POETRY.

FOUR RYE SHEAVES. Facie rye sheaves to be my bed ; "Now God me save," was the prayer I said; And sweet was the sleep that came to me, For I was home where I fain would be ; And sweet was the dream that sleep did yield, A flowering bank, and a daiaied field ; A lovers' lane, and a winsome maid— But I never heard the word she said;

I never heard what word she spoke, For the bugle was blown and I awoke.

Four rye sheaves to be my bed—

But where this night may I lay my head

Four rye sheaves to be my bed—

Will she come with that word if I am dead ?

JosErn LEE, Sergt. The Black Watch.

BOOKS.

THE ECCENTRICITIES OF PACIFIC1831.*

IT is perhaps almost time that war authors should bear in mind the discouragement to all authorship conveyed in the remark of Terence that it is very difficult, in writing a play—and the remark applies squally to a book—to say anything that has not been already said by some one olso--Nullum eat iam dictum, guod non dictum sit prism The constant reiteration of facts which are well known and of arguments which have been worn threadbare is, however, capable of being defended on fairly valid grounds. Cobden said that he carried the repeal of the Corn Laws by stating over and over again the same arguments in slightly different language. He hold that it was only by the adoption of this method that the ear of the public could really be gained. The plea holds equally good in dealing with the causes, both remote and proximate, which led to the present war, the responsibility of the Berlinese and Viennese politicians, the heavy blow which German statesmanship has delivered at public morality, and other cognate matters. Nevertheless, those who attempt to keep themselves abreast of the redundant war literature of the day may perhaps be pardoned if they yield to the lassitude bred of familiarity with the subject, and devote but cursory attention to works which merely tell an oft-told tale.

The case in favour of studying works which deal with the future stands on a different footing. The conditions of peace, the national or international ideals which should be entertained in settling those conditions, and generally the consideration of the auspices under which the new epoch to be inaugurated after the war will commence, are all matters of such transcendent importance that it is well to hear what different intellects, approaching the subjects from different stand. points, have to say, in order to help both politicians and the general public to unravel the tangled social and political skein which will certainly constitute the damnosa hereditas of the present world-convulsion. Even in the wildest and most Utopian outpourings of the extreme Pacificists and doctrinaires there may possibly here and there be found a germ of rational and fertile thought which is capable of fructification. On the other hand, it is very necessary to subject the fallacies and delusive hopes with which literature of this description but too often abounds to a close analysis, in order to warn idealists that, whilst their thoughts may at times be allowed to soar to the empyrean, the:r feet must, if their ideals are in any way to be realized, remain fixed on earth.

The warning is especially necessary in dealing with a book such as that recently published and entitled The Supreme Will, or the Danger of a Premature Peace, of which Mr. H. Dunlop, who is a Hollander with a Scotch name, is the author. Its title is attractive. It encourages, at first sight, a hope and a belief that Mr. Dunlop is not the inhabitant of any ultra-Pacificist dreamland. Neither is this belief wholly unfounded. He thinks that "Germany, led by Prussia, represents European civilization at its worst. And unless Europe succeeds in abolishing Prussianism, her civilization will be lost." He holds that there is very little to hope for the future of Europe unless, "somehow, Germany and Austria are forced to disarm." Indeed, in one respect he goes further in the direction of dictating terms of peace to Germany than those who, though peacaful, cannot be classed as Pacilleists in the technical sense in which that term is now commonly employed. He thinks that at the close of the war " each German kingdom will have to become a separate entity," and that, if the Germans do not on their own initiative adopt th:s policy of disintegration, "they will have to be forced to do so." The most whole-hearted anti-Pacificist scarcely goes so far as this. He thinks that the internal affairs of Germany must be managed by the Germans themselves.

It is, however, in dealing with "The Supreme Will" that Mr. Dunlop's Pacificiat tendencies become morn especially apparent. It does not, at first sight, appear quite clear what necessary connexion there is between "The Supreme Will" and "The Danger of a Premature Peace " ; but it results from a perusal of Mr. Dunlop's pages that what he means is that there can be no durable peace unless the will of a united Europe is made supreme over that of any single member, or combination of members, of the European family. In fact, the remedy which he proposes in order to obviate further wars is one with which numerous other writers have rendered us familiar. Internationalism is to dominate exclusive nationalism. When this object has been seeured, the nations of the world will be able to devote themselves to what is really their "One Great Common Interest "—namely, "the conquest of Nature by the knowledge of its Eternal Laws." "This great Truth must be adopted as a lofty political creed."

Mr. Dunlop then sets himself at work to explain how his object is to be achieved. Above all things, there is on no account to be any " old-fashioned peace." Such a peace would be absolutely useless. It would rest on the stability of treaties, which would only be respected so long as it suited the convenience of the contracting parties to respect them. Arbitration treaties would, indeed, be "worse than useless, and even harmful." What is really required is that there should be a Union of all the States of Europe, to which, in some manner which is not very clearly explained, all the other States of the world are to give their "adhesion." An International Parliament is to be created, which is to sit at the Hague, and in which each European State—no difference apparently being made between great and small—is to be represented by live members. The functions of this Parliament are to be to regulate all treaties ; to ensure the abolition by every State of all armed forces, whether by land, sea, or river, greater than those which are required for the maintenance of order within their own territories; and to control the manufacture of arms and war material of every kind throughout the world. Mr. Dunlop passes lightly over one condition, the fulfilment of which he thinks is an essential preliminary to the establishment of his proposed Union. The acceptance of Free Trade by all European States and their Colonies "is admitted as a sine gud non." As an old Free Trader, who has not yet lost his belief in the validity of Free Trade economic arguments, I wish Mr. Dunlop every success in his endeavour to ensure the abolition of Protection, but I am by no means sanguine of the wish being realized.

It will be seen, therefore, that Mr. Dunlop recognizes that each State must have an Army. There remains the question of its composition. Mr. Dunlop reckons that the population of Europe consists of four hundred and fifteen million inhabitants. Of these, he proposes that one per cent, should be enrolled into an "International Army whose task will be to protect Europe and to carry out the decrees of the Inter.. national Parliament." The greatest danger, against which it is essential to guard, lies in the creation of anything approaching to a national Army. Mr. Dunlop, therefore, proposea that "each battalion of a thousand men should consist as much as possible of a great variety of nationalities, and even in companies this principle should be adopted as much as possible. This is absolutely necessary in order to render conspiracies impossible or easily exposed." An exception may perhaps be made in favour of "the small and unaggressive nationalities," such as the Swiss, Dutch, and Scandinavians. They might be allowed to form national companies. On the other hand, looking to "the spirit of German nationality, and its aggressive fanaticism, German soldiers should be treated with a certain amount of misgiving ; and it would probably be desirable not to allow to Germany the same percentage of international soldiers as to the other nationalities, until their feelings can be more fully trusted." As an example of how the plan would work out in practice, Mr. Dunlop gives the composition of the armed force of Holland. It would be as follows: 16,250 Hollanders.

13,800 Russians.

7,800 Germans.

6,000 Austro-Hungariana.

5,040 Britisher.

4,680 French.

4,010 Italians.

2,280 Spaniards.

900 Belgians.

720 Rumanians.

720 Portuguese. 2,800 other nationalities.

Total .. 65,000 men.

The" very serious difficulty" then arises of the language of command which is to be used by this polyglot force. The claims of the German, Duteh, and Russian languages are rejected on account of their difficult grammar. English, Spanish, and French "would have about equal rights." But Lv far the beet course would he to adopt Latin. The