BOOKS.
TODLEBEN'S CRIMEAN WAR.*—[Frasx NOTICE.] TIIE Imperial Government of France may be said to have set the example of publishing elaborate, costly, indeed luxurious, records of its great military transactions. The magnificent atlas of the war in the East was followed by a similar work on the war in Italy. General E. de Todleben's Defence of Sebastopol is, if not an imitation, at least a rival of the French Atlas, in so far as it is an official production, the fruit of extensive public labours and a large public expenditure. Perhaps it is only imperial democratic despotisms which can afford to erect such monu- ments over their defeats and victories. But Todleben's work has one great advantage over its French rival. That is a mere string of facts and dates accompanied by showy plans ; his book is a history illustrated by maps and plans of equal and in some respects superior value. Todleben's book, moreover, is immeasurably superior to Bazancourt's history of the expedi- tion to the Crimea, which may be regarded as the detailed French official story. This work, as well as the military Atlas and the Russian book, have the ineradicable defect of being official. What- ever may be said of Mr. Kinglake's " Crimean War," it has at least the merit of being the deliberate expression of an independent judgment formed upon due investigation of such materials as were placed before it. That Mr. Kinglake was led to make the fruit of his researches subservient to the inculcation of special views may lead us to mistrust the soundness of his judgment, but cannot be hold to invalidate his independence. General Todleben has expended much time and labour upon his work, and we feel bound to say conscientiously, and with the full desire to ascertain and set down the facts. Nevertheless un- consciously the sense of his position as an official historian must have influenced him in many things, and oven if it did not, our knowledge of the fact does influence us, and prevents us from feeling that we have to deal with a candid and trustworthy book. To give one instance. Whatever may be the explanation, it is manifest, we were going to say to the least informed English
• Dfee'e de Sebastopol. Ouvrage Redige sous la Direction du Lienlenant•Gdodra1 E. do Todleben, Atde•de•Camp Gendral de 8. M. TEmporeur. Tome I. Premiere et Deusleree Puha. Saint Potersbourg. Imprimerie N. Thleblin et Cie. 1553.
reader, that General Todleben is most imperfectly acquainted with the great store of English literature on the campaign. He quotes only three English writers, namely, the " Letters from Head-Quarters," the ‘. Journal of the Engineers," and a little book by " Lieutenant Reilly" (that is O'Reilly), which has been forgotten among us. We are quite willing to admit that in refer- ring only to military writers General Todleben follows the fashion, we ought to say gives in to the prejudice, of his craft. It is the neglect to study the books of non-military men which makes the general run of military writers as historians so inferior. But Todleben not only neglects the rich store of English contributions from non-military pens, he has overlooked apparently such books as Hamley's admirable " Campaign of Sebastopol" and Colonel Adye's somewhat feeble but still useful " Review of the Crimean War." Indeed it may be justly said that the very imperfect knowledge of our books on the subject which the Russiau history displays is the capital defect of the work. The conse- quence is that General Todleben has been obliged to rely on the French, and hence in some important passages he falls into very serious errors. This neglect of English writings is the more remarkable from time fact that we have a permanent controversy on the war, a perfectly free press, and not a few authors who to prove themselves in the right are quite ready to prove their country in the wrong. There is also something here and there in the mode of statement adopted by the illustrious engineer to which a severe critic might take exception. Bat all deductions made, we are glad to say that this history of the Crimean cam- paign by General Todleben is worthy of the subject, and an admirable account of one of the most remarkable series of events to be found in the annals of warfare.
