TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE SITUATION.
WE see no reason to believe that the situation is seriously changed. The " feeling " of London for the past three days has undoubtedly been that war has become less probable ; but " feeling " in London is based on official whispers, telegrams in the newspapers, and reports which are deeply tainted with the stock-jobbing spirit. Financial " syndicates " of importance, though at first pleased with the prospect of a great new creation of securities, which would mean heavy profits for them, have been frightened by the general fall in Stocks, by the danger of a " crash " not only in Berlin, but in Paris, and by the possibility of an English evacuation of Egypt,—the mere suspicion of which sent the Domain Loan down 10, and must have cost one small group several hundred thousand pounds. There is, consequently, great eagerness to spread good news, and all the journals influenced by financiers play the same tune, with an effect which is momentarily exhilarating. The man who reads half a dozen letters from half a dozen capitals, all dwelling on " improvement," naturally thinks there is improvement, and forgets that all the " opinions" may have practically the same source. An undated despatch is even said to have been shown in Vienna, in which the Czar orders his Ambassador to assure Lord Granville that a war between Russia and England would be " deplorable," and hopes for a " prompt and easy " settlement. The paper which published these gracious words even declared that the Russian Ambassador had forwarded an equally gracious reply from Lord Granville ; but as Lord E. Fitzmaurice on Thursday evening denied that any such despatch had been received from Russia, this part of the story at least must be a pure invention. The despatch may be coming, but it cannot have been answered. At all events, even if the Czar has recorded on paper so obvious a truism, the great facts of the situation remain unchanged, or are only altered slightly for the worse. The British Government is making every preparation for actual war at full speed. The Indian Government has expressed through Lord Dufferin, who has been resolutely reticent hitherto, its conviction that the attack on Penjdeh was " unprovoked." The Russian Government, besides ordering its Mediterranean squadron to the Baltic, to place it out of harm's way under the guns of Cronstadt, is pouring troops into the Caucasus and the northern shores of the Caspian, in order that the army of the Caucasus may be relieved if needful for action in Transcaspia. General Komaroff is sending home accounts of the recent engagement on the Khuskh, in which he acknowledges that he drove the Afghans to take refuge in Herat, and that he has organised a provisional Government in Penjdeh ; and finally, Mr. Gladstone, on Thursday, stated distinctly that the current story of a transaction founded on a cession or sale of Penjdeh was without authority, and had not been discussed between Lord Granville and M. de Staal, the Russian Ambassador, who, no doubt, as agent for M. de Giers, is working for peace. Nothing in Mr. Gladstone's remark's suggested a certainty of peace, and nothing in his attitude raises the impression that he will at last recede. Everything waits, as everything waited last week, for a despatch from Sir Peter Lumsden, describing in more detail the events upon the Khuskh, and for an answer from Russia explicitly agreeing to a delimitation of the frontier in the way to which she previously stood pledged. We see no reason whatever for expecting that Sir P. Lumsden will modify in any way the view which he obviously took at first, that the attack on the Afghans was an act of aggression. He is a man of judgment, not a Jingo, and entirely incapable of deceiving his own Government. The Afghans had no motive for bringing-on a contest, and the story of their incitement by English officers is nonsensical ; for, not to mention that English officers on a peaceful mission do not play such tricks, they must have known, and clearly did know—else why Captain Yate's mission to General Komaroff—that the Russian force, if it advanced, could not be successfully resisted. The whole tone of General Komaroff's despatches is that of a man who thought the Afghans needed " a lesson," and gave it, without caring whether England was included in the lesson or not, and is heartily proud of its effectiveness. He even intimates that he could advance further if need were, but sees as yet no " necessity," So far as the " regrettable incident " is con corned, there has been no explanation or apology, but a stout denial that either is required ; and Sir Peter Lumsden's details will probably only make bad worse, by showing that—as the Standard's correspondent in his camp clearly believed an entire month ago—an opportunity for collision was deliberately sought. If there is to be peace, it mast come from another quarter, that is, from a decision by the group of men who guide the Czar that they have made a mistake, and had better accept any bridge that may be offered them,—a kind of structure which diplomatists know well how to build. It is just possible that the party of action in St. Petersburg was swelled by men who thought that Mr. Gladstone would never fight, and that England, after a fuss on paper, would accept any terms ; and that, on finding their error, these men may so far agree with M. de Giers as to advise their master to postpone the struggle. So supported, the Czar may regain his free hand, and by the issue of orders understood to be peremptory, may either extort submission from his great agents in Asia, or compel them to run the serious risk of a rush on Herat,—which, if successful, would force war ; but if unsuccessful, would cost them their positions in the service. No Government likes to appear to desert successful officers, and the Russian Government owes much of its territory to its habitual refusal to do it. We say this is possible, but we see nothing in the intelligence from any quarter which shows that it has occurred. On the contrary, the order to the Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean cannot have been given behind the Czar's back ; and as Alexander III. knows perfectly well that the British Government seeks no war, he must, when he gave the order, have been aware that he might be unable to grant the reparations necessary to secure peace. Events in St. Petersburg may have removed that impression ; but they are not visible to outside observers.
It will be observed that we do not, like some of our contemporaries, accuse the Russian Government of habitual and deliberate bad faith. Its statesmen are probably no worse than half the diplomatists of the Continent, who are all, from Prince Bismarck downward, possessed with the notion that guile is upon occasion an allowable weapon. They regard the making of feints as part of statecraft, just as it is part of strategy, and have no more scruple about gaining time by assurances than about preparing an ambuscade. But we do think, as we have all along maintained, that the Foreign Office of St. Petersburg has not the full control over the acts of Russian Agents which is enjoyed by other Foreign Offices. The Foreign Minister may give assurances in the most perfect faith ; but he does not appoint and cannot remove either the Governor-Generals or the Commanders-in-Chief, and if they act for themselves, the Czar, who alone can control all alike, may for personal, or dynastic, or even political reasons, feel compelled to side with them rather than his Foreign Minister, who, again, when this has occurred, makes the best of it. He may resign, and, according to Western ideas, he should resign ; but that is not the way of despotic Courts, where resignation is regarded as implying an impertinent censure on the Sovereign. If M. de Giers meant resigning, he would not resign, but fall sick. The result of this complex position is a difficulty in dealing with the Russian Court almost as great as if it were treacherous, more especially when, as in the present instance,' two parties, who may be broadly described as the statesmen and the soldiers, are pulling different ways. Which will win in the end we do not know, but war or peace depends on that internal struggle, and not on any self-generated decision of the Czar. To ourselves, as yet, those who believe the peace-party to have won, seem dangerously sanguine. In our time it has only won once, and although it is true that the Russian people are not excited as they would be if the Afghans were Turks, or if the struggle aroused the pride of creed, we must not forget that war with England is in Russia believed to be war with limited liability. England cannot conquer Russia, and can never be in a position in which a few concessions would not induce her to make peace. The Russian war-party, therefore, though not aided by the people, has little to fear from the resistance of their opinion. It is the Army only, and the statesmen, that the Czar has to consult or to convince.
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