The Anglo-Egyptian Breakdown
THERE is only one reasonable explanation of the most regrettable refusal of the Egyptian delegation to sign the draft Treaty. Nahas Pasha and his colleagues were doubtful of what might be said about the acceptance of the Treaty by the extreme members of the Wafd. No Egyptian politician when he is absent from his country is quite sure of -what is happening at home. He is filled with misgiving and suspicions, and it is only fair to add that he generally has just cause. The chances are ten to one that while he is away somebody is pouring advice very different from his into the ear of authority. And, then, there are changes in the relative strength of the Party groups which are probably also designed for his discomfiture.
In the case of the Treaty which has just been rejected there were special grounds for fearing intrigue and dis- loyalty in Egypt while the delegation was in London. It must be remembered that the Treaty was originally negotiated by Mahmud Pasha, the Dictator, and had a bad name on that account. Yet it was only Mahmud's name which was bad ; there was hardly anything in the Treaty itself to which a member of the Wafd in an unprejudiced state of mind could not have subscribed. So far as we can judge, the delegation came to London knowing that Mr. Henderson could not possibly concede anything more in substance than he had already conceded to Mahmud Pasha, yet resolved to sign the Treaty, which as a matter of fact was benevolent and generous and gave to Egypt all that she needs for her content- ment and safety.
After long discussions, however, doubts—inspired more or less as we have suggested—ruled the delegates, and an attack of nerves did the rest. It is lamentable that the representatives of the Wafd should not be able to count confidently on the support of all their fellow- members. Yet so it is. One asks oneself how any Egyptian Party will ever feel strong enough to take the plunge—for assuredly no Party will ever be numeri- cally stronger than the Wafd is now. One good sign, nevertheless, must not be ignored. The delegation left London in excellent spirits and with ready protestations of friendship for Great Britain. The door, as Mr. Henderson has said, is left open. It is justifiable to hope that when Egypt has had a long enough experience of the rather humiliating disadvantages of leaving the Reserved Points unsettled she will declare with a whole mind for accepting the Treaty.
The breakdown was due entirely to disagreement about the Sudan. When we write, the promised White Paper has not been published, but it is said that Nahas Pasha demanded that the Agreement of 1899 should be entirely reviewed within a year. In particular he seems to have demanded that Egyptian troops should be sent back to the Sudan in token of Egyptian sovereignty (or perhaps only of equality of sovereignty) and that Egyptians should have a right of free immigration into the Sudan. When Mr. Henderson flatly refused to agree to these and similar demands the Egyptians announced that they could not sign away the Sudan. This phrase implies that the Labour Government was trying to deprive them of a territory to which they had a legal title. If that were really true Egypt would command and deserve sympathy, but it is not true.
As a great deal of old history seems to have been forgotten, it will be as well to restate here what happened at the end of the last century. The revolt of the Mandi was so menacing thirty odd years ago that there was a danger of all Egypt being overrun. Great Britain came to the rescue and organized and directed the campaign against the -Mandi. Egypt provided a large number of troops, though not officers or directing ability, and paid most of the cost ; but it is certain that without Great Britain the Mandist rebellion would not have been sup- pressed. And no one knows what would have been the fate of Egypt then. When the day of settlement between the victors arrived, Lord Cromer invented a peculiar and very ingenious system of government for the Sudan to meet the peculiar conditions. He provided that the Government of the Sudan should be a Condominium,' represented by the flags of Great Britain and Egypt, which were to be flown together over all official buildings.
He argued that Great Britain had acquired a title to the Sudan by " right of conquest," but that the valuable contributions of Egypt to the cause in men and money must be recognized in some way satisfactory to Egypt herself.
Throughout the clauses of the Anglo-Egyptian Agree- ment of 1899 which define the Condominium there is an unceasing emphasis on the fact that Great Britain is the " predominant partner." The preamble of the Agreement refers expressly to Great Britain's claim to the Sudan as resting on the right of conquest. The supreme military and civil command is vested in a Governor-General appointed by the Egyptian Sovereign on the recommendation of the British Govern- ment. In other ways the peculiar status of the Sudan is distinguished carefully from that of Egypt. There are no Mixed Tribunals, and no foreign Consuls except such as may be appointed with the consent of Great Britain. The circumscribed rights which Egypt has in the Sudan are derived entirely from this Agreement.
If Egypt had any fault to find with the Agreement after 1899 she ought consistently to have asserted the rights which she now discovers to be "inalienable:" She behaved, in fact, in quite a contrary sense. In a letter to the Times last Saturday Sir Malcolm McIlwraith, who was Lord Cromer's brilliant right hand man in arranging the Agreement, recalled the exact circumstances in which Egypt repudiated the claims that she now puts forward. Two foreign contractors sued the Egyptian Government and the Sudan Government jointly in the Cairo Mixed Tribunal for payment for work which had been done at Port Sudan, but the Egyptian Government disclaimed all responsibility, pleading that the Sudan Government was a wholly separate and autonomous Government under the Agreement. Accordingly in a judgment of April, 1910, the Court dismissed the Egyptian Government from the suit.
Egypt obviously loses much more than she gains by refusing the Treaty. The gross anti-British intrigues which were conducted by Egyptian agents in the Sudan in 1924 compelled the British Government to remove all the Egyptian troops ; but the Treaty which has just been rejected would have permitted Egypt to send back a battalion. As it is, the Egyptian battalion will pre- sumably not be received in the Sudan. Further, as the four Reserved Points are still unsettled, British troops will presumably remain at Cairo.
The decisive consideration is the welfare of the Sudanese. At present they are a thriving and happy people. The Egyptians lost their sovereignty over them through bad civil administration and military inefficiency. No Egyptian • who- provides himself with a pass is refused entry into the Sudan. But what is called free immigration would be only a cover for arrenewid of that intrigue which before now has Threatened the Sudan with chaos.
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