General Todleben's version of the origin of the war is, we need scarcely say, entirely Russian. It is sketched from a Russian point of view, and the fundamental idea is that Russia in 1853 and 1851 represented injured innocence contending with a wrathful, prejudiced, and envious Europe. He says it is- superfluous to refute the opinion that the war was caused by the designs of Russia against Turkish territory and the independence of the Sultan. The war arose because certain governments, for political and commercial objects, desired a fight with Russia. The question of the Holy Places was only a pretext, eagerly seized on by the Governments of England and France in order that they might execute their long-designed plans. Now what- ever may have been the case with France, we challenge the memory of any Englishman to say whether this was the case with the English Government. The English people were quite ready for a fight with Russia, because she represented the des- petit) principle and upheld the military monarchies. But the English Government wrought by day and by night to prevent the outbreak of a war. It was with the utmost reluctance that Lord Aberdeen and his Cabinet broke with Russia. General Todleben is quite right in saying that the war was the conse- quence of a long series of events. Did it ever occur to him to rank in that series the war of 1828 and the treaties which followed it ? Did he ever reflect that the fortification of the port and arsenal he was destined to defend, and the accumulation there of ample means not needed for defence but essential to aggression, was one of the series of events ? It may have been "natural" in Russia, it may have been only the consistent development of her " historical tradi- tions" which led her to sap and mine incessantly about the foundations of Turkish power in Europe and Asia, to threaten, and command, and to display with ostentation the formidable engines under her hand. But to describe a policy is surely not to excuse, much less to justify it; and time least we are entitled to say is, that if it was natural in Russia to pursue this line of
conduct, it was not unnatural in the other Powers of Europe, seeing how the realization of Russian policy threatened them, to do their utmost when the conflict became inevitable to frustrate the designs of the Czar. But it is a sufficient refutation of the assertions of General Todleben to inform the reader that while
he scorns the idea of Russian encroachment, lie omits all refer- ence to the famous conversations between the Czar and Sir Hamilton Seymour and the offer made to the Aberdeen Government of a share in the spoil of the Turkish Empire. It is incorrect to say that the Government of England
took any part in rousing public opinion against Russia. That was done by Russia herself. Even General Todleben in a moment of candour admits that it was the interference of the Emperor Nicholas in Hungary, and the demand for the extradition of the Hungarian refugees, which definitely roused public opinion against Russia. We hold it indeed to have been demonstrated that, so far as France was concerned, the question of the Holy Places was a mere pretext for picking a quarrel. We hold also that French diplomacy, adroitly managed, did play with the temper of the Czar and push him beyond bounds. But we also hold that had the Czar been content to relinquish his designs against Turkey betrayed in the imperative demand for a separate protectorate, had he shown common honesty in his negotiations and his dealings with England, had he not in his pride of heart mistaken utterly the power of the peace party in England and his influence at Vienna, he might very easily have routed French diplomacy and frustrated the general and personal projects of the French Emperor. General Todleben's theory of the origin of the war is simply this :—ThatRussia having made certain just demands on Turkey, England and France and public opinion, created by them, pushed Turkey on to refuse ; that Russia was might, and that it is very wrong in the rest of Europe to cause wars by opposing the development of her historical traditions. General Todleben is no doubt sincere in his belief, but it is none the less contrary to the facts.
The narrative of the opening scenes of the war, of Omer Pasha's winter campaign on the Danube, and of the Russian campaign in 1854, is as defective as the account of the origin of the war itself. He does not regard the passage of the Pruth as the beginning of the war. He says that the Turks took the initiative, summoned Russia to quit the Principalities, and then declared war. But the passage of the Pruth was an act of war, and if the Turks did not treat it as such at once that was owing to the strenuous exertions of the Four Powers. He says also that the Western Powers notified that they would not declare war so long as Russia did not pass the Danube, and that they did this in order to leave the Turks free to attack the Russians at discretion. Where does General Todleben find authority for this? The truth is that the Czar himself was afraid to cross the Danube for two good reasons,—he was not prepared for a campaign in Bulgaria, and more than this he was at that moment especially desirous of not alarming Germany. That the Turks profited by this state of things is true, but they derived their advantage from the situation into which the passions of the Czar had impelled him. Turning from the political to the military side of the question, we find a similar want of candour in the sketch of Omer Pasha's operations. Todleben's theory of those operations is that Omer Pasha was engaged in a series of abortive efforts to invade Wallachia on a grand scale. That is not so. To make out his case the Russian historian takes no account of dates. Omer Pasha had an object in view, and that object he accomplished. He wanted to establish a camp at Kalafat, to stop Russian pro- gress on that side, and secure a passage of the river on the Russian flank. He did not seize Oltenitza as a base of operations. He attacked Oltenitza as a diversion, and while he attracted atten- tion there he seized Kalafat and entrenched it. This was a great success, and a soldier of Todleben's renown might as well have acknowledged it. So with the battle of Zetati or Tschetate. He describes this as a Russian victory, and wishes us to believe that the Turks retreated to the right bank of the Danube. But here he shows a weak memory, for he forgets that the Turks fell back after the combat upon their camp at Kalafat on the left bank of the Danube, and that the result of the engagement was the retreat of time Russians from Little Wallachia. The account of the siege of Silistria in the summer of 1854 shows time same contempt for the Turks. Todleben's theory is that just as Silistria was at the mercy of the Russians an order came from the Czar directing the army to retreat there and then. It would have been more creditable to General Todleben had he recognized at least the merit of a defence which for a month kept a Russian army at bay before two paltry earthworks, mere ditches on a bill side. That the Russians would have taken it in the end we have no doubt, but that they did not take it in a week shows how well the Turks fought when led by English officers. Todleben is perfectly right when he tells us that the main reason for raising the siege and for subsequently withdrawing from the Principalities, was that Austria had collected an army in the Carpathians command. ing the Russian line of operations. That was evident at the time to all who were not blinded by a very natural dislike of Austria. In fact from the moment when her troops appeared on the whole flank of the great road from the Pruth to Bucharest the position of Russia in the Principalities became barely tenable. Russia had another reason also correctly stated by Todleben. It was a desire not to provoke the whole of Germany out of its neutrality, and therefore from motives partly political and partly military Russia withdrew her legions to her own side of the Pruth.
Austria at once stepped into thi Principalities, and England and France were free to invade the Crimea.
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