THE AIMS OF GERMANY.
WE wish that our statesmen, instead of watching one of the most prominent of their number galloping over the bloodless battlefields of East Prussia in the train of the German Emperor, or accepting exotic decorations at his hands, would take the trouble to study German political aims. If they did so, we cannot but think that they would be more careful not to allow the doing of things which can be paraded throughout Europe as proof that we are tied fast to an understanding with Germany, and might begin to consider whether it would not be wiser to direct our energies towards the diplomatic isolation of Germany rather than to strengthening the international position of the Kaiser. The proper appreciation of the trend of German policy is, in our opinion, worth any amount of Imperial personal protestations of goodwill and of magniloquent praise of the splendid record of the British Army. And, curiously enough, the study of German political aims needs no very great erudition. They are expressed plainly enough. He who runs may read what the Germans really intend. While the German Emperor is amusing the British bulldog with pats on the head and "Good dog!" blandishments and the genial offer of his best biscuits, his servants in the background are quite openly getting ready sticks and chains and muzzles with which, when the proper time comes, to capture the dog and make sure that he will bite no more. So sure are they, indeed, that the Imperial blandishments will keep the old dog quiet, that they talk about their preparations in the openest possible way, and feel quite satisfied that the stupid if surly old creature will never notice what they are up to. "By no means in vain is the stick got ready in the sight of a dog so stolid and unsensitive as the British bulldog," appears to be the accepted creed in Germany. And after all, they have some reason. Cannot they say our curs barked at him, and he hardly noticed; and when one of the head- footmen threw a stone at him and said it was a disgrace even to compare him to the German fighting dog, he only growled a very little, and next minute trotted up to have his biscuits from the Emperor. Therefore we need not in the least bother about keeping these things out of his sight till we are ready for him ' ?
We shall be told, no doubt, that we are grossly exaggerating, that there are no German political aims which are really hostile to Britain, and that the German Emperor's goodwill to us is perfectly true and genuine, and in no sense a cover for real hostility or an anodyne to keep us quiet for a time. Very well ; but before the verdict is given, we would ask our readers to con- sider the speech of Herr Bassermaain, the leading Parlia- mentary representative of the National Liberal party, made to the annual Congress of his party lately held at Eisenach. His speech clearly showed the nature of German political aspirations, and no one can say that they were not expressed with frankness and clearness. No one, that is, need feel puzzled as to what the Germans want, and what they are driving at in their world-policy, if they will but note the speech in question. Here is an extract from the Times' vers ion. "In our attitude towards England," said the spokesman of the National Liberal party, "we must keep cool, and until we have a strong Fleet it would be a mistake to let our- selves be driven into a hostile policy towards England. In England the extension of our commerce and the growth of our Navy are followed with envy and jealousy. The development of the United States of North America and their desires for expansion are likewise a lesson to us not to be forgetful of our armaments, especially on the sea." With reference to the Navy, continued the speaker, "the Government will keep within the limits of the Navy scheme; but it was a mistake—and the blame rests with the Clerical Centre—that the Reichstag, in passing the Navy Bill, cut out the twelve cruisers for foreign service. The case of the 'Panther' (at Haiti) has shown us how important it is to have ships of war everywhere to protect German interests. East Asia is of special importance. and we require a stronger station there. In this question of the Navy we shall always remember the powerful initiative of the Emperor William, who never loses sight of his aim,—the construction of a great German Navy." With the significant reference to the United States we shall not deal. America is quite well able to look after herself without any promptings from us, and we have no doubt that President Roosevelt and the able statesmen who occupy the chief positions in his Cabinet, Mr. Hay and Mr. Root, have taken the measure of the Kaiser and of German policy generally. We are con- cerned solely with the indications afforded of German political aims, which are, shortly, to keep us amused or engaged in some way or other till the German Navy is ready, and then to deal with us as the interests of Ger- many and the circumstances of the moment require.
