The Eighteenth Decisive Battle
The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World. Warsaw, 1920.
By Viscount d'Abernon. (Hodder and Stoughton. 10s. 6d.) THE title chosen for this book instantly recalls Creasy's Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, and so acts as a magnet to interest. For Creasy's book, now eighty years old, has run through numberless editions—a testimony to the appeal of cataclysmic history. Lord d'Abernon gives his title an ad-• ditional attraction by the silent suggestion that two unnamed decisive battles have occurred between 1851 and 1920, the years of his choice. The missing numbers are in his opinion Sedan and the Marne. The claim of the first may be disputed, for some of us may hold that the consolidation of the United States through the overthrow of the Confederacy has- had an equal or greater influence on the course of world history. Perhaps Lord d'Abernon's truer title would have been the " Nineteenth Decisive Battle of the World."
But at least his claim for " Warsaw, 1920," seems well- founded, and his presentation of it as justified as it is historically valuable. The further we stand back from the picture the more does his view of it seem confirmed. Indeed, he goes back twelve hundred years to Charles Martel's repulse of the Saracen invasion in 732 A.D., for a parallel. " The Battle of Tours saved our ancestors of Britain and our neighbours of Gaul from the yoke of the Koran ; it is probable that the Battle of Warsaw preserved Central and parts of Western. Europe from a more subversive danger—the fanatical tyranny of the Soviet." Because our civilization is of a far higher order than that of the eighth century " the set-back entailed by defeat would have been incomparably graver." Europe was still in the throes of the World War upheaval, and so less capable of resisting the contagion which Russia could have- unloosed if the Polish screen had collapsed. How near it came to falling Lord d'Abernon's vividly revealing story helps us to realize. It is curious how little impression such a dramatic event has made on the public in this country—or would be curious did we not remember the year of its occurrence.
Lord d'Abernon's book consists of extracts from his diary dur- ing the crisis, when he was sent to Warsaw as Special Envoy of the British Government, supplemented by later commentary. If the diary testifies to his clear grasp of the situation, the historical student will appreciate the clear demarcation ob- served between diary and commentary. Contributors to contemporary history are not always so scrupulous.
Perhaps the most significant feature of the book is that it seems to dispel another legend. For it has been commonly assumed that the dramatic turning of the scales was due to the intervention of a French strategist, Weygand. His reput,ation stands so high that we can assume that his advice was sound, and Lord- d'Abemon not only pays high tribute to his ability and cool judgment, but couples him with Pilsudski as the creator of victory.
But the diary does not provide any evidence to support this ; and much to contradict it. For it is abundantly brought out that Pilsudski especially shut himself off froni Weygand, and, even when Weygand was named chief of staff, seems to have ignored him.- The one assistance Pilsudski asked for was the material one of keeping open the line of supply through Danzig. On July 26th the diary records a meeting with the Polish Min isters—" they are convinced of the desirability of using Weygand, but they cannot overcome the resistance of the Head of the State, Pilsudski." Instead of improving the friction became worse, for on August 3rd there is a note- " Weygand appears to be less satisfied than he was regarding the attitude of the military leaders. They are unwilling to accept
his advice . . . " The Anglo-French mission had a conference with the Polish Council of Defence on the 5th, but though a promise of more regard to Weygand's advice was given, Pilsudski himself was not present. He was at the time preparing his own plan—which he carried out himself, leaving Warsaw to take the field. When he came back the issue was decided.
But even then his attitude was unchanged. For on August 19th an entry records—" Weygand complains bitterly of the surly attitude of Marshal Pilsudski : Last night, at a Council of War, Pilsudski hardly said a word to him, but discussed
for two and a half hours in Polish, and paid no attention ivhate-Ver to his presence. He was anxious to throw up his
work at once . . the Poles listened to advice very unwillingly, only told him what suited them, and were not grateful for assistance." They made amends later. But this sequence of entries seems to give no ground for Lord d'Abernon's post- event opinion that while " the credit of designing the plan . . . was due to Polish initiative ... . without General Weygand there would probably have been no plan, or possibly there would have been a great many plans vaguely discussed and not one firmly adopted and carried out." It may be true of the Polish Council of Defence, but Pilsudski paid as little attention to this body as to foreign advice. Lord d'Abernon here seems to became involved in a contradiction. For he shows Pilsudski as a man of unswerving decision, who made up his mind, kept his own counsel, and followed his own course :-
" A man of immense courage and force of character. A pronounced sceptic about orthodox methods, whether applied to military affairs or politics ; loves danger, his pulse only beating at a normal rate when he is in imminent personal peril—at other times at forty to the minute. In appearance so striking as to be almost theatrical. None of the usual amenities of civilized intercourse, but all the apparatus.pf sombre genius. He claims that in actual fighting his methods, though unusual and not in conformity with textbook practice, have invariably proved successful." " He belongs to no school except to one which he calls that of open-sir strategy . . By this he means that his method is not that of employing great masses . . . nor is it the strategy of combined action, with troops in close formation, nor is it the strategy of trench warfare, for he constructed no trenches."
His method was that of free and far-ranging movement over wide spaces. - The retreat had been going on continuously for six weeks. He deliberately accelerated it in order to break away from contact with the Russians. Then he as deliberately weakened the forces covering the vital points of Warsaw on his left and Lemberg on his extreme right. A modern Gideon, he chose picked units to form a small but highly mobile striking force. On the night of August 12th he drove from Warsaw to take personal charge of this spearhead, spent three days in sharpening it, then thrust north through a weak link in the Russian chain of armies. By forced marches at great speed he cut across the rear of the armies that were at the gates of Warsaw. The menace made them recoil, and while the recoil was developing into a general and disordered reflux, Pilsudski himself had rushed back to Warsaw to launch a general pursuit.
It was a greater miracle than that of the Marne, and, unlike this, was consciously achieved by a calculated stroke. Lord d'Abernon remarks : " It is indeed said that only two things really stir Pilsudski : the excitement of being shot at by some assassin, and the suggestion that his strategy in August, 1920, was but a copy of French action on the Marne." The more one knows of the Marne the less one is surprised at his indignation. In pattern there is a resemblance. But while he designed the pattern of his victory, the Marne was a patchwork
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