MARGINAL COMMENT
By HAROLD NICOLSON
IT must be admitted that public opinion, both in Parliament and outside, is becoming perplexed by the confusions and contradic- tions which obscure our war aims. In 1940 the whole mind and soul of the people were concentrated upon avoiding defeat ; in 1942 and 1943 our energies were centred upon the construction of victory ; but now that it is evident that the United Nations are bound sooner or later to achieve supremacy, it is right that people should ask them- selves what form our conquest will assume. During the present weeks, moreover, when the Western offensive is impending, and the Eastern offensive hourly gathering momentum, it is inevitable that the political aspects of the war should receive increased attention. It is not only that people have begun to ask themselves whether the surrender of Germany could not be hastened by political means ; it is also, and more immediately, that the present accumulation of power is driving Germany's smaller allies to an acute consideration of their present dangers. Finland, .Rumania, Bulgaria and even Hungary are showing signs of disquiet, and it is tempting (although by no means necessarily correct), to consider whether their readiness to cut their present losses might not be stimulated by some indication on the part of the United Nations that there does exist some alterna- tive to destruction. It may well be that there are potent arguments of high policy or high strategy which render it undesirable at the present moment to indicate to the satellites of Germany that there is any backdoor of escape. But it is only natural that the public, being uninformed of these arguments, should feel uneasy lest valuable political opportunities may be missed.
This uneasiness centres,-as is natural, around the anomalies which obscure, on the one hand the Atlantic Charter, and on the other hand the phrase " unconditional surrender." Under the Charter the three main Allies renounced all desire for personal aggrandisement while offering to our enemies, whether small or great, the prospect of equitable economic treatment. Yet this side-door of escape would now seem to have been slammed and bolted. The Prime Minister has informed the Germans that the Atlantic Charter does not apply to them. And having thus slammed the door in their face, he has driven home the heavy iron bolt of " unconditional surrender." Some of his reasons for doing so may be excellent reasons ; others may be imposed by the pressure of events ; but the fact remains that, whereas the slamming of the door has echoed through every corridor, the reasons for this action appear either unavowable or inexplicable. Since if the Atlantic Charter does not apply to our enemies then, as Mr. Pickthorn remarked, to whom does it apply? And if surrender is really to be unconditional, then why will it become necessary (as it will certainly become necessary) to negotiate conditions of peace? In this manner phrases and formulas which had a direct and vital bearing upon conditions when pugnacity was our sole weapon, appear inapplicable to a stage when the preponderance of power is slowly but very surely swinging to our side.
* * * * It is possible, of course, that the attitude of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt has been influenced by their memories of what occurred in 1918. It might be argued, though not, I think, very reasonably, that many of our later troubles arose owing to the con- fusion surrounding the surrender of Germany in November, 1918. On October 2nd of that year Prince Max of Baden addressed to President Wilson a Note in which he begged him to negotiate a peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points. These fourteen principles of peace had been enunciated by the President in a speech of January 8th, 1918, without the knowledge or approval of Great Britain, France, Italy and the other Allied and Associated Powers. The President was obliged, therefore, to ask his associates whether they also were ready to accept an armistice and negotiate a peace upon the basis of these principles. They insisted upon being in- formed with greater precision as to the meaning and implications of the fourteen points which the President had proclaimed. This explanation was furnished to them on President Wilson's behalf by Colonel House, and, in fact, the " commentary " of President Wilson's emissary differed in many important respects from the original text of the pronouncement. A situation thus arose in which the Germans accepted the Fourteen Points as originally proclaimed, whereas the Associated Powers accepted them only as " interpreted " by Colonel House. The Germans, moreover, were never informed of the House " commentary." They were able in after years to contend that, whereas they had laid down their arms upon certain specified conditions, these conditions were violated once they found themselves at the mercy of their victors. In actual fact, no deception was intended. On the one hand, the principles expounded by the President were regarded as axioms of Allied policy, and had been proclaimed in almost identical terms by Mr. Lloyd George himself. On the other hand, the complete defeat of the German armies was imminent and inevitable. The whole theory of deception was evolved many years afterwards ; at the time the Germans were willing to accept any terms in order to rescue the remnants of their armies. It may well be that Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt, in in- sisting upon " unconditional surrender," are seeking to secure that a similar misunderstanding, and the legends it gives rise to, does not occur next time.
* * * * As an attitude, this may be both firm and wise ; but as applied to wavering satellites, it may be too rigid. The Charter, as originally propounded, may, in fact, be at several points inapplicable to the con- ditions created by Russia's tremendous victories ; that does not mean, however, that it has lost its validity in so far as Great Britain and the United States are concerned. " Unconditional Surrender" again is a resounding phrase, but does it mean more than that we are not ready to spare the Germans total deteat in the field, or to tempt them into premature surrender by promises which we shall be unable to perform? The stage may be reached, even before this year is over, when we shall be obliged to suggest to Germany and her satellites what sort of future they may expect. The Charter itself indicates the main outlines of that expectation. Germany is to be deprived of every means of making further war ; but economically she will be granted equality of treatment with other Powers. The implications of this theory are more valuable and pertinent than is generally realised. It is true that, when Germany again becomes a member of the comity of nations, she will argue that she can only co-operate upon a basis of " equality," and that " equality " means an equal right to defend herself. Her whole propaganda will be directed towards convincing Europe that to keep her in a con- dition of inferiority of physical power is illogical and unfair. But such arguments this time must be unwaveringly countered by a blunt refusal. And our refusal must be defended, not in terms of British, but in terms of German, thought.
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I was reading recently a most interesting article on this subject contributed to Die Zeitung by Dr. P. H. Frankel, in which he examines the " Mang each Osten" from the historical point of view. The implication is that Germany prospered so long as she regarded herself as a great trading community, and failed so soon as she embarked upon schemes of conquest. The Hansa towns under such an argument were infinitely more in line with Germany's true destiny than was Potsdam. It will be essential, in the years which follow upon Germany's defeat, to " rationalise " her failure. It will be no use seeking to convince her that she has committed a crime, since her own sense of injury will be impervious to such an accusation. But it will be possible to convince her that she made a mistake ; not a small error of strategy or diplomacy, but what she would call a fundamental " geo-political " mistake. The proportions of power in the modern world render any German political or military hegemony impossible ; but her industrial and trading capacities may well open for her a future of calm prosperity. That is the hope which we can give her ; it is the only hope.
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