useless to discuss the Russian settlement any further 1. until the papers are before Parliament and have been carefully studied. The journal which best states the Russian case, and probably is best informed as to the secret Russianview, warned us, indeed„ on Wednesday, that if England didnot hold herself responsible for all future Afghan excesses; Russia would. first punish the Afghans and then annexas much of Afghanterritory as might be needful. That means, of' course, that. Russia is determined when it is convenient to conquer Afghanistan, and is worth remembering asa warning.; but MT. Gladstone's speech of Monday breathes a verydifferent spirit. It is' clear from every sentence of that well-weighed deliverance that the Premierbelieves not only that his Government hasachieved a considerable success, but that this will be acknowledged, when the settlement is made known, by statesmen of all parties. As Mr; Gladstone rarely misunderstands public feeling, and ashe is by no means too trustful of Russian professions, this is, for the present, final ; and the public can only hope that it will, when all is known, share his obvious satisfaction. There remains for discussion the policy announced on Monday as to the Soudan ; and upon this the country, including many Liberals, is, we think, inclined to be unfair. There is a feeling abroad, which finds-full expression in the country journals, that the Government is wise in retiring, but that it has changed its policy somewhat suddenly. and requires pardon for the blood and treasure wasted to no purpose in the Desert. That is unjust, and we have the less hesitation in saying so because we have never supported Mr. Gladstone's policy in Egypt, believing it to rest upon a noble illusion as to the selfgoverning capacity of the Egyptians, and entirely admit that some blunders of detail are perceptible in recent proceedings-. As a whole, however, the Soudan policy, of the Cabinet can be attacked only by a flat denial of the primary data. Those data are three,—that this country intends to restore the Soudan to its inhabitants ; that it was unhappily needful to rescue General Gordon ; and that the Mussulman uprising led by the Mahdi of El Obeid must be prevented from becorning a menace to the Mahommedan world. There is not one of those data which can be honestly denied, which has not repeatedly been affirmed by Parliament,, or which has been in any way abandoned by the Ministry. They have made every effort to surrender the Soudan to its people, offering them peace and self-government over and over again, if only they would allow the foreign garrisons to depart; they sent. an army to rescue General Gordon, and but for treachery among his 'own immediate followers, offieerseelected-andpromoted by-himself, they would have rescued him ; and they-have so defeated the Mahdi's followers -that Iris influence -has been broken,-and that for-the present, it-may be for-years to come, he is powerless-to fling a Soudanese army either upon Egypt or on' Mecca. That it-was harsh or possfbly unwarrantable,-as we-did not intend to govern Egypt, to force.Empt to surrender the Soudan, is a defensible proposition ; bat then it is not the proposition . which 'the critics of the Government -submit. They agree in that policy as a counsel of wiedora,und are never tired of describing -the vastness of the'Sou.dan, which cannot be exag-gerated, and is even yet not 'fully perceived ; its desolateness, which is exaggerated, but is-true from-the European point of 'view ; and its untameableness, -which, so far -as 'English politicians -are concerned, is -undoubtedly -the fact. The country -can be held, as Algeria is held,-by a force equal .to the -British -garrison -of India ; bat it cannot be held in-any other way, and we have no -such garrison'to-'waste in -holding it. There is -not a responsible statesman in the -country-who would advise the retention of the -Soudan as a British -dependency ; and Khartoum cannot be -held in peace "without such 'retention. • The Government, therefore, in leaving it, is-not only doing-what it said it would 'do, but is -doing it -avith• the consent of .all etatesmen -of all parties. The 'Ministry, again,-may have been in the-wrong in sending an expedition to rescue General Gordon, hut-none of its opponents say so; -they.alteommended the -enterprise,end they all lamented its -purely -accidental failure. And 'finally, it may have .been -wrongto attempt to -crash 'the 'Mahdi ; --but that -effort was -sanctioned -by Parliament, and by the majority of 'the people, -mid was approved by all statesmen in 'Europe, who foresaw that if Vahommed Ahmed were not checked, a general Arab uprising might evolve a conquering army of semibarbarians who might flood Turkey and Northern Africa, and ultimately force all Europe into a dangerous and exhausting crusade for its suppression. If the Govern-meat and those -statesmen were -right, as -we -believe they • were, 'then the blood and •treasure -expended -were rightfully expended. The railway -from Suakim to 'Berber .may 'lace -been en ill-considered idea, adopted from that 'deference to ill-instructed opinion-which •is the true defect of this 'Ministry ; but to complain of the slaughter of Osman Digna's-men as "useless massacre "is absurd. Theywere not uselessly massacred. They were killed because -they formed a wing of 'the Mahdi's -army, intent, like their leader, on conquering the Sfahommedan world, and -able to afford -him the greatest assistance in his -projected 'descent on Mecca. They -were fairly fought for adequate reason, and their defeat can only be blamed by-those who contend -that even 'defensive war, if it .be not resistance to actual invasion, is irrational -and nn-Christian. As to the -.word "-massacre," which is' flung -about to prejadice-the discussion, ell -we can say is that the Sondarrese very -nearly defeated -our best--soldiers; and that if any-men in the world ere neither-defenceless, nor weak, nor unresisting,.those men are the -Hadendowas. They were no more massacred 'than the French who fell at -Speicheren, -and not so 'mach, for-the latter -were outnumbered. If it was right • to -defeat -the Slahdi it -was -right -to defeat his followers; and no-mode of defeating -brave -barbarians who court tattle anrl-die fighting, -without killing them, has yet been devised by man. We wish, .as-heartily as any Quakers, that there-were a ersy,-bnt there is 'none; and if -their -defeat is assumed as -expedient, the -objection to killing .is, therefore, only an objection-to-war under any circumstances.