Now let no one suppose that we imagine that when the Fleet is ready Germany will instantly fall upon us and attack us. That is not the plan. A very little reflection will show that such a course would constitute a capital error in world-policy. Germany will do something much cleverer than that. She will, to begin with, try to bully us into a close and dependent alliance with her. We shall be told politely by the diplomatists, and with brutal frankness in the Press and possibly in the Reichstag, that the time has come when Britain must choose whether she will be on the side of or against Germany. If we are willing to stand by the side of Germany, well and good, and we shall share Ger- many's security while lending her our strength, naval and financial, to keep the general peace.—That is always Ger- many's formula for preserving her from the loss of the tern- tory and position she has gained in the last thirty years.— II! we ref use to enter a German alliance, we shall learn that what is in store for us is German hegemony in a coalition of the rest of Europe to deprive us of the Imperial position which we have so long abused. "Your alliance or your life ! " will be the dilemma put to us. We may laugh now at such a dilemma, but if, we persist during the next six years or so in making Russia believe that we are her inevitable enemy, and the Power that always stops her expansion, and also allow France to believe that if it came to war we should be on the side of Germany and against her, we think it by no means impossible that a sudden, secret, and seductively planned offer to head an anti-British coalition coming from Germany might not be effective. Consider how the offer could be put. We have been trying for the last six years to be friendly to England. That we frankly admit. But we have found, as all the other Powers will find, that she is hopelessly selfish and treacherous,—a Power, in truth, hostile to all Europe. and stable only in her determined and slavish en- couragement of the even greater selfishness and arrogance of the United States. Therefore we propose to you that we should come to an understanding to put an end to the tyranny of the modern Carthage.' If owing to our, previous sonmolent acquiescence in Germany s policy of the agent-provocateur we had so contrived our diplomacy as to have no friend in Europe, who can .say what would be the answer to such an appeal ? Certaull-v it would make the German dilemma of "Your alliance or your life ! " by no means a pleasant one with which to be confronted. Our forecast is too pessimistic P—Great States do not, in fact, adopt such Machiavellian schemes. —Germany would -never think of thus trying to bully us into an unwelcome alliance, or else to pick a quarrel ? Such denials are easy to make ; but those who remember how Prussia first joined with Austria to coerce Den- mark, then struck Austria down, then made a friendly understan with her, next " played " with France over ding a scheme for enlarging her boundaries at the expense of Beleium, and then finally struck France down, can hardly pretend that Germany, which is still inspired by the Bismarckian tradition, would not dream of such a policy. Bismarck admittedly formed and executed a scheme for bullying Austria into an alliance with his master, and we see no reason why the Kaiser should not try the same policy in regard to England. Certainly many of the anticipatory phenomena are not wanting. While the Prussian Press and people were showing a virulent and calculated animosity towards Austria, the Prussian Court till the moment for action arrived was studiously courteous and friendly to the Dual Monarchy.
It is, we admit, useless to point out the trend of German aspirations in international affairs and not to suggest some way in which they should be met. In our view, the best method for us to pursue in the circumstances is not to adopt any direct policy of hostility towards Germany, but rather so to prepare the ground that when the German Fleet is ready, and when the time comes for putting to us the alternative of "Your alliance or your life!" Germany will find the presentation of the dilemma far too risky. How is this to be done ? By using the whole weight of our diplomatic influence during the next few years, not to get up any coalition against Germany or to form any scheme for attacking her, but simply to isolate her as she managed to isolate France in the period from 1875 to 1895. There need be no great difficulty in this, for for- tunately the Powers hostile to Germany are most anxious them for pea,e, and would not insist that if we worked with it must be for war. They would not only be content with Germany's isolation, but would much prefer it to war. The proposition, if made bond fide and with no intention to obtain material benefits for ourselves, would be one which would be welcomed throughout Europe. By means of an understanding between Britain and France, Italy might be detached from the Triple Alliance, and in all probability guarantees could be given to Austria which, if they did not break the Alliance, would sterilise it. The crux would, however, be the necessary understanding with Russia. If we could once realise that though Germany in the Persian Gulf might be a menace to our commerce, Russia's access to the open sea in that region would do us no harm, and if we could further prove that we had abandoned our jealous dread of Russia's appearance on the Bosphorus and of her entrance into the Mediterranean, we should find little difficulty in completing a diplomatic ring-fence round Germany which would curb the march of the Pan-Germanism and the world-policy very effectually. Some people may shrink from the idea of thus en- deavouring to isolate Germany as too hostile and too dangerous, and as running the risk should it fail of making a deadly enemy of Germany. Yet in reality it would, we feel sure, have a contrary effect. The Germans respect power above all things, and the moment they saw us take up a seriously watchful attitude to them their one idea would be to try to avoid our enmity. While Germany despises and does not dread our Policy she is dangerous. When she fears it the danger will have passed. To return to our metaphor, if the bulldog were to stop eating the sweet biscuits tendered him by the Imperial hand, and were instead to nip the Imperial calves hard, the preparation of the sticks and chains would be instantly and permanently laid aside, and their quondam preparers (would begin at once to look round for something that ould be more safely and easily tackled than the British bulldog. We gain nothing by letting ourselves be hypno- tised by bitsof biscuit, and we run a great danger that the biscuits will be suddenly exchanged for a stick and a chain with the order, "Come to heel quietly now, or I will make you!"
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