Sir Rennell Rodd, in his introduction to Mr. Villari's able
study of The War on the Italian Front (Cobden-Sanderscin, 18s.) says very truly that this is the first complete picture of . the War in Italy as a whole. It is somewhat unduly. com- pressed, and its outline maps, though supplemented by some remarkable photographs of the Alpine front high i up in the snow, do not enable the reader to visualize the long and extremely difficult mountain barrier which the Italians attacked with astounding gallantry and at the cost of stu- pendous losses. But within his limits of space Mr. Villari has done extremely well. He reminds us that Italy voluntarily joined the Allies, that she mobilized five-and a quarter million men, or fourteen and a half per cent. of her population—a higher percentage than any other Ally except France—and that her loss of 680,000 men killed in action was similarly the highest in proportion, except again that of France. In the first two years the Italian Armies had a series of hard-won victories. The German-Austrian attack at Caporetto in October, 1917, which led to the collapse of the Eastern front, succeeded, in the author's view, as much by reason of over- confidence on the part of the commander on the upper Isonzo as through traitorous propaganda and war-weariness in the rank and file. Mr. Villari points out that the French mutinies earlier in the year and the Bolshevik movement in Russia had a considerable effect in Italy. After Caporetto the Armies and the nation pulled themselves together. It is quite true, as Mr. Villari says, that the Italians in retreat held the Piave p line and the Grappa by their own efforts, and that the Allied corps sent to Italy were few in number and remained in reserve until later. His account of the desperate fighting of May-June, 1918, and of the final victory in October, should correct many misapprehensions. The Austro-Hungarian Army was loyal to the end, when employed against Italy, and had to be defeated. Its overthrow at Vittorio Veneto finished Austria and enabled the Allies to plan the invasion of Germany from the south. The effect of this threat on the armistice negotia- tions was immediate and potent, though it is often ignored by English and French writers.
Previous page
