The hard Red line
Gerald Segal
All the signs are that the Russians are trying t° impose from off-stage a hard-line, Sovietoriented policy on the meeting of some eighteen West European Communist Party leaders tO be held in Brussels on January 26-28. The agenda of the meeting consists of the 'allowing points; the crisis of European capitalism; possible policies for the communist Parties in pursuit of social progress, democracy, national independence, peace and socialism; and the struggle for the unity of the Working class and democratic forces. The Soviets, through an article which apPeered in Pravda on December 21, and Presumably through other more private Means', seem to be trying to lay down the cil.iscussion guidelines and to formulate the mai resolution of the impending meeting. The article was signed 'V. Petrov' — clearly a cover name for the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee — and carried the title, Ihe Internationalism of the Foreign Policy of he Soviet Communist Party.' It was marked, Lts all authoritative articles are, 'Questions of theory.' The title is itself significant, internationalism being counterposed to the regionalism of the Brussels conference. In this ,..context, Petrov, as though to remind the western communist leaders of what their real Position is in the overall world picture as c„Onceived by true Marxist-Leninists, points '-`1 a Particular clause of the 1969 Declaration Of the World Communist Conference which Was signed by most western leaders. That 1.,_clanse calls for "the unity of the peoples of the 'oMmunist bloc countries, of the proletariat and the democratic forces of the capitalist c„0,1Intries and of the third world national tweration movements." In other words the western communist P,arties representing the proletariat and the 'ernocratic forces of the capitalist countries „,are Committed to a larger 'trinity' and in no tIay independent of it. Moreover just in case hey draw the wrong conclusions from clArrent talk of ddtente, Petrov emphasises that this clause was adopted because "it was cognised that ahead lay long and heavy ",ruggles against imperialism and that sharp class battles are unavoidable." 1969 — the 1:ear the clause was adopted — was reasona21Y calm in Western Europe, although the f.,-ast was in ferment in the aftermath of the 1-_zechoslovakian crisis of the previous year. 1u74 is five years 'ahead' and a pretty sharp class battle seems to be raging in Britain; if an !,onomic crisis should envelop the entire stern half of the continent, would this be L'lle Year for the communist parties to launch widespread strike action with a view to hanging, in Mick McGarvey's words, the Social order?
, Petrov does not tackle this question directly Fut he does lay down a more general and
„nerd-line analysis of current trends and in `11cates tough political policies. He warns that Proletarian internationalism which is binding ,t1Pon the western communists allows of no viations and, in particular, "no defence of bourgeois yoke of any kind is acceptable." "'IS Presumably must be interpreted as a Ziarning that any alliances for example of the nd made by the French communist leader l'eorge Marchais with Francois Mitterand of the Socialist Party (the third point on the tgenda) must be based unreservedly on nierxist-Leninism, and that the final aim is the otal transformation of current western sys`erns.
Moreover Petrov's analysis of the role of The EEC will come as a surprise to many of the Brussels functionaries who, for the past year, have been looking forward to being 'recognised' by the USSR and the other communist states. The EEC is now ranked with NATO its a category of aggressive imperialist military blocs and unions; both have been created "by the capitalist monopolies of the West including the international monopolies" and their basic aim is to undermine the international unity of the above mentioned 'trinity' (communist bloc, western proletariat and third world liberation movements).
In effect the Soviet communist leadership is calling upon the western communist leaders to come out with a clear anti-EEC and antiNATO policy. A political justification is given. In language reminiscent of attacks by Stalin's henchmen on the inchoate western defence and economic arrangements of the late 'forties, the concepts 'Europe' and 'Atlantic' are condemned as bourgeois-nationalist and cosmopolitan, "serving to defend an unjust social order, private capitalist ownership, the exploitation of the workers, national oppression and inequality."
It is difficult to believe that such a crude analysis could be acceptable as it stands to Western European communist leaders at the present time. The British Communist Party has already adopted an anti-EEC platform but would the Italian and Irish communist leaders, knowing what their peoples stand to gain from EEC regional policies dare harangue a crowd in Dublin or Naples on anti-EEC lines? it is true that Georges Marchais, the French communist leader, has recently issued a forceful statement condemning what he calls the "supernationalism" inherent in some EEC policies, but would he dare call for the abandonment of the Common Agricultural Policy? And would talk of "national oppression and inequality" really meet with much response among any of the European electorates, on the lines for example of the 'antiCoca-Cola imperialism' campaigns of 1947-48? It seems unlikely.
The Soviets would also like the Brussels conference to condemn the "Maoist renegades" who allegedly are -allied with the most reactionary circles in the imperialist camp—hawks like Senator Jackson, neo-fascists such as Franz Josef Strauss and the Chilean military junta."
A more detailed ideological case against the Chinese, taken from the Bulgarian journal,
Pcirty Life, was published in Pravda on January 2. The Chinese are now accused of
revisionism on the grounds that they have, through the Maoist doctrine, "revised the Leninist organisational principles and in particular democratic centralism upon which communist parties should be based."
If the Brussels conference does lead up to a new world conference of Communist parties which the Russians have called for but the British, Italian and Dutch 'parties are said to be strongly resisting, then revisionism would presumably be the charge on which to seek to cut off China completely from all other communist parties. Which is odd, in that revisionism is normally associated with the 'liberal' experiments of Yugoslavia and of 1968 Czechoslovakia.
From the Soviet point of view if the Chinese could be isolated in this way it would serve a double purpose. First, it would deter the western parties such as the Italian from indulging their own version of revisionism and even from attempting to re-export back to Eastern Europe. Second, and perhaps more important, it would give the Soviets allies in undermining the current Chinese leadership and could, conceivably, depending upon the overall European situation, prevent the development of long term political, economic and technological contacts between Europe and China. The difficulty will lie in imposing what amounts to Stalinist-like control over the West European parties. Come this March the old dictator will have been dead twentyone years.
Previous page
