International marriage a la mode
Raymond Carr
DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE by Larry Siedentop Allen Lane, £18.99, pp. 254 Larry Siedentop has no doubts. Feder- alism is the right goal for Europe. But it must be truly liberal, democratic federalism embodied in a constitution with 'a formal disposition of authority and power, checks and balances and maximising popular par- ticipation'. In the post-Maastricht rush to `ever closer union' we may unknowingly be fobbed off with an inferior article: bureau- cratic centralism dressed up in federal clothes without the serious and high-level debate which accompanied the drafting of the American constitution, to Siedentop a model for Europe. 'I am convinced,' he writes, `that only if the deeper issues are identified can federalism in Europe become either plausible or attractive.' He has not written yet another boring book on the development and functioning of the institutions of the EU but a sophisticated treatise on political theory that confronts these deeper issues head on. His aim is to provoke debate and, if the flights of his his- torical imagination sometimes leave one gasping, he succeeds.
Siedentop reminds us of the precondi- tions that made the American constitution possible: a strong tradition of local govern- ment under the British crown; a shared political and religious culture; a common language. But these preconditions are either weak or non-existent in Europe. French cultural chauvinism rules the use of English as a common language out of court. The makers of the American consti- tution were dealing with the incorporation of the various states — Virginia, Mas- sachusetts etc — into a federal union. The architects of a European federal union will be confronted by the much more difficult task of incorporating nation states, each with its own particular political culture and many without deep-seated democratic tra- ditions — the old GDR for example — or ones who have established pluralist democ- racies relatively recently — Spain and Por- tugal are such.
A consistent thesis of this book is that the moral foundations of liberal democracy are the residual legacy of Christianity: 'The moral beliefs that Christianity fostered still underpin civil society in Europe.' Christian- ity, in theory, was subversive, a revolution- ary onslaught on societies and political systems based on inherited status, birth or family for example. For Christianity, all human beings are moral beings equal in the sight of God and therefore possessed of equal claims to justice. It has a universal inclusive message whereas the democracy of the classical city states was exclusive and particular; such republics breed the civic virtues so cherished by Machiavelli, but these heroic virtues are practised by privi- leged citizens; in Siedentop's striking phrase, they are 'paraded' in front of slaves and mechanics. However, the Catholic church did not live up to its revolutionary message. It sided with authority. But the radical individualism of its message allowed `anti-clericals' who rejected the claims of the church and indeed of religion itself to become the proponents of liberal democra- cy and the free market of competing indi- viduals.
Siedentop is a constitutionalist. Constitu- tions foster active citizenship. The obstreperous citizen can appeal to the courts to defend his rights. He is fiercely critical of Britain's unwritten constitution. It is an inadequate guarantee of individual rights and fails to impose constraints on an executive with a parliamentary majority, as we have seen with Blair's media-driven presidentialism. Dicey long ago pointed out the implications of the sovereignty of par- liament, the core of our unwritten constitu- tion. If parliament legislated that we should all wear Bermuda shorts, the police and the judiciary would be bound to enforce the law. The limits are 'common sense' and the fear of defeat at the polls. I think these lim- its have operated successfully. Nor do I share Siedentop's view that our politics and society suffer from aristocratic hangovers. It is absurd to argue that we make alliances with authoritarian states like Saudi Arabia because our establishment is staffed by residual aristocrats.
Siedentop sees liberal democracy under threat when it forgets the Christian mes- sage of the moral autonomy of the individ- ual — what he calls the `economism' of a crude utilitarianism that sees the purpose of politics as the satisfaction of individual wants turns active citizens into mere con- sumers. Hence the primacy of growth to satisfy their wants. Economists, who have a receipt for growth, rule the roost in a capi- talist democracy. Then there is the 'siren call' of communitarians. Community has become a voguish buzzword. While corn- munitarians may be correct, that individual decisions must be seen in a social context; to prioritise the claims of community threatens to undermine the moral autono- my of the individual. Worst of all is fash- ionable multi-culturalism. A respect for the diverse cultures of our societies is one thing. To accept that political life be based on the claims of groups, defined by the colour of the skin, sexual preference etc, likewise threatens to erode the moral autonomy of the individual. The political correctness of sentimental liberals in accepting these claims weakens the univer- sal claims of liberalism itself. Should the state subsidise Islamic schools, he asks, when their teachings deny the moral auton- omy of the individual? 'The liberty of groups is not the same as the liberty of individuals'; it may involve an assault on such a conception of liberty.
If the kind of `transparent' democratic, liberal federalism which Siedentop advocates really came into existence, Eurosceptics like myself might well accept it as the best of a bad job. But there is no consensus in Europe as to what powers should be granted to the EU and what powers should be left to the constituent nation states. The much vaunted concept of subsidiarity (ie that powers should be granted to those bodies most competent to administer them) is dangerous when it lacks constitutional definition.
When Britain was excluded from the Community and German democratic enthusiasm was of recent growth, France was left in the driving seat. It is determined to remain there. Jolted out of any Gaullist notion of a Europe of Nations by the threat posed by German unification, it deter- mined to accelerate the creation of a unit- ed 'federal' Europe. This will produce a Europe modelled on its own centralist, eli- tist, bureaucratic traditions and in its own interests. Essentially this vision is powered by the brilliant civil servants who had engi- neered the postwar recovery of France. They are now ruthless and obstinate in their defence of French interests in the EU. Their success is evident in their tri- umphant defence of the absurd Common Agricultural Policy, against all odds, and in the absurdly low financial contribution of France to the EU's budget.
So fierce is Siedentop's criticism of the shortcomings and corruptions of Brussels and the dreadful consequences of an ill- considered rush towards 'ever closer union' without serious political debate that an unintended consequence of the book is that it may become a sourcebook for Eurosceptics. For Siedentop union must be founded on consent and consensus, and on the existence of what might be termed a European patriotism. But these are in short supply when a political elite pushing for union at all costs is out of touch with its future citizens. To provide these condi- tions, which made the American constitu- tion possible, will be a long job, the work of decades if not generations. Siedentop's final sentence runs, 'Federalism is the right goal for Europe. But Europe is not yet ready for federalism.'
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