We notice with deep regret that the negotiations between the
Indian Government and that of Tibet have been broken off, and the Tibetan Envoy has returned to Lhassa. He absolutely refused to discuss anything, unless the suzerainty of Tibet over-Sikkim were 'first of all acknowledged. As Sikkim has been a 'feudatory State. of India for more than thirty years, and as the little Principality controls the best route through which a Chinese army could enter Bengal, this demand was inadmissible, and the two countries remain theoretically at war. It is just possible that Pekin may coerce Lhassa into reason, but it is improbable, one motive for the Tibetan stubbornness probably being the wish of the Lamas to give their over-lord a rather severe lesson. If Pekin is power- less, the Indian Government will be compelled either to garrison Sikkim and Darjeeling, a most expensive and. wearisome precaution, or to march on Lhassa at any risk of quarrelling with the Chinese. China will like the march well enough, being pleased to see the Lamas tamed at our expense ; but she is sensitive about the seclusion of Tibet, and will want to regulate the terms of the treaty of peace. The march on Lhassa is quite practicable ; but the passes are 15,000 ft. high, there is nothing whatever to get by victory, and if the Tibetans retreat, the war may drag on for any number of years.