Perceptions and signals
Christopher Hitchens
Washington There are two voguish current terms which make American political discourse extremely irritating. They occur routinely in every press conference, every current affairs broadcast, every Congres- sional debate and almost every editorial comment. The terms are 'perception' and 'signal'. The first is used either as a displacement or an evasion. The speaker need not say that he thinks the consequence of policy X will be harmful. That would be too definite and thus too risky. It is usual,
then, for him to intone that policy 'will be perceived' as harmful. This has two political advantages: it takes longer to say and thus sounds more important; and it is ambiguous, having all the moral weight of the statement, 'It's not me, it's the neighbours.'
`Signal' is the other standby of the cor- nered politico. In this case, the speaker refrains from saying that policy X will amount to appeasement of the Russians, the Cubans, the Nicaraguans or whoever. Instead he bleats that policy X would 'send them the wrong signal'. 'They' in this sentence are usually the Russians, which makes one wonder what became of the hot line if we are reduced to international semaphore.
'I understand they're turning it into an old folk's home.' This has been a cheap and disgraceful week in foreign policy. The Reagan Ad- ministration, while attacking all the critics of its Lebanon policy as cowards and traitors, was all the while preparing its own withdrawal. The object, as we now learn from White House spokesmen, was to deal with the public 'perception' that the Marines were being endangered for no Pill' pose, without sending a 'signal' to the Rus- sians that American resolve had weakened. The use of massive offshore batteries was, literally as well as figuratively, to lay smoke over this policy in time for the evening news. There is, after all, no lobby ill Washington to maintain that some of our best friends are Druze. On 3 February, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, the President was asked about Speaker Tip O'Neill's call for withdrawal of the Marines. 'He may be, ready to surrender,' sneered Reagan, 10' I'm not.' Four days later, he announced the, pull-out and flew off to the seclusion 01 his farm in Santa Barbara. I have never seen such rage and contempt among normally mild-mannered Democratic CongressMe,,; Speaker O'Neill may be a dim old tub old guts, but he is an extremely loyal all, reasonably honest tub. He fought bravelY and stupidly in his own party for a 11,8. tional' approach to Lebanon, arguing 1°' the tradition that 'politics ends at the water's edge' — meaning you don't snipe at the commander-in-chief. For Reagan to a- cuse him of cowardice and desertion, on day when he must have known that he himself was about to order a withdrawal, is unpardonable — or is at least wide' perceived to be so. The President's conduct has led many pundits to accuse him of inconsisteno; This is tempting, but misleading. Ti2e withdrawal was all of a piece with the original commitment, and with the whn b unhappy experience of the 18-nlontA presence. It was decided in a haphazard an; jumpy fashion, as an improvised respons, to a situation that was eluding the contl (and, it is fair to say, the comprehension) °e the political leadership. A week after Lr Marines were landed, on 28 Septernu,'„, 1982, Reagan said that they would reinal; in Lebanon until all foreign forces Weis withdrawn, 'because I think that's Occ to come rapidly. I think we're going to 5 the withdrawal.' Later he said that 'the American forces will not engage in com- bat'• Later still, `So it could be that they will be there for quite a period.' By last Oc- tober the Marines were there to show that America could not be pushed around — a new objective, which was replaced a few elaYs later with: 'What exactly is the opera- tional mission of the Marines? The answer Is to secure a piece of Beirut, to keep order in their sector and to prevent the area becoming a battlefield.' But it all ended up with our old standby — a test of American will. This is normally, to borrow from the argot I have been criticising, a 'signal' that a scuttle is being Prepared. In his weekly radio chat with the nation the old maestro said bravely: 'Yes, the situation in Lebanon is difficult, frustrating and dangerous. But that is no reason to turn our back on friends and to Cut and run. If we do, we'll be sending one signal to terrorists everywhere, they can gain by waging war against innocent. People,'
The friends, if they heard that, must have started packing for Switzerland on the ins- tant. The 'terrorists', who already know that violence pays, were presumably unim- pressed. Speaker O'Neill, who had taken a real Political risk in helping to get Reagan the September War Powers Resolution, authorising another 18 months in Beirut for the Marines, is just plain disgusted.
Within the White House, it seems that there is still division between those who favour withdrawal (or 'redeployment') and those who feel that President Gemayel should be backed to the hilt. In the former camp are Caspar Weinberger and the Chief of Staff, James Baker. In the latter are ,9,eorge Shultz and Robert McFarlane, the AN ational Security Adviser. Henry Kiss- inger, who is still manoeuvring cannily for a Place in the next administration, has swit- Fhed, in the space of one month, from say- ing that those who advocate withdrawal are Preaching surrender to saying that the latest Pullback is timely and statesmanlike. The 'signals' sent by all this to Moscow and Damascus are distinctly garbled. Neither government has ever doubted that the United States is capable of using force the Middle East, but both may be marvenin-
at the 'seat-of-the-pants' way in
clwheich Reagan operates. Perhaps, by acci- ,m,the President has found his equivalent Richard Nixon's 'madman theory of „wt." r , where neither your enemies nor your iends have any idea what you may do next. e 'perceptions', in domestic terms, are 1.:(trenielY confused also. I wrote recently Reagan's apparant honesty and amiability have enabled even his critics to give him the benefit of the doubt. Last ,Leck, I met more than a few people who rinoUght they detected, for the first time, the ancid whiff of a presidential double-cross. Are the Marines to be withdrawn, or are they not? Whose side are we on? If sLelPanon is so vital, why isn't there a really victrlous troop commitment? If it isn't so al. why are we shelling it in fits of pique?
Above all, why say one thing and do another?
It is overlooked, in all this, that the Ad- ministration supported Begin and Sharon whey they invaded Lebanon and radicalised the Shia Muslims while driving them nor- th, along with the Palestinians, to Beirut. It is also overlooked that the Marines were committed to Beirut in the first place because of the Sabra and Chatila massacres, which were the last in a long line of General Sharon's broken promises. The blasting of the Marine barracks, and many subsequent miseries, can be viewed from one perspective as the revenge for Reagan's endorsement of 'Operation Peace for Galilee'. Even the Israelis now regard that summer as one of their greatest mistakes. There has been no comparable accounting here, but if ever there is, there may be some lasting changes in 'perception'. One final perception if I may. President Reagan's first campaign speech was to the Association of Christian Broadcasters, a rather bovine and literal-minded group of evangelists who not only think that you can live twice, but believe that they themselves are already doing so. In his speech, the can- didate referred to the need to bring God back into life and society. He never misses the opportunity of accusing America's enemies of being atheists and materialists. Here is another 'signal' that did not get through. His opponents in Lebanon may be many things, but 'godless' they are not.
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