SIR MICHAEL BEACH ON NAVAL POLICY.
SIR MICHAEL BEACH devoted the best part of his speech at Bristol last Monday to a very reasonable defence of the Government for proposing to devote the main constructive policy of next Session to the Navy Question. There is a certain timidity which we hardly understand about the way in which the supporters of the Government approach their proposal to increase the naval strength of England till it reaches the point at which we may reasonably hope to maintain our present position against any coalition which is at all likely to be brought against us. Whatever else is doubtful, we do not think that it is at all doubtful that the power of naval attack has greatly increased of late years in proportion to the power of naval defence. It will be a much harder business to defend successfully a long line of coast both here and in the Antipodes, than it will be to spring a successful attack on any Power which has a long line of coast to defend. The autumn manceuvres completely proved this, and though, of course, it tells as much in favour of Great Britain as an attacking Power as it tells against her as a self-defending Power, yet that is not altogether a sufficient reply. For, in the first place, the mischief which would be done by a successful descent on the richest British or Colonial ports would probably be far greater in magnitude than any retaliation we could inflict ; and, in the next place, we should, of course, wish to be in a position so secure that no such attack upon us would be ventured upon. The mere general impression that we should stand to lose much more than we could hope to gain in a naval war, would be most injurious to our position in the world ; and yet that is, no doubt, the impression which prevails at present. We do not suppose that anybody seriously believes that it would, be-an easy matter to land a great invading force on the soil of Great Britain. But that a great deal might be done in the way of exacting black-mail from undefended or inadequately defended British ports, and in rendering the seas unsafe for our commerce, is hardly denied; and while that is so, we must, in the present unsettled state of the Continent, run great risks of some combination that might very seriously injure us, and perhaps succeed in con- vincing our distant Colonies that the British flag is no longer the protection that it used to be.
Therefore, we hardly understand the half-apologetic tone in which the proposal to bring the Navy up to the new standard required, is usually entered upon. If the English people supposed that we should be at all likely to use our increased Navy for aggressive purposes, the case might be different. But they suppose nothing of the kind. They know very well that peace is our chief interest, but that it is also our chief interest that it should be regarded as of the greatest possible advantage to other nations to be at peace with us, and very dangerous for them to be disposed to threaten us with war if we are not inclined to lend ourselves to their designs. Almost every step in the advance of naval science has added to the difficulties of securing a widely distributed wealth more than it has added to the difficulties of pouncing suddenly down upon some few centres of that wealth ; and therefore there is nothing unreasonable in the position of the Govern- ment that relatively to the possible combination of other Naval Powers against us, our Navy is not so effective as it was, though positively it may be stronger, perhaps, than it has ever yet been. Relative strength is, of course, much more important than positive strength. A man with a sword and a revolver may be safe against two assailants who have neither the one nor the other ; but if his assailants have each of them got a sword and a revolver, he will certainly not be safe unless he can bring one or two com- panions to his side at a moment's notice in case of attack. There is no occasion, as Sir Michael Beach says, to suppose that all the navies of the world are likely to be united against us. We must make ready for emergencies which are probable, not for those which are barely possible ; and looking to the all but certain tendency which aggres- sive designs have to excite opposition, we may fairly say that England will never be the object of a unanimous or even nearly unanimous hostile coalition amongst the other Naval Powers of Europe. There must be something -very irritating indeed about our foreign policy, if any such combination were even within the limits of moral contingency. And Lord Salisbury has certainly not shown himself at all disposed to insult, or even needlessly affront, the other Powers. Still, for some combinations against us we ought to be ready, and so far ready that we could keep up our commercial relations with the most distant parts of the world, with far less serious loss in time of war than any other mercantile Power engaged in the war. We take it, that if anything is clear, it is clear that no trustworthy authority on the Navy, whether in the Government or out of it, is of opinion that we are strong enough to hold our own in this sense against any probable naval combination without a very considerable temporary increase of our expenditure, and perhaps some permanent increase, so long as the unstable equilibrium in Europe lasts. And as that is so, and nobody can suggest a mode of bringing about a general disarmament, the reasonable, the sober, nay, the most pacific course we can take is to set about increasing the armament which makes for peace, and which, if raised to adequate efficiency, will shorten any probable naval war, and restore as soon as possible, at least on the sea, the peace that had been disturbed.
Of course, the danger will be that a cry may be raised that on a national question of this End, the Government of the party at present in power cannot be trusted; - that they have an interest in diverting attention from home questions, in exciting the sensitive pride of the people, and stimulating those fears which tend to foster imperialism at the -expense of local interests. We have little doubt that Mr. Frederic Harrison, for instance, fully believes that the present Government are utterly untrustworthy on such a question, and that they exaggerate all the dangers of that disintegration which he himself so ' ardently desires. But then, we do not think that Mr. Frederic Harrison has many followers, and we are sure that the great majority both of Liberal Conservatives and of Liberal Unionists give Mr. Goschen credit for a sobriety on this subject which is certain to be all the cooler for his hearty desire to keep down expenditure and remit taxa- tion. Mr. Goschen is no doubt a profound believer in the necessity of keeping England strong. But he is as anxious to keep England strong without affronting the national pride of other peoples, and without bearing too heavily on the commerce and savings of the people of this Kingdom, as Mr. Gladstone himself ever was in the years of his most famous Budgets. Mr. Goschen at the Exchequer is, we believe, the best security we can have that the money spent upon improving our naval resources and defences will not be lavishly spent or ostentatiously spent, and will be so spent as to secure efficiency in the reforms determined on. With our responsibilities to our great Colonies and Dependencies, with our responsibilities to Egypt, with our long line of ill-defended coast, and with the rapid advance which is taking place in the navies of Russia, Germany, Italy, and France, it is the most obvious of the administra- tive duties of our Government to assure our own people in the first place, and the rest of Europe in the next place, that we are not likely to be easily cowed by hostile combinations, and that if we should be forced to defend ourselves, we shall have the means of so doing it that our enemies will very soon be brought to open negotiations for peace.
Of course, it may be asserted that this new departure in strengthening the Navy will be made the excuse for not extending the Local Government Bill to Ireland, and for not recasting the Irish Land Laws on a large scale. That is a charge which can hardly be brought against Sir Michael Beach, who both last year and this has advocated the extension of local liberties to Ireland,—in our opinion, very prematurely. But, for our own parts, we should never dream of making a new scheme of naval administration the excuse for not offering to Ireland what in the present state of Ireland would, in our opinion, do Ireland a great deal of harm, and unsettle again the comparative tranquillity which has been established there. Of course we do not apply this remark in any sense to a larger treat- ment of the agrarian question, for which we have always earnestly contended. But the experience of last Session does not entitle us to expect that any proposal really tending to the removal of popular discontent in Ireland can be introduced into the House of Commons without exciting the utmost obstruction from the Parnellite Party. In any case, the question of external safety is not the less im- portant because the Irish people are so frankly favourable to the enemies of England. The strengthening of the British Navy is forced upon us by the condition of the other navies of the world ; and it will clearly rather hasten than delay the day on which we can extend English local liberties to Ireland, that we should at once take every pre- caution against a condition of things that might tempt the enemies of Great Britain to coquet with Irish disaffection to our prejudice, and to renew the French alarms of the last century in Irish waters.
Previous page
