No change, more decay
Bohdan Nahaylo
Despite the Soviet system's well-known L lack of adequate provisions for resolv- ing a succession crisis, for the second time in 15 months there has been a remarkably swift and orderly change in the Soviet leadership. In this context the word `change' is, however, something of a misnomer. One infirm General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party was replaced by another ailing, elderly official, who in turn has been replaced by an even older man, himself formerly the first man's closest associate. Soviet leaders are replac- ed, it seems, but the gerontocracy remains. For a while longer, at any rate.
Andropov's death brought predictable reactions in the West. Once again the familiar hasty and flawed assumption was made by many, and not only journalists, that a change of leadership in the Kremlin necessarily implies a change in policy, if not domestic then at least foreign. When Brezhnev died it was widely expected that Andropov would inaugurate an era of reform and seek to ameliorate the interna- tional climate. Although these hopes prov- ed to amount to nothing more than wishful thinking, similar sentiments have greeted Andropov's demise. Many in the West still vainly await a Malenkov or a Khrushchev at a time when `De-Stalinisation' has long since been halted in the USSR and the limits of any meaningful change reached almost two decades ago with the modest but short- lived Libernman-Kosygin economic reform proposals.
In fact the real choice this time was bet-
ween Konstantin Chernenko, a septua- genarian Brezhnevite crony, champ- pion of the Party and ideological apparat- chik, and a relatively younger protege of Andropov's,Gregory Romanov or Mikhail Gorbachev, whose supposed technocratic and, therefore, in Western eyes, perforce `reformist' slant, would in any case have been offset by the need to placate two crucial constituencies not noted for their liberalising zeal — the military and the security organs. In the event, the Polit- buro's old guard reaffirmed their deter- mination to hang on until the end and anaged to carry the day. Consequently hernenko, until recently regarded as a
olitical has-been, broke his predecessor's political
by becoming, at the age of 72, the oldest man ever to become Soviet leader.
He is be no means the strong man that Andropov might have become had he had more time. A dedicated if colourless funs" tionary, Chernenko never had an indepell" dent power base and owed his elevation to the top levels of Soviet power entirely to Brezhnev. With his patron gone, he was swiftly outmanoeuvred by Andropov and seemed for a time to be on the way out. But he clung tenaciously to the duties he had in' herited from the late Mikhail Suslov in the sphere of ideology and propaganda, and as Andropov's illness continued he once again achieved prominence and influence. What' ever the extent of the rivalry between the two men, Chernenko appears to have even- tually reached an accommodation with An' dropov which enabled him to remain well" placed in the event of the latter being unable to carry on as leader. All the indications are that Cherneok° won as a result of a compromise and is viewed by his colleagues as merely an interim leader. This was borne out by his in augural speech in which he emphasised con: tinuity with Andropov's policies through the 'collective' efforts of the leadershiP• is still too early to say how firm his control over state affairs will be while behind the scenes the next round of the successi°11, struggle, now more than ever a generational
battle, is played. old
Although identified with the Brezhnevites, Chernenko is probably in t(); precarious a position to risk embarking on course of outright regression at borne' Much of the old course will therefore re" main. The anti-corruption campaign °III; ched by his predecessor, which has purgeu 0 number of Brezhnevite officials, might we be scaled down, but it is unlikely to be cc"; pletely abandoned. The calls for greater discipline, efficiency and productivity .3t. work will no doubt also continue to le`
made. Nevertheless, Chernenko did sound a distinctly cautious note, saying that there would be a reassessment of the present policies and that as far as experimentation In the economic field was concerned, 'it Would be well advised to observe the wise qild rule, look before you leap'.
As a Party apparatchik and ideologue, Vhernenko will seek to bolster the Party's authority. In view, however, of the growing Influence of the military, the security organs and the well-educated technocrats and economic managers, this may well prove to be the biggest challenge he will face. In the ideological and cultural sphere, there is no prospect of any relaxation of controls, for Chernenko spelt out his neo-Stalinist line in these matters at last June's Central -orrimittee plenum. Obsessed with counter- ing 'pernicious' influences from the West
and, like the rest of the Soviet leadership, convinced of the need to maintain the Soviet Union's military might at full capaci- ty, Chernenko will continue with the policy of 'Fortress USSR'.
And what of Andropov? How will he be remembered? For some as the potential in- novator who was dogged by ill-health and defeated by time. A pragmatist who had the courage to admit the serious economic and social shortcomings of the system and to bring in younger men in the place of old incompetent officials. Others will recall him as a ruthless disciplinarian who hounded dissenters and attempted to squeeze more out of the workers without rewarding them accordingly, who intensified Russification of the non-Russian republics to un- precedented levels, and under whom East- West relations reached an abysmal low.
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