The-single-objection--which can now be-raised-to. the 'Govern-xnent•policy is' that-they-are retiring ; and on what. does-that rest? 'It may be-eaid-that.the Mahdi will recover e but where is the-proof -of.that ? The evidence -is that his influence is so 'hroken thatthis own compatriots and co-religionists are-attacking-him-in -a-way-which, whether ^they-are successful or not, must-foryears-cripple-his power-of leading-an army-out of his -own dominions. Are-we to keep 'fourteen thousaridS'eglishmen -camped in-the-Desert 'and on -the' Nile until-that civil war settles itself? 'That is surely -an unreasonable-demand ; -and if -lye-are-to-retireat-'all,-why-:notnow? Because, answers the Titree.z, -we ought .to -keep 'Khartoum as -an outlying -post 'fur 'she defence and propagation of European civilisation. 'Ver31-good,-thatis a-1)6li7, and a large one,-and one which,if we-were -going to -keep Egypt, we should 'disease-with aeerlsin-sympathy ; but, then that is not the policy either of the Government orbf 'those-14m queetion its resolve. They both -refuse to-holdKhartouna ; and except to hold it, or to unser a victorious Afahdi, -what -should we -go there 'for?
but they say, there is the railway to Berber ! •Sarely Ito sanction -that and .then -abandon it is weak ? .Itenever was sanctioned except -to facilitate military .-operatiesui ; and if those are abandoned, what is the :use of the railway ? To diffuse civilisation ? -Rubbish! A railway can no more civilise a people who have to be shot down to prevent their tearing it up, than the bullets themselves can. 'There are new fanatics among us who believe in railways and telegraphs and -other methods of hurrying as they once believed in 'Missionaries ; but the Soudanese no.morewant.the gospel of Manchesterthan they want the Gospel of Christ, and we have -no more right to force the one on them by.the bayonet than -to force . the other. Railways must be 'built as roads must be cut, if we cannot reach enemies without theta; but to lay a railway with human lbodies for sleepers in the -name of civilisation is -preposterous. And -so we come to the last argument, -which is that -we owe obligations -to the "friendly tribes" who :hare helped us, and who =will be -killed out if we depart. ,Why -shoreld-they be killed out any-more -than before We -have weakened-their enemies,-notstrengthened them. As amatter of fact, Osman Digna's men not only are not going -to kill them, but, as was reported only this -week,-abstain from -firing on the "-friendlies" -when they are set to watch our -camp • by ; the obvious -reason being that the Hadendcrwas -do not want.a blood:dot/a-with tribes who -will be =alwayswith them, 'whether eve go.or stay. We believe that if we assist them with -arms and animals and 'money, the " friendlies " will-vote us. away as readily as the enemy 'would; 'audio any case,-where is the remedy ? We must go -some day,'-and the longer we stay the more difficult -will the friendly tribes find it to -discover a modus viveadi -with hostile tribes who by that time-will .be in despair. The plain truth of the matter is,etlaat if the 'Mahal • is still 'strong, or if we intend to annex the .Soudan, either -to England-or to Egypt, then, we areayrongin 'retiring ; but if the Mahdi is weak, and wo intend to abandon the Soudan -at -all, then the Government is right. It dins expended much blood and much -money, but in its own jndgmeat it has -done its work ; andto spend -more -would be, for it, unjustifiable waste.
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