The World's Verdict at Geneva
THE handling of the Sino-Japanese dispute by the League of Nations Assembly, as distinct from the Council, which was dealing with the affair till March 3rd, has a historical importance, if nothing else, for this is the first time in the League's existence that the Assembly has ever had a dispute before it. The wisdom of referring the Far Eastern conflict from the smaller body to the larger seemed questionable, but the result so far has more than justified the action taken by the Chinese delegate, Dr. Yen, in demanding that it be so referred. The Assembly has been as united as the Council, it has spoken with a more decided voice, and the resolution it adopted—which has since received the warm official approval of the State Department at Washington—is stronger than anything that has emanated from the Council. And the authority behind it is not that of twelve States, but of forty-five, the two disputants being excluded in either case. Such a concentration of the world's opinion is not negligible. With America con- curring and Russia not dissenting the world may be said to have spoken.
Of course, the Sino-Japanese question is not settled yet. Local details regarding the Japanese withdrawal have to be decided, and till the withdrawal has been actually carried out there is always the danger that fighting may break out afresh. The question of compensation may have to be discussed. The situation created in Man- churia with the support of Japan, as theJapanese delegate frankly admitted at the League Council table, will have to be considered in the light of the principle laid down by Mr. Stinson, and since endorsed by the League Council and Assembly, that changes effected by methods contrary to the Covenant and the Pact of Paris cannot be recog- nized. (Sir John Simon has already in the House of Commons dismissed any idea of according recognition to the new Manchurian Republic at present.) All these questions still remain open, and for that reason the Assembly has set a strong committee to work and will itself meet again not later than May 1st. By that time the Lytton Commission, which is now at Shanghai, may. have sent in a first report. Meanwhile, the Assembly, by a unanimous vote, China and Japan abstaining, has gone as near to condemning Japan as an aggressor as is possible without using the actual words ; has, as already Men- tioned, laid it down that no recognition can be given to changes effected in violation of the Covenant ; has declared itself seized of the Manchurian as well as of the Shanghai question ; and has affirmed (in spite of Japanese objections, significant in themselves) that it is contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the settlement of a dispute should be sought under the stress of military pres- sure on the part of either disputant. The cessation of hostilities which synchronised with the first introduction of the resolution was, no doubt in part, the outcome of other contributory causes. One was the steady move- ment of world opinion against Japan. Another was the unexpectedly effective resistance of the Chinese, and the consequent cost to the assailants in life and money. Another was the fact that the Japanese, through an attack. delivered just when a truce was believed to have been con- cluded, had reached their ostensible objective. The net result is that hostilities at Shanghai have ceased, and there is fair reason for hoping they will not be renewed.
But important as the Sino-Japanese crisis is, more im- portant still is the question of the capacity of the League of Nations to handle such a crisis,for on that the League's whole future, or a great part of it, may hang. It is too soon to pronounce a verdict on that yet, but this at least
may be said, that the Assembly has done a good dcal to dispel the doubts the more hesitant methods of the Council had inspired. To have lent any emintenanee to the inadmissible claim of Japan to waive the proVis. ions of the Covenant at will for her own benefit, to have given colour to the charge that the League could"be firm with States of the calibre of Greece and Bulgaria, limit nerve- less when a Great Power was concerned, to-have allowed a State attacked to appeal for support and protection in vain, would have impaired gravely, though doubtles,, not irreparably, the League's power to discharge the duty laid on it in the first line of the Covenant"to achieve international peace and security." The end, it must be repeated, is not yet. The time is probably still distant when it will be possible to look back 'on the Sino- Japanese conflict as a closed episode and in full objectivity pass judgement on the record not only of the disputants but of the League. Before then new crises may have to be faced. The question of definite League action may have still to be considered. If so, it is well that the responsibility should be shouldered squarely by the several members of the Assembly as a whole, not merely (in the first instance) by the handful who compose the Council.
It would be idle to pretend that the Assembly's action has disposed, on every point, of the criticism directed at the Council while the matter was in its hands. If it is the case that Japan was the aggressor, she -assumed that role at Shanghai as early, at least, as January 28th, and it was in resistance to such aggression that thousands of Chinese were killed, tens of thousands wounded, and perhaps a million rendered homeless, while • the Council was in session. The time for the League to assert itself was then, not six weeks later. What is done is done now, and even the Chinese are disposed to be -satisfied with a cessation of hostilities and a settlement- of the whole affair on equitable terms. But it is essential to know whether if the same situation arose again the League would act in the same way or differently. Sonic critics have suggested that since Japan would not only resent -but resist any interference- with her projects, Great Britain and the whole League can do nothing but sit still and watch her carry out her pro- gramme to any length she chooses. That means, of course, the end of the League as a guardian of international order and reversion to the old reign of force, with eVeryone arming to the utmost and the weakest going inevitably to the wall.
That, at least, has been avoided. The League, tluough its Assembly, has spoken with decision. It has refused to listen to the weak plea that a nation most not- be con- demned, because that would increase the difficulty of conciliation. There are times when nations deserving con- demnation must receive it, and be treated accordingly. In this case, as soon as Japan refused arbitration and attacked, all League States ought at least to have pro- hibited the export of munitions to her. • The Assembly, moreover, by its words and its vote, has disposed strikingly of the common criticism that even so small- a body. as the Council would never achieve unanimity on the question of aggression. The forty-five Assembly States reached immediate agreement on that. What is equally-important. the difficulty of effective co-operation between Geneva and Washington in case of need has been shown to be imaginary. That is immensely reassuring. The League -has not great reason- to look back on the past five months with satisfaction, but thanks largely to the -Assembly, it can face the future with new confidence..